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Chapter 1
Introduction
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism (e.g., Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972), from a
normative point of view, deals with the question of how to optimally design the vertical
structure of state. Two issues lie at the heart of this line of research, namely the assignment
of functions to different levels of government and the choice of adequate fiscal instruments
(e.g., Oates, 1999). While macroeconomic stabilisation, income redistribution and the
provision of national public goods (like defense) typically constitute central government
functions, Oates’s famous decentralisation theorem suggests that, in the absence of cost
savings potential from centralised provision and fiscal externalities, decentralised provision
of public goods with localised effects should be welfare enhancing.1 The basic argument is
that local governments are better able to take into account local differences in preferences
and costs. In order to carry out their functions, governments at the different levels of state
will generally feature tax and debt instruments. Moreover, federal states are typically
characterised by systems of intergovernmental grants (e.g., Boadway, 2004).
The design of fiscal federalism as well as the degree of fiscal decentralisation varies
significantly across industrialised countries. This can be seen in figure 1.1 which shows
subnational revenue and expenditure shares for a sample of OECD countries in the year
2005. Note that the share of subnational tax revenues lies between approximately 1% and
52% while the spending share varies from 8% to some 64%. Germany is characterised by
relatively high subnational revenue and expenditure shares of 50% and 59%, respectively.2
Although, a significant heterogeneity is observed among OECD countries regarding the
degree of fiscal decentralisation, a common pattern can be identified in the gap between
subnational spending and revenues. A closer inspection of figure 1.1 shows that Sweden
1See Oates, 1972.
2Note that, while simple subnational revenue and spending shares are widely used as measures for the
degree of fiscal decentralisation , such indicators can hardly capture the full complexity of the institutional
framework in countries characterised by a pronounced fiscal federalism. In this context, Stegarescu (2005)
suggests alternative measures for the degree of revenue decentralisation which focus on the concept of
autonomous tax revenue. For Germany, for example, this study reports a significantly lower level of tax
revenue decentralisation which lies below 10% of overall tax receipts.
1
2is the only country in our sample of industrialised countries displaying a subnational tax
revenue share exceeding the expenditure share. Most other countries are characterised by
significant ”fiscal gaps” which according to a recent OECD study3 have widened in the
last decade, reflecting the tendency to assign a wider range of spending responsibilities to
subcentral layers of government. At the same time, local taxing powers have been scaled
back in many countries, suggesting an increased dependency of lower level governments
on central government resources, in particular via intergovernmental grant schemes.
Figure 1.1: Decentralisation ratios in OECD countries, 2005
CAN
DNK
DEU
ESP
SWE
USA
40
50
60
al
 re
ve
nu
e 
sh
ar
e 
in
 %
AUT
BEL
CZE
FIN
FRA
GRE IRL
ITA
LUX NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
UK
0
10
20
30
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
su
bn
at
io
na
subnational expenditure share in %
Source: National Accounts of OECD Countries
In addition, most federal countries with multiple levels of government such as Australia,
Canada, Germany or Switzerland have installed some redistributive transfer system with
the aim of reducing regional or local differences in revenue raising capacity or public ser-
vice cost. Such fiscal equalisation schemes tend to be fairly heterogenous across countries
as they are designed according to the specific architecture of fiscal federalism, e.g. the
degree of fiscal autonomy at the subnational level as well as the responsibilities and fis-
cal resources assigned to lower levels of government (e.g., Blo¨chinger, Merk, Charbit, and
Mizell, 2007). However, a common feature of redistributive intergovernmental transfer sys-
tems is the function of correcting for possible imbalances resulting from subcentral fiscal
autonomy. In this context, a number of contributions have addressed the issue of verti-
cal fiscal imbalance in a federation on the basis of normative theoretical frameworks (e.g.
Dahlby and Wilson, 1994; Dahlby, 1996), suggesting that the pure accounting definition
3See Blo¨chliger and King (2006).
3of a fiscal gap, i.e. the difference between subnational revenue and spending shares, lacks
any justification from public finance theory.4 From an allocative efficiency point of view, a
federation should rather be in a state of fiscal balance if the marginal cost of raising public
funds are equalised across all levels of governments. In other words, raising additional tax
revenues should induce an equal deadweight loss for all levels of government. If this was
not the case, a shift of taxation responsibilities within the federation would be welfare
improving. One reason why, in the absence of intergovernmental grants, marginal cost of
public funds might well be different between levels of government, is that most tax bases
are more mobile at the subnational level. Thus, the mobility of economic units is of major
concern when discussing the optimal design of federal systems. If local governments, for
example, make use of taxes that are not associated with localised public goods and ser-
vices, taxation will likely cause allocative distortions as households and firms are able to
relocate within the federation in order to obtain a more favorable tax treatment. In this
context, a seminal contribution by Gordon (1983) uses an optimal taxation framework
and systematically analyses the various distortions resulting from local governments not
taking into account the external effects of their fiscal policy decisions. Furthermore, a
broad body of literature has extensively dealt with the topic of local tax competition for
mobile tax bases (especially capital). Early contributions in this area include Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) which point to inefficient low levels of local taxa-
tion and public good provision if policymakers do not take into account fiscal externalities
arising from their tax policies.5 Besides the aspect of tax competition for mobile tax bases,
the theoretical literature on fiscal competition has pointed to the role of public inputs such
as infrastructure spending as a means to attract private investment early on, focusing on
the problem of overprovision. Taylor (1992) models a race between jurisdictions which
compete for capital by building infrastructure more rapidly than their neighbors. Bu-
covetsky (2005) argues that public inputs, by attracting mobile factors, may create scale
economies, and that governments tend to invest too much when choosing their level of
spending on infrastructure. The literature has also addressed the link between taxes and
public inputs in games of fiscal competition. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) deal with
local jurisdictions which compete for a mobile capital tax base by setting the tax rate and
by providing a public input to production. Keen and Marchand (1997) extend the analy-
sis, showing that in the presence of a productivity-enhancing public good the composition
of local public spending tends to be systematically biased towards a relative overprovision
of public inputs compared to public goods which are consumed directly by residents.
While systems of intergovernmental grants can serve a number of objectives within a
federal system such as redistribution or equity, an important feature in the context of fis-
4See Dahlby (2008) for an overview.
5See Haufler (2001) for a comprehensive treatment of theories and evidence related to tax competition
in an international context.
4cal competition for mobile tax bases is the internalisation of interregional spill-overs (e.g.,
Boadway, 2004). A number of theoretical studies (e.g., Smart, 1998; Koethenbuerger,
2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) have recently argued that capacity-based equalisa-
tion transfers may act as corrective devices for alleviating inefficiencies in local public
finances arising from capital tax competition. If the design of the equalisation mechanism
is such that transfers are inversely related to a jurisdiction’s tax base it tends to internalise
fiscal externalities arising from tax competition, thereby promoting local tax effort and
inducing governments to provide a higher level of local public goods.6 Recent empirical
analyses support the existence of such incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on
local tax policies. Based on a broad sample of municipalities in the German state of
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Buettner (2006) shows that, in line with theoretical expectations, a
higher degree of redistribution within the local equalisation system induces municipalities
to increase their tax effort. Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007) examine a natural
experiment in the German State of Lower Saxony and find that a change in the equalisa-
tion formula which was introduced in 1999 exerted a significant impact on municipalities’
tax policy.
This book builds on the above mentioned literature on fiscal competition and the impact
of intergovernmental transfers. It aims to provide further insights into the functioning
of federal systems and, in particular, the incentive effects arising from fiscal equalisation
schemes. The focus thereby lies on fiscal federalism in Germany. On the basis of a multi-
level government framework, chapter 2 provides a theoretical analysis of the conditions
under which local grant systems enforced by an upper-level government will enhance effi-
ciency of local public finances. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policy examines
the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with
the efficiency consequences of fiscal competition when governments, in addition to a purely
consumptive public good, provide a public input to production, which, besides local tax
policy, serves as an alternative policy instrument to attract local investment. Here, the
focus lies on the question how the local spending mix is affected if local decision makers
compete for a mobile capital tax base via the provision of a productivity-enhancing public
good and whether, similar to the case of pure tax competition, the implementation of a
capacity-based fiscal equalisation system improves the efficiency of local public finances.
The theoretical analysis presented in 3, in a first step, deals with the case of pure expen-
diture competition. The implications from this analysis are then tested empirically on the
basis of a panel of German states. In a next step, the theoretical analysis is broadened
in chapter 4 by allowing for bi-dimensional competition in taxes and public inputs. A
subsequent empirical analysis uses a rich panal dataset of municipalities in the German
state of Baden-Wuerttemberg to test whether local fiscal equalisation exerts a significant
6See section 1.2 for further details.
1.1. Fiscal Federalism in Germany 5
incentive effect on local spending policies. Finally, Chapter 5 presents a framework of
interregional policy interaction which is used to derive general policy reaction functions
of local governments from a model of tax and public input competition. An empirical
counterpart of the system of fiscal reaction functions is then estimated using data from a
large sample of German municipalities, thereby providing evidence on fiscal competition
in a model treating taxes and spending on infrastructure as jointly determined endogenous
variables.
Before turning to the analytical chapters of this book, we will first give an overview of
the institutional framework characterising German fiscal federalism in section 1.1. Sub-
sequently, section 1.2 deals with the main theoretical and empirical contributions in the
literature on the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on local tax policies and
provides an intuitive illustration of the mechanisms at work. Finally, the main results of
this book are summarised and classified within the existing literature in section 1.3.
1.1 Fiscal Federalism in Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany constitutes a multi-tier federal state. It comprises the
federal level (Bund), the 16 independent states (La¨nder) and the municipalities (Gemein-
den), which according to the constitutional rules on public finances (Art. 104 - 115 of
the Grundgesetz (GG) or German basic law) are part of the La¨nder. Unless otherwise
stated, Article 30 of the Grundgesetz generally assigns the fulfillment of public functions
to the La¨nder. Notwithstanding, the legislative competence has largely been displaced to
the federal level which besides its exclusive legislation (Art. 71, 73, 105 para.1 GG) has
made extensive use of the so called ”rival” legal competence of the Bund (Art. 72, 74,
105 para.2 GG). In the course of the ”federalism reform 2006” legislative competencies
have been re-circumscribed leading to a strengthening of federal legislative competencies
in areas of national relevance while fields of regulation with a regional focus have been
assigned to the La¨nder. For the sake of legislative and economic unity, the Bund has, in
particular, realised its ”rival” legislative competence in the range of taxation. Therefore,
the tax autonomy of the states and their municipalities is largely limited to regional excise
taxes. However, municipalities have tax autonomy with respect to property as well as
business tax (Grund- und Gewerbesteuer) and, in the course of the ”federalism reform
2006”, the states have gained the authority to set the tax rate with regard to the property
acquisition tax (Grunderwerbsteuer).
While legal competencies are predominantly concentrated at the federal level, the
state governments according to Art. 50 GG participate in the legislation process via the
Bundesrat. In particular, federal legislative proposals require authorised approval by the
La¨nder if they relate to taxes whose revenues partly or entirely accrue to the states or their
1.1. Fiscal Federalism in Germany 6
municipalities.7 Moreover, legal and administrative execution is predominantly incumbent
on the German states. With respect to tax administration, according to Art. 108 para. 1
GG, the Bund is merely responsible in the fields of custom duties, fiscal monopolies and
excise taxes.
The German Tax and Fiscal Equalisation System
According to Art. 106 para.3 GG, both the federal as well as the state level (incl. mu-
nicipalities) are entitled to adequate fiscal resources in order to cover their necessary
expenditures. Moreover, revenue requirements are to be coordinated to ensure uniform
living conditions within the German federation. Tax revenues are therefore distributed
vertically among the different levels of state (Art. 106 GG in connection with para.1 of
the fiscal equalisation law (FAG)) and horizontally among the La¨nder via the state fiscal
equalisation system (Art. 107 GG in connection with para.2 FAG). In the latter case,
state level tax revenues are redistributed in order to equalise per capita tax revenue differ-
ences among the states. Remaining imbalances are then further reduced by supplementary
federal grants (Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen). At the local level, revenue redistribution
takes place on the basis of municipal fiscal equalisation systems which are administrated
by the La¨nder and incorporate vertical and horizontal transfers. In the following, the
structure of the German tax and fiscal equalisation system is described in more detail.
Vertical Tax Distribution
The German basic law, according to Art. 106, assigns a number of tax categories exclu-
sively to different levels of state. For the federal level this includes the petroleum tax,
most of the excise taxes as well as the insurance tax. The La¨nder receive the revenues
from the property and inheritance tax and some excise taxes while the municipalities ob-
tain the land and business tax revenues as well as the receipts from local excise taxes.
Note that the Grundgesetz entitles the municipalities to autonomously set the rates of the
land and business tax. On the other hand, the Grundgesetz defines several major taxes
as so called ”joint taxes” (Gemeinschaftssteuern) which are distributed among the Bund,
the La¨nder and, to a degree, the municipalities. These make up approximately 70% of
overall tax revenues and include the income tax (Einkommenssteuer), the interest rebate
tax (Zinsabschlagsteuer), the corporate tax (Ko¨rperschaftssteuer) and the value-added
tax (Umsatzsteuer).
State Fiscal Equalisation
Besides the constitutionally mandated revenue sharing of the ”joint taxes”, a variety
of intergovernmental grants lead to the fact that public finances at the different lev-
7See section 1.1 for details on the vertical distribution of taxes in Germany.
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els of state are strongly interlinked. The German system of fiscal equalisation (Bun-
desstaatlicher Finanzausgleich) includes both vertical and horizontal transfers. It mainly
builds on two pillars, the state fiscal equalisation system (La¨nderfinanzausgleich im en-
geren Sinne), which contains vertical and horizontal elements, and special requirement
transfers (Sonderbedarfs-Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen) to the states. Due to the infras-
tructural backlog after reunification, these special requirement transfers to a large extent
at present flow from the federal level to the eastern German states . Within the first pillar
states with a below average fiscal capacity receive horizontal transfers from fiscally strong
states. Remaining fiscal capacity differences are then further reduced by federal transfers
(Fehlbetrags-Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen). All transfers within the German system of
fiscal equalisation are regulated by law (FAG - Finanzausgleichsgesetz ).
In the following, we will describe the Germen state fiscal equalisation system (SFES)
in more detail and, with regard to the empirical analyses presented in chapters 2 and 3 of
this book, highlight its basic functioning on the basis of a stylised model.8 A particular
focus will lie on the derivation of so called state-specific marginal contribution rates to the
SFES, which quantify to which extent marginal revenue increases in a given state reduce
its transfers received from, or in the case of fiscally strong states, raise the contributions to
the system. The marginal contribution rate constitutes a key parameter when analysing
the incentive effects of the German state fiscal equalisation as it captures the treatment
of individual states within the redistributive grant system.
Generally, the treatment of each state within the equalisation scheme depends on its
ratio of fiscal capacity (Finanzkraftmesszahl) to fiscal need (Ausgleichsmesszahl). We will
refer to this ratio as the relative fiscal capacity. A state’s fiscal capacity (ti) is determined
by summing up its revenues from the different tax types while the respective fiscal need
(ni) is basically calculated by multiplying average per capita tax revenues in the federation
with each state’s population number. Formally
ni =
∑
j tj
P
pi,
where P represents the overall population while pi denotes the population in state i. In
principle the system of fiscal equalisation assumes equal fiscal requirements per inhabitant.
However, in order to account for agglomeration costs, the problem of commuting (while
decomposing taxes according to the residence principle) and the fact that metropolitan
areas provide public goods of supra-regional importance the fiscal equalisation law assigns a
8In 2005, a reform of the German system of state fiscal equalisation came into effect which aimed
at improving the incentives the German states face within the system by linearising the scheme and
introducing a so called premium model. Note that, the empirical analyses presented in chapters 2 and 3 of
this book are based on an institutional database comprising data prior to this reform. However, the basic
functioning of state level fiscal equalisation has in principal not changed since the implementation of the
system in 1970.
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higher fiscal need to the city-states Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin. Moreover, inhabitants
in the sparsely populated eastern states receive a higher weight when calculating fiscal
need.
States with a fiscal capacity below fiscal need receive transfers, while states with a
fiscal capacity exceeding fiscal need contribute to the system.
As already mentioned, the German SFES is comprised of three different stages:
• VAT Equalisation (Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich)
• Fiscal Equalisation in the narrow sense (Finanzausgleich im engeren Sinne)
• Federal Grants (Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen)
VAT Equalisation In the first stage of the SFES up to 25 % of the overall state VAT
revenues are used to compensate for fiscal capacity differences between the La¨nder. States
with a per capita fiscal capacity below 92% of the average receive transfers in the course
of VAT equalisation.9 These states, which are labelled as low capacity states in stage one
of the fiscal equalisation scheme, receive transfers
zi1 =
(
0.92
∑
j tj1
P
− ti
pi
)
pi, j = 1, ..., n.
Note that capacity differences below the threshold level are fully equalised. On the other
hand, states with a per capita fiscal capacity above 92% of the average (high capacity
states) will implicitly contribute to the system as transfers to fiscally weak states will
reduce their own VAT revenues. These contributions of high cpacity states equal
ci1 =
∑
k zk1∑
m pm
pi, k = 1, ...,m; l = 1, ..., (m− n).
Note that k indexes low capacity states whereas l indexes high capacity states so that the
number of contributors equals m − n, i.e. the number of low capacity states minus the
overall number of states. Now, in order to see how a marginal increase in revenues will
affect transfers received and contributions made in stage one of the equalisation scheme,
we can differentiate zi1 and ci1 with respect to ti. This yields
∂zi1
∂ti
= 0.92
pi
P
− 1 < 0
and
∂ci1
∂ti
=
0.92m∑
l pl
pi
P
> 0.
9Note that in the VAT equalisation stage only state-specific revenues are taken into account. In stage
two and three fiscal capacity will also include a fraction of the municipal tax revenues as well as VAT
revenues (after equalisation).
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For a low capacity state, we observe two counteracting effects. First, as the degree of
capacity equalisation below the 92% threshold level approaches 100%, the direct effect
will be a complete offsetting of revenue increases through a reduction of transfers in stage
one of the system. However, a secondary effect arises as the increase in tax revenues in
a low capacity state will positively affect average fiscal capacity and therefore also raise
its own fiscal need ni. Note that this secondary effect, which partly offsets the transfer
reduction effect, will become more important as the relative size of the transfer dependent
state grows. Tax revenue increases in high capacity states will also be redistributed within
stage one of the equalisation system as, again, marginal capacity increases will positively
affect average fiscal capacity and therefore increase transfers to low capacity states. The
corresponding rise in contributions will positively depend on the relative population size.
Horizontal Fiscal Equalisation In the second stage of the SFES, fiscal capacity dif-
ferences which remain after VAT equalisation are further reduced. Now, states with a
relative fiscal capacity10 below unity (low capacity states) receive transfers
zi2 = γi (ni − ti) , γi = γ( ti
ni
), γ′i < 0
while high capacity states, i.e. states where the fiscal capacity exceeds fiscal need, con-
tribute
ci2 = δi (ti − ni) , δi = δ( ti
ni
), δ′i > 0.
Note that, for low capacity states, the gap between fiscal need and capacity is reduced
according to an equalisation rate γi which negatively depends on relative fiscal capacity.
On the other hand, high capacity states contribute to the system according to a contri-
bution rate δi which increases with relative fiscal capacity. Again, the comparative static
effects of variations in the taxing capacity highlight the treatment of transfer dependent
and contributing states within stage two of the equalisation scheme:
∂zi2
∂ti
= γ′i
(
ni − ti piP
n2i
)
(ni − ti) + γi
(pi
P
− 1
)
< 0
∂ci2
∂ti
= δ′i
(
ni − ti piP
n2i
)
(ti − ni) + δi
(
1− pi
P
)
> 0
The first derivative shows that for a low capacity state a marginal increase in tax revenues
will trigger two effects. First, the corresponding increase in its relative fiscal capacity
will negatively affect its equalisation rate which reduces transfers received. Moreover, the
gap between fiscal need and capacity is diminished which in addition lowers the amount
of transfers in the horizontal equalisation stage. Note that, similar to the case of VAT
10Note that in stage two also VAT revenues as well as revenues from municipal taxes are taken into
account when determining ti and ni.
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equalisation, the direct effect of an increase in the fiscal capacity is partly offset due to the
fact that average fiscal capacity increases rises. Therefore, the transfer reduction rate of
a low fiscal capacity state will decrease as its relative poulation size increases. Turning to
high capacity states, a marginal increase in tax revenues positively affects contributions
made in stage two. This is due to the fact that on the one hand a higher relative fiscal
capacity raises the contribution rate δi. On the other hand, higher tax revenues increase
the excess of fiscal capacity over fiscal need which adds to the positive impact of a marginal
increase in the fiscal capacity on contributions made to the transfer system. Note that
the relative population size also matters for high capacity states. As in the case of low
capacity states, an increase in the population share will reduce the overall impact of a
marginal tax revenue increase.
Federal grants Finally, in the case where a state‘s relative fiscal capacity lies below
0.995 after stages one and two of the equalisation scheme it will receive additional transfers
from the federal level, formally
zi3 = 0.775 [0.995ni − ti] = 0.771ni − 0.775ti.
Differentiating with respect to fiscal capacity yields
∂zi3
∂ti
= 0.771
pi
P
− 0.775 < 0.
This indicates that an increase in tax revenues of a low capacity state will lead to a
decrease in grants received from the federal government. Similar to stages one and two,
the negative impact of a marginal increase in the fiscal capacity is alleviated as the relative
population increases.
Overall, the above comparative static analysis suggests that larger states, irrespective
of being characterised as low or high capacity states, face a more preferential treatment
within the state fiscal equalisation system as efforts to generate further tax revenues are
”punished” to a lesser degree via transfer reductions or increased contribution payments.
Marginal Contribution Rates Finally, in order to fully capture the treatment a state
faces within the SFES in a single indicator, we calculate so called marginal contribution
rates. These are computed by summing up the partial effects of marginal increases in
fiscal capacity in the different stages of the equalisation system and relating this sum to
the absolute change in tax revenues.
For low capacity states the marginal contribution rate is computed as
ϑlci =
|∂zi1∂ti |+ |
∂zi2
∂ti
|+ |∂zi3∂ti |
dti
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Table 1.1: Overview: State Fiscal Equalisation 2003
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal need e per capita 2296 284 2156 2886
Fiscal capacity e per capita 2160 409 1823 3403
Relative fiscal capacity ratio .944 .149 68.0 120
Transfer dependent (rel. f. c. < 0.92) binary .500 .516 0 1
Transfer dependent (rel. f. c. < 1.00) binary .188 .403 0 1
Contributor (rel. f. c. > 1) binary .313 .479 0 1
Fiscal equalisation transfers (capacity based) e per capita 95.5 291 -379 778
Federal transfers (capacity based) e per capita 62.9 50.5 0 130
Special requirement transfers e per capita 325 342 0 869
Marginal contribution rate in % 83.4 14.2 46.3 97.8
Source: ”Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung des Finanzausgleichsgesetzes 2003” and own calculations.
while for high capacity states as
ϑhci =
∂ci1
∂ti
+ ∂ci2∂ti
dti
.
In order to compute the empirical counterparts of these state-specific marginal contri-
bution rates and thereby capture the incentives the German states face within the fiscal
equalisation system, we employ a simulation program which takes into account the full set
of equalisation rules defined by law. This enables us to compute various parameters of the
SFES, in particular transfers received, contributions made as well as marginal contribution
rates. The calculations are based on population and tax data for the German states which
are officially published on a yearly basis in the ”Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung des
Finanzausgleichsgesetzes” and are available from 1970 onwards when the German SFES
was put in place. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the most important parameters of the
German state fiscal equalisation system for the fiscal year 2003.
For the year 2003, 1.1 shows that on average fiscal need amounted to around 2300
e per capita while fiscal capacity averaged 2160 e . Therefore, the relative fiscal capac-
ity, i.e. the ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need stood at around 0.94, indicating that
on average states received transfers from the equalisation scheme. More concretely, in
2003, 9 out of 16 German La¨nder were characterised by a relative fiscal capacity below
92% and therefore were eligible for transfers in stage one (Erga¨nzungsanteile). Due to
a relative fiscal capacity below unity, eleven states received horizontal transfers in stage
two of the system while, on the other hand, five states contributed to the equalisation
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scheme. The average amount of capacity based fiscal equalisation transfers amounted to
around 96.6 e per capita in 2003 while federal transfers were somewhat lower, i.e. approx-
imately 63 e per capita. The marginal contribution rate, i.e. the rate at which additional
tax revenues are reduced via lower transfers received from or higher contribution to the
equalisation system, stood at 83.4% in 2003, indicating that, on average, only around 17
cent of an additional Euro tax revenues remained in the state budget.11 Note that states
with a fiscal capacity below 92% of the average face particularly high transfer reduction
rates (close to 100%) due to the equalisation rate of 100% in stage one of the equalisation
scheme (Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich). Therefore, these states have hardly any incentives
to generate further tax revenues. On the other hand, states which are relatively large in
terms of their population (and fiscally strong) are characterised by relatively low marginal
contribution rates as revenue increases strongly affect average taxing capacity within the
federation, which partly offsets the increases in the contribution rate.
Municipal Fiscal Equalisation
Besides horizontal and vertical equalisation at the state level, German fiscal federalism also
features substantial revenue redistribution at the municipal level. Each state in Germany
administers a municipal fiscal equalisation system according to corresponding regulations
defined in the fiscal equalisation law (FAG). In principal, municipal fiscal equalisation has
two objectives, namely to provide municipalities with additional revenues in order to fulfill
their self-administered spending responsibilities (”vertical equalisation”) and to equalise
excessive fiscal capacity differences among municipalities (”horizontal equalisation”). Each
state in Germany administers its own municipal equalisation system and institutional
differences occur but the basic structure is similar across states. Here, in view of the
empirical analyses presented in chapters 4 - 5, we focus on the equalisation scheme in the
major German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
In principle, fiscal capacity equalisation is achieved by reducing the difference between
what is defined by law as fiscal need12 and a municipality‘s fiscal capacity13. According to
their relative fiscal capacity, i.e. the ratio of fiscal need to fiscal capacity, local jurisdictions
are categorised as having ”low” (< 60%), ”medium” (> 60% and < 100%) or ”high” (>
100%) fiscal capacity. The latter group does not receive any transfers while municipalities
with relative fiscal capacity smaller than 100% receive formula-based fiscal equalisation
grants. In addition, municipalities which are characterised by a ”low” fiscal capacity
receive supplementary transfers to ensure a relative fiscal capacity of at least 60%. Fiscal
11Note that, for practical reasons, when calculating marginal contribution rates on the basis of the above
mentioned simulation programme we assume a tax increase by one percent.
12Fiscal need is determined by a basic per-capita allowance which is multiplied by the municipality‘s
population size.
13The fiscal capacity of a municipality is determined by the tax base of the local business tax as well as
other revenues, in particular the municipal share of income and corporate taxation.
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equalisation grants are partly financed by contributions that all municipalities have to
finance out of their local tax revenues. Contributions to the state and to the county occur
in addition.
Buettner (2006) shows that the municipal system of fiscal equalisation in the state of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg can be summarised by a linear function which relates grants to the
municipal tax base, i.e. gi = yi − ϑiki, where gi denotes overall grants received, yi depicts
unconditional transfers which do not depend on the local tax base ki14, and ϑi constitutes
the marginal contribution rate a municipality faces within the system. The latter captures
to what extent marginal increases in the local tax base increase contributions made to the
municipal equalisation scheme. Note that ϑi can be calculated as
ϑi ≡ τ rs + (τ0 − τ rs)
(
θlocali + θ
state
i + θ
equal
i
(
1− θlocali − θstatei
))
, (1.1)
where τ rs labels a uniform tax rate which determines revenue sharing with the federal
and state level and τ0 constitutes a standardizing tax rate used to determine the taxing
capacity of the local business tax. In addition, municipalities have to finance contributions
out of their fiscal capacity to the county (θlocali ), the state (θ
state
i ) as well as formula-based
contributions into the system of fiscal equalisation (θequali ). Note that transfers to the
state and county reduce fiscal equalisation contributions.
Unconditional grants yi from the upper-level government are derived from
yi ≡ xi + ξini
(
1− θlocali − θstatei
)
−
(
ϑi − τ rs
τ0 − τ rs
)
, (1.2)
where xi labels other revenue and ni depicts fiscal need. The parameter ξi captures that
municipalities are being treated differently within the fiscal equalisation system conditional
on whether they are characterised by a low, medium or high fiscal capacity.15
Table (1.2) gives an overview of the fiscal equalisation parameters for the fiscal year
2004. While fiscal need does not display substantial cross-sectional variation one observes
a high standard deviation in the case of fiscal capacity. Therefore, relative fiscal capacity
varies strongly between 32% and 414%. Approximately 90% of the municipalities in the
state of Baden-Wuerttemberg are characterised by low or medium fiscal capacity and
receive fiscal equalisation transfers. One quarter of the sample displays a relative fiscal
capacity below 60% and therefore is eligible for additional equalisation transfers. These
municipalities are facing particularly high marginal contribution rates. Note that, on
average, municipalities were subject to an marginal contribution rate of around 13%.
14Note that, as already mentioned in section 1.1, German municipalities have taxing autonomy with
respect to the local business tax. Therefore, profits earned by local firms make up for a large fraction of
the municipal tax base.
15For further details on the formalization of the municipal fiscal equalisation system in the German state
of Baden-Wuertemberg see the Appendix in Buettner (2006).
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Table 1.2: Overview: Municipal Fiscal Equalisation 2004
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal need (ni) e per capita 726 51.6 690 954.5
Fiscal capacity e per capita 548 205 187 3292
Relative fiscal capacity ratio .7536 .2712 .3260 4.14
Low fiscal capacity binary .2414 .4281 0 1
Medium fiscal capacity binary .6633 .4728 0 1
High fiscal capacity binary .0953 .2937 0 1
Rev. sharing tax rate (τ rs) in % .041 0 .041 .041
Standardizing tax rate (τ0) in % .145 0 .145 .145
County contribution rate (θlocal) in % .3280 .0428 .27 .421
State contribution rate (θstate) in % .2118 .0101 .2045 .2795
Fiscal equalisation contribution rate (θequal) in % .7057 .2616 0 1
Unconditional grants (yi) e per capita 274 46.4 68.4 373.7
Marginal contribution rate (ϑi) in % .1313 .0118 .0922 .145
Marginal contribution rate (ϑi) in % .1313 .0118 .0922 .145
Sample size consists of 1102 municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
Relating this figure to the average statutory business tax rate τi yields an equalisation
rate of around 85%. This indicates that in 2004 only around 15 cent of an additional
e revenue from the local business tax remained in the municipal budget due to higher
contributions to the local equalisation scheme. Note also that unconditional transfers
amounted to 274 e per capita.
Besides fiscal equalisation grants, municipalities receive additional transfers in order
to fulfill their self-administered spending responsibilities. This also includes two types
of specific grants: Firstly, within the so called ”traffic and transport burden sharing”
(”Verkehrslastenausgleich”), municipalities receive general as well as lump-sum grants
depending on the length of the road network and the size of the municipal area respectively.
Secondly, in the course of ”school burden sharing” (”Schullastenausgleich”), municipalities
receive transfers depending on the number of pupils.
1.2 The Incentive Effects of Fiscal Equalisation Transfers
The aim of this section is to give a brief overview of the existing literature dealing with the
impact of capacity-based fiscal equalisation schemes on local public finances when inde-
pendent governments within a federation compete for a mobile capital tax base. Moreover,
based on a simple model of interjurisdictional tax competition which forms the basis of the
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theoretical analyses presented in chapters 2 - 4, we want to provide an intuitive illustration
of the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on local tax and spending policies
and highlight the mechanisms at work.
Starting with the seminal contributions by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wil-
son (1986), a broad base of literature has emerged on the topic of interjurisdictional tax
competition.16 A central result of this strand of the public finance literature is that inde-
pendent governments competing within a federation for a mobile tax base will tend to set
inefficiently low tax rates and provide suboptimal levels of public goods. This inefficiency
in local public finances results from the fact that each government when maximising local
utility does not take into account fiscal externalities arising for other jurisdictions within
the federation. More concretely, when lowering its tax rate say on mobile capital, a local
government will only internalise the positive effect on its own tax base while ignoring the
corresponding capital outflow from other jurisdictions. In contrast, a central planner max-
imising overall utility within the federation would internalise all fiscal externalities arising
from local tax policies. The resulting coordinated equilibrium would then be charcterised
by higher tax rates and, in turn, an increase in the overall provision of local public goods.
Besides coordinating tax policies within a federation, the implementation of intergov-
ernmental grant systems constitutes an opportunity to take into account fiscal externalities
when local governments engage in wasteful tax competition. Wildasin (1989), for example,
suggests a corrective subsidy in the form of a matching grant that induces local govern-
ments to internalise the fiscal externalities resulting from their tax policies. Smart (1998)
analyses the impact of capacity based equalisation transfers and argues that such transfers
tend to partially compensate subnational governments for the deadweight loss resulting
from the imposition of higher tax rates. Therefore, the intergovernmental grant system
induces local governments to increase distortionary taxtion in order to attract equalisa-
tion transfers. More recently, a number of theoretical contributions have dealt with the
relation between tax competition and fiscal equalisation. One of the first attempts in this
direction is a theoretical analysis by Koethenbuerger (2002) who explores the efficiency
consequences of equalisation transfers in a standard setting of interjurisdictional capital
tax competition. The author explicitly assumes that each local government within the fed-
eration can influence the level of grants received from the transfer system via its tax policy.
As a result, tax base equalisation induces independent local governments to increase dis-
tortionary taxation of a mobile capital tax base. Moreover, if the design of the transfer
scheme is such that taxing capacity differences are fully equalised, then decentralised tax
policy becomes efficient, i.e. equalisation transfers constitute a device to internalise fiscal
externalities arising from competitive local tax setting. This result establishes a rational
for redistributive grant systems not only on equity but also on efficiency grounds. In
fact, efficiency of local public finances improves as the degree of redistribution within the
16See Wilson (1999) for an overview.
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federation increases. While Koethenbuerger (2002) assumes identical regions and a fixed
aggregate supply of capital, Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) present a more general analysis
allowing for elastic tax bases and heterogeneity across regions in terms of tax capacities,
population and local preferences. The authors show that in a variety of different settings a
simple equalisation scheme generates an efficient decentralised optimum and thereby fur-
ther promote the idea that systems of intergovernmental grants do not only serve equity
objectives but also improve economic efficiency. However, the analysis suggests that full
equalisation only restores a first-best optimum if the implicit coordination of local tax
policies via the equalisation mechanism does not affect the nation-wide tax base. If the
increase in the local tax effort induced by the intergovernmental transfer system distorts
capital supply to the federation, partial equalisation turns out to generate optimal local
tax policies, giving rise to a standard tradeoff between equity and efficiency.
In order to provide a more intuitive understanding of the mechanisms at work we will
briefly sketch a simple theoretical model of intergovernmental tax competition similar to
the one in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and introduce a capacity-based equalisation
scheme. The model constitutes the basic framework used and further developed in chapters
2 - 4 of this book.
Consider a federation with a large number of regions. In each region, a homogenous
output is produced using immobile labour supplied by a representative consumer and
perfectly mobile capital. Each region’s consumer is equipped with a uniform capital en-
dowment (s¯) which can be invested freely within the federation.17 Regional governments
tax locally installed capital (ki) to provide a public good (Zi) according to the budget
constraint τiki = Zi, where τi denotes the tax rate. Private consumption (ci) is financed
via labour and capital income, i.e. ci = f(ki) − kif ′ki + rs¯, where f(ki) constitutes the
linear-homogenous production function and r denotes the net rate of return to capital.
Note that, due to the assumption of free capital mobility, the net rate of return is equalised
within the federation so that r = f ′(ki) + τi.
When choosing the optimal capital tax rate τi, local governments maximise the utility
of the representative consumer which we assume to be captured by a quasi-linear utility
function, i.e. ui = ci + v(Zi), where v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Maximising with respect to τi and
taking account of the above local budget constraint leaves us with the following optimality
condition.18
v′ =
ki
ki + τi ∂ki∂τi
. (1.3)
Quite intuitively, this first order condition states that in the local optimum the marginal
17Note that similar to Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) we assume that there is no external supply of
capital to the federation, i.e. the sum of individual capital endowments determines the fixed nation-wide
stock of capital.
18Note that, for simplicity, we assume that jurisdictions are completely symmetric.
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utility from providing the public good needs to equal the marginal cost of raising public
funds (MCPF) to finance the increased provision. Given that an increase in the local tax
rate will trigger a negative tax base effect, i.e. ∂ki∂τi < 0, one can immediately see from equa-
tion 1.3 that the local optimum is characterised by MCPF exceeding unity. In contrast,
a social planner maximising overall utility within the federation, would internalise fiscal
externalities arising from local tax policies19 and provide public goods efficiently, i.e. the
coordinated equilibrium would be characterised by v′ = 1. Therefore, given the decreasing
marginal utility of Zi, we can conclude that in a decentralised setting independent local
governments will provide an inefficiently low level of public goods coinciding with tax rates
below the level a central planner would choose. This is the standard result from the tax
competition literature (e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986).
Now, let us introduce a simple system of equalisation transfers where jusridictions
receive equalisation transfers according to their respective tax base. The design we chose
and which is also used in the theoretical analyses in chapters 2 - 4 is such that grants
received from the upper-level government (gi) negatively depend on the capital stock
installed in a given jurisdiction, i.e. gi = yi − ϑiki. Note that local governments receive
unconditional transfers yi which do not depend on their tax base and contribute to the
nation-wide transfers system according to a marginal contribution rate ϑi. This changes
the local budget constraint so that Zi = (τi − ϑi) ki + yi. Again maximising local utility
yields the following optimality condition:
v′ =
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
(1.4)
From 1.4 one can immediately observe that by setting the marginal contribution rate to the
equalisation system (ϑi) the central government is able to alter the jurisdictions’ MCPF.
If a local government now decreases its tax rate in order to attract the mobile tax base
it will also face a higher contribution to the intergovernmental grant system. That way,
the jurisdiction implicitly internalises the fiscal externalities resulting from its tax policy.
Note also that the MCPF observed at the local level decrease as the marginal contribution
rate increases. In the extreme case of full equalisation, i.e. τi = ϑi, decentralised tax
policy turns out to be efficient as the local optimum is characterised by v′ = 1.20
Figure 1.2 further illustrates the underlying mechanism. Note that, in the absence of
fiscal equalisation transfers, independent governments will provide the level X0 of public
goods where the marginal utility (in e terms) equals the local marginal cost of raising
public funds. As each local government only takes into account the impact of a change
in the tax rate on its own tax base, local MCPF always exceed the social marginal cost.
19Note that, given the fixed nation-wide capital stock, a marginal decrease of the capital tax rate in
one jurisdiction will trigger a capital inflow to this jurisdiction and a corresponding outflow from other
jusrisdictions.
20See, e.g., Koethenbuerger (2002).
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Implementing a transfer scheme as described above will now shift the local marginal cost
curve downwards. As the perceived MCPF decrease as the marginal contribution rate to
the equalisation system set by the central government increases, local governments are
induced to increase their tax effort and provide higher levels of public goods, e.g. the
level X1 indicated in figure 1.2. Note that, in the case of full equalisation, the perceived
local MCPF correspond to the social marginal costs. In this case, the regional government
provides the first-best optimal level of public goods X2. Therefore, from a theoretical
point of view, capacity-based equalisation transfers operate as a corrective device for
inefficiencies resulting from local tax competition tax for mobile tax bases. Note however
that, as already mentioned above, the optimal design of such transfer mechanisms crucially
depend on the assumptions made with regard to the elasticity of the national tax base
(Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006).
Figure 1.2: Tax competition and fiscal equalisaton
 
marginal utility 
local marginal costs 
social marginal costs 
€
public good provision X0 X1 X2 
Source: Buettner, T. (2006): Tax competition and finance equilibrium, ifo Schnelldienst 04/2006,
Munich.
A number of empirical studies have recently analysed the impact of fiscal equalisation
transfers on local tax policies. Snoddon (2003) investigates the incentive effects of such
transfers in the context of fiscal federalism in Canada. The author examines a reform of
the provincial equalisation system which took place in 1982 and finds a significant impact
from this systemic change on own-source tax revenue growth for most recipient provinces.
Also focussing on the case of Canada, Smart (2006) observes that provinces respond to
expansions of equalisation transfers by increasing their own tax rates. Moreover, Dahlby
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and Warren (2003) find a similar incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on re-
gional tax policies in Australia. For the case of Germany, Baretti and Lichtblau (2002)
empirically analyse the impact of fiscal equalisation on revenue collection at the state
level and find that, although largely lacking taxing autonomy, efforts to collect taxes seem
to be discouraged as the transfer dependency increases. Buettner and Schwager (2003)
examine the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers in the context of a frequently
discussed reform option to provide German states with more taxing autonomy, namely
a surtax on the federal income tax. The study resumes that, while a higher degree of
tax autonomy at the state level would increase the scope for horizontal tax competition,
the system of vertical tax sharing and, in particular, the highly redistributive equalisation
scheme would undermine such tendencies. More recently, two studies focus on German
municipalities which are a particularly interesting case to study in the context of capital
tax competition in the presence of fiscal equalisation. This is due to the fact that local
governments in Germany have tax autonomy with respect to the business tax which, since
interjurisdictional mobility can be assumed to be high at the local level, should give rise
to competitive municipal tax policies. At the same time municipalities are subject to
significant capacity-based fiscal equalisation. Exploiting a natural experiment in the state
of Lower Saxony, Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007) provide evidence that the
change in the equalisation formula as of 1999 exerted a significant impact on local busi-
ness tax policies. Moreover, and strongly related to our analysis presented in chapter 4 of
this book, Buettner (2006) analyses the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on
municipal tax policies in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Based on a rich panel
dataset and exploiting both non-linearities in the incentives generated by the municipal
equalisation scheme as well as systemic changes over time the author provides evidence
that municipalities facing higher marginal contribution rates21 to the intergovernmental
transfer system set significantly higher local business tax rates.
1.3 Summary of results
The remainder of the book is divided into four chapters, three dealing, both theoretically
and empirically, with the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on state and local
public finances in Germany. The fifth chapter presents an empirical analysis of strategic
policy interactions among German municipalities.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical analysis of the conditions under which local grant
systems enforced by an upper-level government enhance efficiency of local public finances.
Building on previous theoretical research (e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and
Smart, 2006), which suggests that redistributive grant systems tend to internalise fiscal
externalities resulting from tax competition and thereby improve efficiency of local public
21See section 1.1 for a description how such contribution rates are computed.
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finances, we consider a standard model of fiscal competition between local jurisdictions
and introduce a system of equalisation transfers enforced by an upper-level government.
The design of the equalisation scheme is such that, while income from grants in a juris-
diction constitute a linear function of the local tax base, the state government can adjust
the degree of redistribution within the system by setting the marginal contribution rate.
Thus, the upper-level government is able to implicitly impact the marginal cost of raising
public funds at the local level. In a first step, we assume that the upper-level government
is a benevolent planer which aims at maximising overall utility in the federation when
setting the equalisation parameters. In this setting, we find that, only if capital supply
to the federation is completely inelastic will the state government set the marginal con-
tribution rate of the equalisation scheme equal to the tax rate and, therefore, implement
full equalisation of tax bases. In this case, inefficiencies resulting from local capital tax
competition, i.e. an inefficiently low level of taxation and public good provision, are fully
corrected and local governments provide a socially optimal level of public goods. How-
ever, as shown in Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), if the implicit coordination of tax policies
affects capital supply to the federation, partial equalisation, i.e. a marginal contribution
rate below the tax rate, turns out to be optimal resulting in a trade-off between equity and
efficiency objectives. In the next step, we deviate from the assumption of a benevolent
upper-level government and, similar to Edwards and Keen (1996), introduce separate state
government policy objectives. More concretely, besides the objective of efficiency of local
public finances, the state governments is now also interested in extracting resources from
the local transfer system to finance own spending which does not affect the local residents’
utility. In this setting we find that if the state government values own funds more than
funds for local jurisdictions such that it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing
system, and if the supply of capital is sufficiently inelastic, a marginal increase if the local
tax rate above the first best, induced by the local equalisation scheme, is beneficial for
the state government. Moreover, if the supply of capital to the federation is completely
inelastic, then increasing the contribution rate above the local tax rate is beneficial for the
state government. In addition, we extend our analysis so that the upper-level government
itself is subject to revenue equalisation at the state level and find that, if supply of capital
is not completely inelastic, local public finances are distorted regardless of whether the
state government is benevolent or extracting funds for wasteful purposes. The theoret-
ical results suggest that similar to the literature on vertical tax competition (Keen and
Kotsogiannis, 2002; Wrede, 1997) attempts by upper level governments to extract fiscal
resources from the local revenue sharing system will tend to undermine efficiency of local
finances, and possibly result in excessive equalisation. These theoretical predictions seem
to be of particular relevance in the case of the German federation as municipalities make
use of the local business tax which involves them in capital tax competition. Moreover,
each state redistributes revenue substantially by means of local revenue sharing while itself
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being subject to significant revenue sharing at the state level. These theoretical implica-
tions are contrasted with the experience in Germany. Since it is very difficult to compare
the complex local revenue sharing systems across German states, our analysis considers
empirical implications for the local tax policy. Specifically, we test whether fiscal condi-
tions at the state level, i.e. debt servicing costs, the fiscal capacity as well as the treatment
within the state equalisation system, affect average local business tax rates at the state
level. Taken together, the empirical analysis provides partial confirmation of our theoret-
ical predictions. In particular, the results obtained for the states’ debt service and the
states’ transfer revenues suggest that the position of the state government’s budget line
has a significant effect on the level of taxation chosen by the local governments in a state:
a decline in available fiscal resources at the state level causes an increase in local tax rates.
The aim of the theoretical and empirical analysis in Chapter 3 is to extend the existing
theoretical and empirical literature on the ”internalising” impact of capacity-based equali-
sation schemes to the case of local expenditure policies. We therefore use a standard model
of fiscal competition where local governments compete for a mobile capital tax base via the
provision of a productivity-enhancing public good and analyse how the implementation of
an intergovernmental grant scheme affects the local spending mix between public inputs
(such as infrastructure spending or education) and public consumption. Our theoretical
analysis builds on Keen and Marchand (1997) who extend the seminal paper by Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) and show that in the presence of a productivity-enhancing public
good the composition of local public spending tends to be systematically biased towards a
relative overprovision of a productivity-enhancing public good compared to public goods
which are consumed directly by residents. We then introduce a system of redistributive
equalisation transfers such as the one used in chapter 2. As the primary interest of our pa-
per lies in the compositional spending inefficiencies arising from public input competition,
we assume tax policy to be coordinated at the federal level. Therefore, local jurisdictions
can only attract the mobile capital tax base by providing a productivity-enhancing public
input and we are left with a framework of pure expenditure competition. In addition,
we deviate from the analysis of Keen and Marchand (1997) by explicitly modelling the
subnational governments’ decision on the local expenditure structure, i.e. the ratio of
spending on public inputs to overall public spending. Note that, similar to the case of
pure tax competition, local jurisdictions will not take into account fiscal externalities aris-
ing from their spending policy. Specifically, governments can attract local investment by
increasing their budgetary share of the public input to production as this will increase the
marginal productivity of capital within the jurisdiction. This will induce a capital inflow
while the other localities - given the assumption of a fixed nation-wide capital stock - will
face a decrease in their tax bases. As such ”spill-overs” are not taken into account by
independent governments, the equilibrium in a decentralised setting will be characterised
by a relative overprovision of public inputs. We then use the model to analyse how fiscal
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equalisation transfers affect the local spending mix and find that a higher degree of redis-
tribution within the intergovernmental revenue sharing system induces local governments
to rebalance their budgets towards a lower budgetary share of the productivity-enhancing
public input to production. This suggests that the spending bias pointed out by Keen and
Marchand (1997) is (at least partially) corrected via the implementation of capacity-based
equalisation transfers. The mechanism at work is again similar to the case of tax compe-
tition. As fiscal equalisation transfers are inversely related to the jurisdiction’s tax base,
the provision of the public input to production becomes more costly as positive tax base
effects will lead to higher contribution payments to the transfer scheme. More intuitively,
a higher degree of equalisation will make it less attractive for the individual jurisdiction to
provide public inputs as positive tax base effects are redistributed to a higher extent among
governments within the federation. This generates incentives for local governments to sub-
stitute public input provision by public consumption. Thus, a higher degree of revenue
sharing induces a ”price-effect” which, from the viewpoint of a single jurisdiction leads, to
an implicit internalisation of fiscal externalities resulting from its spending policies. In the
extreme case of full equalisation of tax bases local governments choose a socially optimal
spending mix.
The implications from our theoretical analysis are finally tested in the course of an
empirical analysis of German state expenditure policies. Germany is a very interesting
case to study in this context as tax rates for the most important tax types are set coordi-
nately at the federal level and, on the other hand, states can rather freely decide on the
composition of the spending side of their budgets. Also, Germany is characterised by a
complex system of fiscal equalisation among state governments. Our empirical analysis is
based on an annual database of German states which covers the period between 1980 and
2003. It contains detailed data, both on the expenditure structure of the German states
and on the most important parameters of the state fiscal equalisation system. This allows
us to identify ”productive” spending items at the state level, such as expenditure on edu-
cation, R&D as well as the street infrastructure, and compute an empirical counterpart of
the expenditure structure referred to in our theoretical analysis, i.e. the budgetary share
of productivity-enhancing public goods. Moreover, using a simulation programme which
incorporates the full set of rules implemented in the German state fiscal equalisation sys-
tem, we calculated marginal contribution rates which quantify the rate at which additional
tax revenues are reduced via lower transfers received from or higher contribution paid to
the system. In combination with detailed data on the most important fiscal equalisation
transfers, this allows us to very specifically capture the treatment of each state within
the German state fiscal equalisation system. We then used this data set to estimate the
determinants of state expenditure structures in Germany. Carefully taking into account
potential problems of endogeneity in our regression equations, the results from our panel
analysis strongly support the existence of an incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers
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on state expenditure policies. Concretely, we observe that an increase in the marginal con-
tribution rate to the system of fiscal equalisation induces state governments to reduce the
overall budgetary share of public spending on infrastructure and education. This finding is
in line with the theoretical implications from our model suggesting that fiscal equalisation
exerts an incentive or price effect which induces governments to rebalance their budgets
towards a lower share of productivity-enhancing spending items.
The theoretical analysis presented in Chapter 4 of this book extends the preceding
analysis by assuming that local jurisdiction have available two policy instruments to com-
pete for the mobile capital tax base, i.e. the local capital tax rate and the provision of a
productivity-enhancing public input to production. Again, we analyse how the implemen-
tation of a capacity-based equalisation scheme affects the efficiency of public finances at
the local level. As already shown, e.g., in Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), we find that fiscal
capacity equalisation induces local jurisdictions to increase distortionary taxation of the
mobile tax base. In addition, we show that increasing the degree of redistribution, while
compensating for budgetary effects, induces local governments to rebalance their budget
towards a lower budgetary share of the publicly provided input. Thus, in our analysis the
implementation of a system of fiscal equalisation alleviates both tax as well as expenditure
competition. In the case of full equalisation of tax bases, the compositional inefficiencies
in local spending pointed out by Keen and Marchand (1997) vanish when assuming inelas-
tic supply of capital. Compared to the theoretical analysis in chapter 2, the result that
fiscal equalisation transfers discourage public input provision relative to purely consump-
tive public goods is shown in a more general setting where local jurisdictions engage in
simultaneous tax and public input competition. The subsequent empirical analysis tests
for the existence of the theoretically predicted incentive effect of fiscal equalisation trans-
fers on local spending policies in Germany. It is based on a broad panel of municipalities
in the German state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Moreover, the underlying data set, similar
to the one used for the empirical analysis in chapter 2, contains detailed information on
municipal expenditure structures and therefore allows us to compute budgetary shares of
”productive spending”, i.e. the ratio of spending on basic schools and the local road net-
work to overall primary spending. In addition, we have computed various parameters of
the municipal system of fiscal equalisation. In particular, our data set contains marginal
contribution rates to the local equalisation scheme which quantify to what extent increases
in the local tax base lead to increased contribution payments within the transfer system.
It comprises detailed information on fiscal equalisation related transfers. We then use
this data set to estimate the determinants of local expenditure structures in the state of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Following Buettner (2006) we exploit non-linearities in the munici-
pal equalisation scheme to identify the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on
local expenditure policies. In particular, we make use of the fact that the marginal contri-
bution rates which municipalities face within the equalisation scheme depict deterministic
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albeit discontinuous functions of the local fiscal capacity which may be utilised on the basis
of a regression discontinuity approach. Overall, our results strongly confirm the existence
of an incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on local expenditure policies. We find
that a higher marginal contribution rate to the redistributive grant system induces local
governments to reduce their budgetary share of infrastructure spending on the local road
network and basic school expenditures. This finding is in line with the implications from
our theoretical analysis which suggests that an increase in the degree of redistribution
within a system of fiscal equalisation induces local governments to rebalance their budgets
towards a lower share of ”productive” spending.
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 deals with strategic fiscal competition among local
governments in Germany. In this context, it has long been recognized that governments
may use various instruments to attract mobile factors. With regard to capital, two of
these instruments have received special attention in this book: Business taxes and pub-
lic infrastructure investment. While it seems natural to think of governments’ choices
regarding tax rates and public input provision to be closely interrelated, the empirical
literature on fiscal competition has in most cases treated them separately. The analysis
presented in this chapter is an attempt to overcome this deficiency. In the first step, we
derive general reaction functions of local governments from a model of tax and public in-
put competition. As in Keen and Marchand (1997), our theoretical analysis is based on a
model of fiscal competition with two instruments. Local jurisdictions compete for a mobile
tax base by setting the capital tax rate and by providing a productivity-enhancing public
input to production. As both taxes and inputs affect the tax base, the determination of
optimal local taxing and spending decisions is substantially more complex than in a model
with just a single policy instrument. We use the theoretical framework to highlight the
forces that drive the strategic behavior of local governments when setting tax rates and
public inputs. In particular, we demonstrate that governments react to taxes as well as
to the level of public inputs provided by other jurisdictions when choosing each of their
own policy instruments. In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical work on gov-
ernments competing for mobile capital has mostly treated fiscal competition as pure tax
competition. The standard argument states that governments competing for mobile cap-
ital neglect the fiscal externality of their tax policy, resulting in an inefficiently low level
of taxation and an underprovision of public goods in equilibrium. Based on the work of
Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and Wildasin
(1988), a number of empirical studies have shown that the tax setting behavior of local
governments in many countries appears to be in line with the predictions of the theoret-
ical tax competition literature. Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), for instance, estimate a
property-tax reaction function for U.S. cities and find a non-zero slope. Buettner (2001)
identifies local business tax competition among German municipalities and Hayashi and
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Boadway (2001) analyze provincial corporate income taxes in Canada.22 Empirical con-
tributions addressing the joint effect of taxes and public inputs on the allocation of capital
are scarce. Therefore, our empirical analysis of tax and public input competition among
municipalities in Germany is one of the first attempts to extend the canonical empirical
model of tax competition to account for public inputs as a second policy instrument. As
already mentioned, German municipalities have autonomy in setting the local business
tax rate and, within their self-administration responsibilities, decide on spending on local
infrastructure. In this respect, Germany is an interesting and appropriate case to study.
Building on recent work of Kelejian and Prucha (2004), we estimate a system of equations
allowing for the joint determination of the municipalities’ business tax rate as well as
their level of spending on local infrastructure. In particular, the estimation results of our
system of interrelated equations show that the municipalities engage in simultaneous tax
and public input competition. Firstly, in accordance with earlier research, in particular
Buettner (2001), we find a positive and significant direct interaction effect in the local
business tax rate. Municipalities facing competition from low-tax jurisdictions thus set
lower taxes than municipalities with high-tax neighbors. Secondly, the local governments
also adjust their level of spending on infrastructure towards the average level among neigh-
boring jurisdictions. For our preferred specifications, the direct interaction effect in public
input provision is statistically different from zero in 10 out of 14 cross-sections, and it
tends to be larger than the direct interaction effect in taxes. Moreover, treating taxes and
public inputs as alternative means to attract capital reveals that the municipalities react
to competition in a rather flexible way. If neighbors lower their taxes, a municipality not
only adjusts its own tax rate, but also increases its level of public input provision. Finally,
we also demonstrate that our results depend on the choice of the spatial weighting scheme
in a predictable way, and that all main results are robust across various cross-sections.
The main contribution of this book is to provide further insights into the functioning
of federal systems and, in particular, the incentive effects arising from fiscal equalisation
schemes. The analyses presented in this book go beyond the existing literature in sev-
eral ways. Most notably, we extend the analysis of fiscal competition in the presence of
fiscal equalisation to the case of local expenditure policies. The theoretical models pre-
sented in chapters 3 and 4, to the best of our knowledge, are the first to investigate how
capacity-based equalisation transfers affect the decision of subnational governments on
their spending mix between public consumption and investment. We show that equal-
isation transfers which are inversely related to local tax bases exert a ”price-effect” or
”substitution-effect” which induces local governments to rebalance their budgets towards
a lower share of publicly provided inputs to production. Empirical evidence for this incen-
tive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on subnational expenditure policies is presented
22For further references on strategic tax setting of local jurisdictions see Brueckner (2003) as well as
Revelli (2005).
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for state and municipal governments in Germany. Moreover, the empirical analysis in
chapter 5 constitutes one of the first attempts to extend the canonical empirical model of
tax competition to account for public inputs as a second policy instrument. Herein, we
provide original evidence for the existence of simultaneous tax and public input compe-
tition among local governments in Germany suggesting that fiscal policy interactions are
much more complex than stated in the earlier literature.
Chapter 2
Efficient Revenue Sharing and
Upper Level Governments
It has already been pointed out in chapter 1 that many countries display a substantial
degree of taxing autonomy for local jurisdictions not only with regard to the taxation
of land or property but also with regard to income taxation. As emphasised in the tax
competition literature this may lead to inefficiently low taxes due to the existence of fiscal
externalities of local tax policy decisions (e.g., Wilson, 1999). However, many countries
with a decentralised public sector also display some redistributive grant systems which
tend to internalise fiscal externalities arising from tax competition (Bucovetsky and Smart,
2006; Koethenbuerger, 2002).
While the existence of redistributive grant systems may explain why local governments
in those countries make use of distortive taxes despite tax competition (Koethenbuerger,
2002; Smart, 1998; Dahlby, 2002), the welfare implications from tax competition and tax
coordination strongly depend on the government objectives. In fact, as noted by Wildasin
and Wilson (2004) the standard view that tax competition reduces welfare is probably
most challenged by Leviathan models, where governments pursue objectives other than
maximizing the utility of residents.
Given this background the analysis presented in this chapter explores the conditions
under which redistributive grant systems will or will not achieve or raise efficiency in local
finances.1 More specifically, we consider a standard model of tax competition between
local jurisdictions and follow Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) by introducing a system of
redistributive grants enforced at the state level which under certain assumptions restores
efficiency. This model is then extended by introducing additional government objectives
at the state level, such that the state government is not solely interested in the efficiency of
local finances but pursues its own policies under specific constraints. The extensions enable
1An earlier version of this chapter has already been circulated as a discussion paper. See Buettner,
Hauptmeier, and Schwager (2006).
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us to derive some testable hypotheses and predictions to show under which conditions the
potentially beneficial state intervention into local finances introduces new distortions at
the local level. Consequently, if the state government wants to raise expenditures related
to own policies and cannot further reduce unconditional grants to local jurisdictions, it
may use its influence on the local tax policy in order to raise local tax revenue, which,
in turn, is transferred to the state budget by means of higher local jurisdictions’ revenue
sharing contributions.
The theoretical implications are then contrasted with the experience in Germany. Ger-
many is a particularly interesting case to study in this respect as it combines municipal
tax autonomy and substantial revenue sharing among municipalities supervised and en-
forced by the states.2 Previous research also indicates that the revenue sharing among
municipalities does in fact exert a strong impact on the jurisdictions’ tax policy (Buettner,
2006;Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2007). At the same time, some of the German
states are in an increasingly difficult fiscal situation where the debt burden is sufficiently
high that they may be tempted to induce local jurisdictions to increase taxing effort. The
German system of fiscal federalism provides several incentives and disincentives for gov-
ernment policies at the state level which can be used to identify the constraints under
which the states operate. This will allow us to investigate whether, in fact, the response
of state governments to changes in the policy constraints, for example a reduction in the
grants received at the state level, includes an adjustment of the revenue sharing system
among municipalities.
Since it is very difficult to compare the complex local revenue sharing systems across
German states, our analysis considers the empirical implications for the local tax policy
and test whether conditions faced by state policy makers are reflected in the tax policy
pursued at the local level. The results indicate that, controlling for differences in the tax
base, the local tax rate does respond to some significant degree and in the way suggested
by the theory to the fiscal conditions at the state level. This supports the concern that
the potential benefits from local revenue sharing cannot be obtained if the state as the
institution enforcing the revenue sharing system pursues own objectives.
We will proceed as follows. The following section contains the theoretical analysis
which derives empirical implications with regard to local jurisdictions’ tax policy. Section
2.2, then, provides an empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany. The last section
provides the conclusions.
2.1 Theoretical Analysis
This section formally explores the conditions under which a redistributive grant system
enforced by the state can be expected to restore efficiency in a situation of tax competition,
2See section 1.1 for further details on the municipal equalisation system.
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and the circumstances under which grant system will introduce additional inefficiencies.
The first subsection lays out a standard model of tax competition. The second subsection
defines an optimal grant system designed to raise the efficiency of the local public sector,
which is closely related to Bucovetsky and Smart (2006). The third subsection, then,
introduces the possibility of additional state government objectives beyond simply ensuring
efficient local finances. Finally, the fourth subsection analyses the impact of redistributive
grant systems at the state level.
2.1.1 Tax Competition
We consider a set of n local jurisdictions, labelled i = 1, ..., n, which are situated in the
same state. In each of them, a competitive firm produces the same homogenous private
good by means of two factors, one of which is mobile, say capital, the other immobile, say
labor. Denoting by ki the amount of capital employed in jurisdiction i per unit of labor,
the per capita production function f(ki) is assumed to be identical across jurisdictions
with f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. Local jurisdictions levy a source based tax on capital at a rate of
τi units per unit of capital installed in jurisdiction i. Profit maximisation by local firms
and free mobility of capital imply that the net rate of return to capital r is equal across
jurisdictions and given by the after tax marginal product of capital:
r = f ′ (ki)− τi.
As a consequence, capital demand (per-capita) at location i is determined by a function
ki = φ (r + τi) .
From the profit maximisation condition, note that we have
∂ki
∂r
=
∂ki
∂τi
=
1
f ′′(ki)
< 0.
Thus, both a higher net interest rate and a higher local tax rate reduce the demand for
capital in jurisdiction i.
Residents of jurisdiction i derive utility ui from private (ci) and public (Zi) consump-
tion per capita in their home jurisdiction according to a quasi-linear utility function
ui = ci + αiv (Zi)
where v is an increasing and strictly concave function. The parameter αi > 0 measures
the intensity of preferences for the public good in jurisdiction i and may vary across
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jurisdictions. Private consumption per-capita is given by
ci = f (ki)− kif ′ (ki) + sir
= f (ki)− ki (r + τi) + sir,
where si is the capital endowment of residents in jurisdiction i per-capita. Public con-
sumption is determined by the budget constraint of the local government
Zi = τiki + gi,
where gi is revenue from grants.
Suppose that the total net supply of capital to the state is a positive function s(r) of
the net rate of return. Then, the capital market equilibrium is given by∑
i
ki =
∑
i
si + s (r) .
Implicit differentiation of this condition yields
∂r
∂τi
= −
∂ki
∂τi∑
j
∂kj
∂r − ∂s∂r
.
Note that from ∂ki/∂τi = ∂ki/∂r < 0 and ∂s/∂r > 0, it follows that −1 < ∂r/∂τi < 0.
We assume that the local jurisdictions choose their tax rates simultaneously such that
each jurisdiction takes the tax rates of the other jurisdictions as given and neglects the
impact of its tax policy on the other jurisdictions. Private consumption ci is a function of
the local capital stock ki and the net interest rate r which in turn are determined by the
local tax rates. In the absence of grants, the same is true for local public good supply Zi.
The utility of the residents of jurisdiction i can thus be written as a function of the tax
rate set by this jurisdiction, ui(τi). The first-order condition for maximisation from the
perspective of the local government is
∂ui (τi)
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂Zi
(
ki + τi(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
!= 0. (2.1)
As a benchmark, let us now consider a situation where the state government directly
chooses the local tax rates τi and the levels of the local public good Zi. Assume that the
state government aims at maximizing the sum of utilities
V 1 ≡
∑
j
u1j =
∑
j
(
f (kj)− kj (r + τj) + sjr + αjv(zj)
)
,
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subject to the overall budget constraint∑
j
zj =
∑
j
τjkj .
With the Lagrangian
L1 = V 1 + λ1
∑
j
τjkj −
∑
j
zj

optimality from the perspective of the state level requires
∂L1
∂Zi
= αi
∂v
∂Zi
− λ1 != 0, (2.2)
∂L1
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ1
(
ki + τi(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ1
∑
j 6=i
τj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 != 0. (2.3)
Equation (2.2) shows that in an efficient allocation, the marginal rate of substitution
between private and public consumption, αi∂v/∂Zi, must be equalized across jurisdictions.
Eliminating λ1 with the help of (2.2), condition (2.3) becomes
∂L1
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂Zi
(
ki + τi(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+
∑
j 6=i
αj
∂v
∂zj
τj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
!= 0. (2.4)
A comparison between equations (2.1) above and (2.4) shows that the last two terms in
(2.4) are not taken into account by the local governments. These terms capture the fiscal
externality exerted by an increase in the tax rate in locality i on other jurisdictions. The
last term, which is positive, expresses the direct benefit from capital flowing into other
jurisdictions, while the second-to-last term is the indirect effect arising from a change in
the equilibrium interest rate.
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity in the exposition, in the sequel, we follow
Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and restrict attention to a model where the solution to (2.2)
and (2.3) displays a uniform tax rate τi = τj =: τ . This implies also that capital demand
is equalised across jurisdictions, ki = kj =: k. Moreover, for simplicity, we assume that in
the first best situation described by (2.2) and (2.3) the endowment with capital is equal
to the demand for capital in all jurisdictions, si = k. At the ensuing equilibrium rate of
return the net supply of capital to the state is zero, s(r) = 0.
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2.1.2 Efficient Revenue Sharing
Now, while the state government by assumption differs in its view on optimal fiscal policies
it may want to raise efficiency of local taxation. In most real constitutions however, the
state government does not directly control taxes and spending in local jurisdictions as in
the benchmark described in (2.2) and (2.3). Nevertheless, one possible option internalise
fiscal externalities consists of imposing corrective taxes or subsidies (Wildasin, 1989). This
could be done, for instance, by setting a marginal contribution rate ϑi such that income
from grants gi is a linear function of the tax base3
gi = yi − ϑiki.
Facing this grant scheme, the utility of a local jurisdiction is a function of the tax rate
and the two parameters determining the grant:
u2i (τi, ϑi, yi) = f (ki)− ki (r + τi) + sir + αiv (τiki + yi − ϑiki) .
Under the influence of the grant scheme, the optimal tax rate chosen by the local juris-
diction will obey
∂u2i (τi, ϑi, yi)
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂Zi
(
ki + (τi − ϑi)(∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
!= 0. (2.5)
In a situation where the net capital supply is zero in all jurisdictions the second term
drops out. Rearranging yields the usual optimality condition stating that the marginal
rate of substitution between public and private consumption equals the marginal rate of
transformation, i.e. the marginal cost of raising public funds
αi
∂v
∂Zi
=
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi)(∂ki∂τi +
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
.
As the contribution rate ϑi enters the denominator on the right hand side we see that
the redistributive grant system allows the state government to adjust the marginal cost of
raising public funds. From ∂ki∂τi =
∂ki
∂r < 0 and 0 >
∂r
∂τi
> −1 it follows that ∂ki∂τi +
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
< 0.
Hence the marginal cost of public funds decreases if ϑi is raised. By imposing a higher ϑi,
therefore, the state government can induce the local jurisdiction to increase the local tax
rate, that is, ∂τi/∂ϑi > 0.
3This specification reflects the common characteristic of most redistributive transfer systems that trans-
fers are inversely related to the tax base or some corresponding measure of “fiscal capacity”.
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The state government will choose ϑi and yi in order to optimise the sum of utilities
V 2 ≡
∑
j
u2j (τj , ϑj , yj) .
In this subsection we consider a benevolent state government. It will redistribute the full
amount of resources collected from the individual jurisdictions by means of grants such
that its budget constraint becomes∑
j
yj =
∑
j
ϑjkj . (2.6)
Formally, we set up a Lagrangian
L2 ≡ V 2 + λ2
∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj
 .
Differentiation with respect to yi yields the f.o.c.
∂L2
∂yi
= αi
∂v
∂Zi
− λ2 != 0, (2.7)
which indicates that the state government differentiates the unconditional grants yi among
local jurisdictions such that the marginal rates of substitution are equalised. The optimal
choice of ϑi obeys
∂L2
∂ϑi
=
∂V 2
∂τi
∂τi
∂ϑi
+
∂V 2
∂ϑi
+ λ2
ki +
ϑi∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 ∂τi
∂ϑi
 != 0. (2.8)
Now inserting
∂V 2
∂ϑi
= −αi ∂v
∂Zi
ki
and replacing λ2 by αi ∂v∂Zi according to (2.7), condition (2.8) becomes
∂L2
∂ϑi
=
∂V 2
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂Zi
ϑi∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 ∂τi
∂ϑi
!= 0. (2.9)
In the appendix A.1 it is shown that the condition (2.9) is equivalent to (2.4) from the
previous subsection. This confirms that a linear grant scheme can indeed internalise the
fiscal externalities induced by tax competition.
Using the symmetry of the first best solution, one can further compute the optimal
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contribution rate ϑi = ϑ∗ which, in the symmetric situation, is also uniform across juris-
dictions:4
ϑ∗ = τ
(
1−
∂s
∂r
r
nk
∂s
∂r
r
nk −
(
n−1
n
)
∂k
∂r
r
k
)
. (2.10)
Here τ is the optimal local tax rate according to (2.4), ∂k∂r
r
k is the interest elasticity of
capital demand in a single jurisdiction evaluated at the optimal capital stock k, and ∂s∂r
r
nk
is the interest elasticity of capital supply to the state. We can immediately see the result
of Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) that only if capital supply were completely inelastic,
∂s
∂r = 0, the marginal contribution rate is set equal to the tax rate. Otherwise, a lower
contribution rate is optimal.
Note that even in the symmetric situation, we allow for differences in preferences
expressed by different αi. In order to obtain an efficient decentralised solution despite
these, the approach taken by Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) requires a complete set of
individual lump-sum grants yi to each jurisdiction. In a more general setting, where the
optimal tax rates also vary across jurisdictions, the contribution rates ϑi must also differ
so as to correct incentives specifically for each local jurisdiction.
2.1.3 The Role of Own State Government Objectives
The preceding analysis has dealt with the state government as a benevolent institution
which employs a grant policy where the sole objective is the efficiency of local finances.
However, it is not obvious whether it is appropriate to consider states as benevolent
agencies solving inefficiencies from local externalities. For example, mobility, which may be
an important driving force towards efficiency, is much lower at the state level as compared
to the local level. This raises the question of whether the results are robust against the
inclusion of separate state-level objectives.
Let us consider the case where the state government aims not simply at maximizing
residents’ utility. Instead, following Edwards and Keen (1996), assume the state is inter-
ested in spending some public funds e even if the residents do not derive any utility from
those expenditures. Formally, we define the corresponding objective function as
V 3 ≡
∑
j
u2j (τj , ϑj , yj) + βw (e) ,
where the first term is, as before, the sum of residents’ utility, i.e., V 2 , and w (e) is some
increasing and strictly concave sub-utility function capturing the valuation of expenditures
e by the state government. If we take account of the state budget constraint we see a trade-
4See appendix A.2.
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off between state spending e and the amount of grants allocated to the jurisdictions
e = m+
∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj ,
where m is some exogenously fixed source of revenue which is not affected by local policies.
For the subsequent analysis, the role of unconditional grants is crucial. On the one
hand, if the state government can adjust
∑
j yj according to its desires we have a rather
trivial case where the state government’s expenditure decision does not conflict with the
efficiency of local finances. But, if the state drives down the volume of funds transferred
to the local jurisdictions it will approach some limit where political cost increase as the
operation of local jurisdictions becomes difficult.5 To account for such a limitation, let us
assume for simplicity that there is some lower bound to the unconditional grants, where the
state cannot further reduce the transfers to the local jurisdictions. At this limit, however,
the state may use its influence on the local tax policy in order to induce local jurisdictions
to raise tax revenue. The additional revenue will then, in turn, be partially transferred to
the state budget by means of higher financing contributions of local jurisdictions in the
system of revenue sharing.
In order to reflect this in the current model, assume that the average unconditional
grant paid to the jurisdictions has to be, at least, at a level of y′
1
n
∑
j
yj ≥ y′. (2.11)
In order to distinguish the issue of horizontal redistribution among municipalities from the
role of the state’s objectives, in the following, we keep the assumption of Bucovetsky and
Smart (2006) that the individual grants yi are still differentiated among local jurisdictions.
By replacing e with the net receipts of funds from the municipalities and other ex-
ogenous sources of fiscal revenue m we can rewrite the state government’s optimisation
problem for the case where the total amount of transfers to the municipalities is not
allowed to fall short of the amount ny′. The Lagrangian becomes
L3 ≡ V 2 + βw
m+∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj
 + λ3
∑
j
yj − ny′
 .
5This is the case in Germany where the state governments have to ensure, under constitutional law,
that their municipalities are able to accomplish their functions (e.g., Article 73 (1) of the state constitution
of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; corresponding rules can also be found for the other states). If the state would
substantially reduce the transfers to the municipalities, they would appeal to the state court of justice
(Staatsgerichtshof). Two of the last eight decisions of the Staatsgerichtshof in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, for
example, deal with the volume of grants received by the municipalities.
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The f.o.c. with respect to yi now is
∂L3
∂yi
= αi
∂v
∂Zi
− β∂w
∂e
+ λ3 != 0. (2.12)
This condition can be represented in two ways. Firstly, the constraint (2.11) on the
minimal amount of unconditional grants may not be binding. Then λ3 = 0 and we have
αi
∂v
∂Zi
= β ∂w∂e . Thus, if the state can adjust the lump sum grants without restriction at the
margin, it will do so until its own marginal benefit of funds equals the marginal benefit of
public funds for a local jurisdiction. Secondly, if the constraint on the unconditional grants
is binding, then λ3 = β ∂w∂e − αi ∂v∂Zi > 0. In this case, the Lagrange variable measures the
net benefit to the state from transferring one unit of tax revenues from jurisdiction i to
the state level, determined by the difference between the marginal valuation of spending
at the state level and the marginal utility of public funds in jurisdiction i. Since we are
interested in the case where the state government provides only minimal support for local
municipalities, it is plausible to restrict attention to this case. Note however that in both
cases, the marginal rates of substitution αi ∂v∂Zi are equalised among the local jurisdictions
by means of unconditional grants yi.
With regard to the contribution rate the optimality condition is
∂L3
∂ϑi
=
∂V 2∂τi + β∂w∂e
ϑi∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 ∂τi∂ϑi
+
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂Zi
)
ki
!= 0. (2.13)
In order to assess the impact of the state’s own objective on its choice of grant scheme,
we start by considering the contribution rate of the first best solution (2.9). We then use
(2.13) to evaluate in which direction the state would like to adjust this rate as soon as it
takes the new, self-serving objective into account.6 To do so, we compare equation (2.13)
with the benchmark (2.9), and note that the difference between the optimality conditions
is
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ∂L
2
∂ϑi
=
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂Zi
)ki +
ϑi∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 ∂τi
∂ϑi
 .
The sign of this expression depends first of all on the term β ∂w∂e − αi ∂v∂Zi . In the case of a
binding constraint (2.11), this is positive, i.e. the state wants to extract further resources
6Since in this paper, our aim is to highlight the incentives introduced by own state objectives, we
restrict attention to a local analysis of the first order conditions around the first best, or to comparative
statics around a local optimum. A global analysis would be much more involved while being very unlikely
to produce additional economic insights.
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from the local jurisdictions.
Whether or not the state government is able to extract resources from the local revenue
sharing system by inducing higher local taxes depends also on the sign of the second term.
This term expresses by how much the aggregate receipts from revenue sharing
∑
j ϑjkj
collected by the state changes if the contribution rate for state i is increased. If this term
is positive, the state will indeed raise more revenue by increasing ϑi. This expression may
be negative, however. A decrease in the contribution rate might raise revenue because
it might cause, via the associated fall in the tax rate τi and the corresponding rise in
the net interest rate r, a strong inflow of capital to the state as a whole. This might
then outweigh the direct effect of taking less money away from jurisdiction i. To observe
under which circumstances the positive effect prevails, note that, from the capital market
equilibrium and utilising the symmetry, ϑi = ϑj , we can rewrite the difference in the
optimality conditions as
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ∂L
2
∂ϑi
=
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂Zi
)[
ki + ϑi
(
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
∂τi
∂ϑi
]
.
In this expression, the term in squared brackets is positive if ∂s/∂r is small. Intuitively,
in the extreme case where the state is essence a closed economy, the total amount of
capital is essentially fixed, and thus total revenue can only rise if a contribution rate is
increased. Therefore, if the capital supply is not too elastic the state government gains
from an increased ϑi and induces a higher local tax rate than in the benchmark case (2.9).
We can summarise these findings by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Distortion by State Government Objectives)
If the state government values own funds more than the funds for local jurisdictions such
that it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing system, and if the supply of capital
is sufficiently inelastic, a marginal increase of the local tax rate above the first best, induced
by the local revenue sharing system, is beneficial for the state government.
Proposition 1 says that a partially self-serving state government uses its local revenue
sharing system in order to induce higher local tax rates. This result can easily be applied
to understand why such revenue sharing systems may lead to excessive equalisation in the
sense that a local jurisdiction has to pay more than 100% of additional tax revenue into the
revenue sharing system. To see this, consider the case where capital supply is completely
inelastic, ∂s∂r = 0, so that Proposition 1 applies. In this case, the first best contribution
rate is ϑ∗ = τ , as can be seen from (2.10). Hence, already in the first best, the grant
system entirely eliminates any increase in local tax revenue induced by an increasing tax
base. Adding now a self-serving motive for the state government, there is an incentive to
raise the contribution still further. Thus, as the following Corollary implies, an increase
in a jurisdiction’s tax base actually reduces its revenues after equalisation.
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Corollary 1 (Excessive Equalisation)
If the state government values own funds more than the funds for local jurisdictions such
that it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing system, and if the supply of
capital is completely inelastic, then increasing the contribution rate above the local tax rate
is beneficial for the state government.
Given that the state government extracts funds it is useful to consider as a simple
comparative static exercise a variation in exogenous resources received by the state. As a
reduction in m forces the state to cut spending, it contributes to an increase in the marginal
benefit of state spending. Hence, we should expect that the state induces jurisdictions to
set higher tax rates. To see that this is the case, let us reformulate optimality condition
(2.13); given the symmetry and taking into account the capital market equilibrium we
obtain
∂L3
∂ϑi
=
{
∂V 2
∂τi
+ β
∂w
∂e
ϑi
[
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]}
∂τi
∂ϑi
+
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂Zi
)
ki
!= 0.
Rearranging yields
∂L3
∂ϑi
=
∂V 2
∂τi
∂τi
∂ϑi
+ β
∂w
∂e
[
ki + ϑi
(
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
∂τi
∂ϑi
]
− αi ∂v
∂Zi
ki
!= 0. (2.14)
Recall from above that, with a low elasticity of capital supply, the second term will be
positive. Then, it is obvious that with an increase in β ∂w∂e the second term rises. In order
to restore optimality, the remaining parts of ∂L
3
∂ϑi
have to decrease which, around a local
maximum, requires an increase in ϑi. That in turn implies that the state induces local
jurisdictions to raise their tax rate:
Proposition 2 (Impact of State Level Revenue)
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, if the state government experiences a reduction in
revenue m independent of local jurisdictions’ policies, a marginal increase of the local tax
rate, induced by the local revenue sharing system, is beneficial for the state government.
2.1.4 Disincentive Effect of Fiscal Equalisation at State Level
Besides own objectives of state governments the efficiency orientation of states is partic-
ularly doubtful in the German situation, where the states are subject to a large degree of
fiscal redistribution among states. They have to share a substantial amount of local tax
revenue, ξk, with the other states and the federal government. Thus, even if states are
simply benevolent, the transfer obligation will alter the marginal cost of providing local
public services and, hence, will affect efficient revenue sharing.
In order to analyse this case, we have to modify the above budget constraint (2.6) by
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the amount of transfers to other states ξ
∑
j kj . Formally, we set up a Lagrangian
L4 ≡ V 2 + λ4
∑
j
(ϑj − ξ) kj −
∑
j
yj
 .
Differentiation with respect to yi again yields the f.o.c. (2.7), λ4 = αi ∂v∂Zi . Using this in
the f.o.c. with respect to the contribution rates, we have
∂L4
∂ϑi
=
∂L2
∂ϑi
− αi ∂v
∂Zi
ξ ∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ξ
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 ∂τi
∂ϑi
!= 0.
Taking into account the capital market equilibrium we can simplify this expression to
∂L4
∂ϑi
=
∂L2
∂ϑi
− ξαi ∂v
∂Zi
[
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!= 0. (2.15)
The additional term captures the consequences of revenue sharing on tax policy: if a
higher tax rate at i reduces capital supply, then the transfers to the state level fiscal
equalisation system are reduced. Consequently, this last term is positive, indicating that
the contribution rate ϑi is increased against the case where ξ = 0. However, if capital
supply is inelastic (∂s∂r = 0), the last term vanishes. In this case the spending obligation is
financed solely by a uniform reduction of grants without altering the contribution rates.
As before we could introduce the assumption that the state government extracts re-
sources from the jurisdictions by means of the local revenue sharing system as there is a
minimal mandatory endowment of jurisdictions with unconditional grants (2.11). In this
case, the additional transfer obligations at the level of states would reduce the amount of
state spending
e = m+
∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj − ξ
∑
j
kj .
Inserting this expression into the extended objective function we obtain
L5 ≡ V 2 + βw
m+∑
j
(ϑj − ξ) kj −
∑
j
yj
 + λ5
∑
j
yj − ny′
 .
The optimality condition for yi replicates (2.12). The condition for ϑi now reads
∂L5
∂ϑi
=
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ξβ ∂w
∂e
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 ∂τi
∂ϑi
!= 0. (2.16)
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Simplification using the capital market equilibrium condition yields
∂L5
∂ϑi
=
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ξβ ∂w
∂e
[
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!= 0. (2.17)
While the first term is equivalent to the case of own state government objectives, the
second term captures the impact of the fiscal equalisation system between federal and
state governments. Note that this term is positive which reflects the fact that a tax rate
increase lowers the tax base in the state and, therefore, reduces transfer obligations from
the state budget. This exerts an incentive towards a higher contribution rate and higher
taxes.
Together, the last two results can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 3 (Distortion by State Level Fiscal Equalisation)
If the state government has to contribute to a redistributive system of intergovernmental
transfers some part of the revenue raised at the local level, ξ
∑
j kj, and, if the supply of
capital is not completely inelastic, then a marginal increase in the local tax rate, induced
by the local revenue sharing system, is beneficial for the state government, regardless of
whether it is benevolent or expropriating funds for wasteful purposes.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
The above propositions appear to be of particular relevance in the case of the German
federation. While local municipalities make use of a local business tax and, consequently,
are involved in tax competition, each state redistributes revenue substantially by means of
a local fiscal revenue sharing system. Previous research has shown that the redistribution
causes local municipalities to set higher tax rates (Buettner, 2006; Egger, Koethenbuerger,
and Smart, 2007). The systems of local revenue sharing are broadly similar across states,
however there are differences in institutional details which make it very difficult to establish
key parameters such as the level of grants and the marginal contribution rates for all states.
Therefore, the empirical analysis is concerned with the implications of a state influence
on local revenue sharing for the local business tax rate.
2.2.1 State and Local Finances in Germany
In order to identify a state influence on local tax policy we need to find some variation
in the conditions faced specifically by state governments but not by local jurisdictions.
It is important that this variation is not affected by or statistically correlated with the
local jurisdictions taxing decisions. A first variable which comes to mind is the level of
the debt burden. The level of debt is inherited from past policy, therefore it seems useful
to consider a state’s debt burden as an indicator of the availability of fiscal resources in
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the sense of Proposition 2. However, there are two obvious problems with this approach.
The first relates to a potential correlation between state and local finances. If there is
some common source of shocks driving deficits both at the state and at the local level, the
empirical correlation with state level debt might be misleading. In order to overcome this
problem we will include debt-variables for both state and local debt. This allows us to
consider the impact of state debt conditional on the local debt burden. A second problem
arises from the role of the capital market in the determination of the interest rate. If
tax policies are taken into account by the capital market it seems generally possible that
certain tax policies are reflected in the interest rate or the market value of the debt.
However, as the federal government is forced by the constitution to provide backing for
state finances this effect is likely to be negligible.7
Another promising source for variation in conditions faced by state governments is the
system of fiscal equalisation at the state level which exerts important incentives for state
government policies. Depending on the fiscal capacity relative to what is considered as
“fiscal need”, the system of fiscal equalisation allocates funds such that states with low
capacity receive transfers while those with high capacity will actually contribute to the
system. A change in the grants received implies a shift in the state-government budget
constraint which will according to Proposition 2 result in different local tax rates provided
the state government pursues own policies and has already lowered unconditional grants
to municipalities. A second potentially important variable derived from the state-level
equalisation system is the marginal contribution rate. This is the rate at which an increase
in the state-wide business tax base actually reduces the net transfers received within the
state-level fiscal revenue sharing system. As explained above (see Proposition 3), given
a higher marginal contribution rate the state might want to induce local jurisdictions
to increase taxing effort. A significant positive coefficient of this variable will actually
provide evidence on the pure (dis-)incentive effect of state level fiscal equalisation on
the state’s operation of the local finances. With this approach, the empirical analysis is
related to Baretti and Lichtblau (2002) who find some support for the hypothesis that
intergovernmental relations at the state level exert adverse disincentive effects on a state’s
revenue collection. In contrast, our analysis is concerned with the incentive effects on
local taxation which originate in the state’s role to enforce revenue sharing among local
jurisdictions.
As is discussed in more detail in Buettner (2006) in the context of municipalities,
the fact that equalisation grants and marginal contribution rate are determined by a
complicated, non-linear, albeit clearly defined system of fiscal equalisation, allows us to
pursue an identification strategy along the lines of regression discontinuity estimation (e.g.,
Van der Klaauw, 2002; Angrist and Lavy, 1999). If we control for the potential influence
7Seitz (1999) describes how supreme court decisions on federal support have prevented the rating of
state bonds to deteriorate relative to the federal level.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Collection rate (in %) 352.3 37.57 254.0 431.6
State debt service (e per capita) 143.0 10.77 1.386 495.6
Municipal debt service (e per capita) 48.19 23.11 1.340 94.13
Population (in 1000) 7372 4992 1043 18073
State (net-)equalisation revenue (e per capita) -17.24 107.2 -474.7 196.0
State marginal contribution rate (in %) 42.97 13.94 8.139 72.01
Rel. fiscal capacity 1.861 .2785 .8901 2.460
Stand. business tax base (e per capita) 64.77 21.57 20.87 122.6
State parliament election year .2463 .4316 0 1
Municipal council election year .2022 .4001 0 1
Annual data for 8 German States in the period 1970-2003.
of fiscal capacity in the estimation, we can separate out the differential treatment of the
states.
2.2.2 Data
To study the German case, we have collected an annual database for German States in
the period between 1970 and 2003. Since data are only available from 1991 onwards,
the new states in former East Germany are excluded. Furthermore, we exclude the three
city states of Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin since there is no clear distinction between
state and local level. The database contains information regarding the average tax rate
for the local business tax in each of the states and corresponding revenue data as well as
net interest expenses. In addition, the database contains detailed information regarding
the treatment of each state in the state-level equalisation system. More specifically, the
database allows us to compute for each state and each year all contributions and transfers
related to fiscal equalisation at the state level.8 Some further control variables are used to
capture the population size, the lagged tax base, and election years both at local and state
level. The latter will control for political business cycle effects which have been found to
be important at the local level (e.g., Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli, 2002).
Table 5.1 provides some descriptive statistics. The local tax rate is depicted by the
collection rate (“Hebesatz”), which is an unknown concept for readers not acquainted with
the German case. However, it is rather simple: the tax law sets a base rate of 5% and
requires each local jurisdiction to set its collection rate. For instance, the collection rate
might be a figure of 380%, which means that the statutory tax rate applied to the firm is
3.8× 0.05 = 19%.
The collection rate displays substantial variation across time and states. Note that
8See section 1.1 for further details.
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level and variation of debt service are much larger at the state as compared to the local
level. State net-equalisation revenue varies strongly between positive and negative figures
indicating that some states receive positive transfers while others are net contributors.
Note that the marginal contribution rate is above 40 % at the mean, indicating that on
average a state has to transfer an amount of more than 40 cents out of each Euro of
additional tax revenue. A problem with this variable is, however, that it shows not only
a high degree of variation across states but also strong fluctuations in time.
2.2.3 Results
Table 2.2 provides results from alternative specifications. In order to control for the
heterogeneity of states, state fixed effects are included. Since the tax policy will need
some time to adjust the lag of the tax rate is included. We also control for the tax base,
but since the current tax base is co-determined by the current tax rate, only the lag
of the tax base is employed. Specification (1) uses a basic set of explanatory variables,
specification (2) additionally employs some cubic trend-polynomial in order to test for the
importance of common trends. Specification (3) to (5) test for an impact of the state-level
fiscal equalisation system including terms capturing the differences in fiscal capacity.
The strong effect of the lagged collection rate supports a standard partial adjustment
process. With regard to elections the political business cycle hypothesis is confirmed in
the sense that current municipal council elections do exert the expected negative effect.
Elections for the state government are not found to exert an impact on taxation. With
regard to the debt service, we find not only that the municipal debt service exerts a
significant impact on the local tax rate but also that the burden of debt service at state-
level proves significant across all specifications. In light of Propositions 1 and 2 this
supports the view that the availability of fiscal resources at the state level exerts an
impact on the tax policy of local jurisdictions. While we cannot say whether this effect
is the consequence of changes in the local revenue sharing system as the above theory
suggests, this result raises doubts as to whether the state government should really be
considered as pursuing policies only in the interest of municipalities.
With regard to incentives generated by the state-level fiscal equalisation system note
that the specifications test for the effects conditional on (relative) fiscal capacity. This is
important in order to make sure that the results capture the impact of fiscal equalisation
rather than simply reflecting differences in the taxing capacity. In order to make sure that
also no non-linear differences in the fiscal capacity are driving the result, specifications
(4) and (5) employ quadratic and cubic specifications, respectively. The results support
an impact of the volume of transfers received. Since net-revenue from equalisation may
be negative it is entered in per-capita terms. In order to compare the magnitude of the
estimate with that of an increase in the state’s debt burden we have to evaluate the semi-
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elasticity obtained for the debt burden at the mean. Using the figure of 143 e per capita
as depicted in Table 1, we obtain an average marginal effect of the state debt service
of approximately .028 which has a similar magnitude in absolute terms as the effect of
the net-equalisation revenue. Thus, the point estimates imply that an increase in state
revenue or a decline in the debt burden of about 100 e per capita leads to a reduction
in the collection rate by 2.5 or 2.8 percentage points, i.e. 0.13 to 0.14 percentage points
in the statutory tax rate in the short run, or about 1.2 to 1.3 percentage points in the
long run.9 The marginal contribution rate, which determines to what extent net-transfers
received shrink given an increase in business tax revenue, shows no significant effect. This
variable, however, shows rather strong fluctuations since the system of fiscal equalisation
not only responds in a non-linear fashion to the fiscal capacity of the considered state but
also in a non-linear way on the fiscal capacity of the other states. This makes it very hard
to identify the incentive effect of fiscal equalisation at the state level.
Taken together we can state that the empirical analysis provides partial confirmation
of the above theoretical predictions.10 The results obtained for the states’ debt service and
the states’ transfer revenues suggest that the position of the state government’s budget
line has a significant effect on the level of taxation chosen by the local governments in a
state: a decline in available fiscal resources at the state level causes an increase in local tax
rates. Broadly seen, this is in line with Proposition 2, which provides the argument that
the government assigns some value to its own funds such that it extracts fiscal resources
from the local governments. By contrast, the third prediction, from Proposition 3, is not
confirmed. However, as we have just argued it seems likely that this failure is related to
the statistical properties of the state-level fiscal equalisation system.
2.3 Summary
Recent literature has emphasised that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalise
fiscal externalities arising from tax competition (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006; Koethen-
buerger, 2002), at least to some extent. While the existence of redistributive grant systems
might explain why local governments make use of distortive taxes despite tax competi-
tion (Smart, 1998; Buettner, 2006), it is difficult to derive policy recommendations. The
reason for this is that the welfare implications from tax competition and tax coordination
strongly depend on the government objectives.
Given this background the current paper has explored the conditions under which
9The latter calculation takes account of an estimate for the coefficient of the lag of the collection rate
of about 0.89.
10Similar results have been obtained for Canadian provinces. Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (2002) find
that provinces which receive equalisation grants set higher personal income tax rates if the contribution
rate to the equalisation system is increased. Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) show that an increase in
the volume of federal grants received induces provinces to reduce their corporate income tax rates.
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redistributive grant systems will or will not achieve efficiency in local finances. We have
considered a standard model of tax competition of local jurisdictions and introduced a
system of redistributive grants executed at the state level. The basic model has then been
extended in order to allow for variations in the government objectives at the state level.
The theoretical results suggest that similar to the literature on vertical tax competition
(Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002; Wrede, 1997), attempts by upper level governments to
extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharing system will tend to undermine
efficiency of local finances, and, possibly, even result in excessive equalisation.
These concerns are corroborated by the empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany.
The results from our empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany suggest that attempts by
state governments to extract fiscal resources from the municipal revenue sharing system
exert an upward pressure on tax rates. While we cannot say whether this effect is the
consequence of changes in the local revenue sharing system as the above theory suggests,
this result raises doubts as to whether the state government should really be considered as
pursuing policies only in the interest of municipalities. The results of the paper support
concerns that the potential benefits from local revenue sharing cannot be reaped if the
state, as the institution enforcing the revenue sharing system at the local level, pursues
its own policies and operates under conditions which cause inefficiencies at the state level.
Chapter 3
State Fiscal Equalisation and the
Composition of Public Spending
The literature on fiscal competition has thus far mainly focused on the aspect of tax
competition. The standard argument states that competing governments lower their tax
rates in order to attract a mobile tax base, thereby neglecting negative fiscal externali-
ties. The bottom line is an inefficiently low level of taxation and a relative underprovision
of public goods (e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986). Recent literature
(e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) suggests that fiscal externali-
ties arising from tax competition tend to be internalised by introducing fiscal equalisation
schemes which inversely relate transfers to the local tax base.1 Therefore, the perceived
local marginal cost of raising public funds is reduced and governments increase their taxing
effort to provide a higher level of public goods. Previous empirical research by Buettner
(2006) and Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007) supports the view that revenue
sharing exerts a strong impact on local tax policy. The aim of the analysis in this chapter
is to extend the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the ”internalising” impact
of capacity-based equalisation schemes to the case of local expenditure policies.2 We use a
standard model of fiscal competition where local governments compete for a mobile capital
tax base via the provision of a productivity-enhancing public good and we analyse how the
implementation of an intergovernmental grant scheme affects the local spending mix be-
tween public inputs such as infrastructure spending or education and public consumption.
Finally, the theoretical model is taken to an empirical test focusing on state expenditure
policies in Germany.
Our theoretical analysis builds on Keen and Marchand (1997) who extend the seminal
paper by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and show that in the presence of a productivity-
1See section 1.2
2An earlier version of this chapter has already been circulated as a discussion paper. See Hauptmeier
(2007a).
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enhancing public good the composition of local public spending tends to be systematically
biased towards a relative overprovision of a productivity-enhancing public good compared
to public goods which are consumed directly by residents. Hindriks, Peralta, and Weber
(2007) present a model suggesting that such compositional inefficiencies might be reversed
in a dynamic setting. In their analysis, local governments face incentives to underinvest in
stage one of a strategic game in order to alleviate second-stage tax competition. Related
to our paper, the authors then show that under fiscal equalisation public investment is
discouraged. Empirical contributions addressing the effect of public investment on the
allocation of capital are scarce. Be´nassy-Que´re´, Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007) show that
both capital tax rates and public capital stocks help to explain FDI flows. More related to
our analysis, Borck, Caliendo, and Steiner (2005) deal with strategic interaction of German
local governments in different expenditure categories, suggesting that governments use
public spending to attract mobile factors of production.
Given this background we extend the model of interjurisdictional fiscal competition
presented in Keen and Marchand (1997) and, similar to Bucovetsky and Smart (2006),
introduce a system of redistributive equalisation transfers. As the primary interest of our
paper lies in the compositional spending inefficiencies arising from public input competi-
tion, we assume tax policy to be coordinated at the federal level. Therefore, local jurisdic-
tions can only attract the mobile capital tax base by providing a productivity-enhancing
public input and we are left with a framework of pure expenditure competition. In addi-
tion, we deviate from the analysis of Keen and Marchand (1997) by explicitly modelling
the subnational governments’ decision on the local expenditure structure, i.e. the ratio of
spending on public inputs to overall public spending. This theoretical framework is then
utilised to analyse how fiscal equalisation transfers affect the local spending mix. By an-
alytically separating income and substitution effects resulting from exogenous changes in
the marginal contribution rate to the equalisation scheme, we show that a higher degree of
revenue sharing induces a ”price-effect” which, from the viewpoint of a single jurisdiction,
increases the relative cost of providing public inputs. Thus, a higher degree of redistri-
bution within the intergovernmental revenue sharing system induces local governments to
rebalance their budgets towards a lower budgetary share of the productivity-enhancing
public input to production. The spending bias pointed out by Keen and Marchand (1997)
is, therefore, (at least partially) corrected via the implementation of capacity-based equal-
isation transfers. To the best of our knowledge, our theoretical analysis is the first to show
this result in a standard framework of fiscal competition.
The implications from our theoretical analysis are finally tested via an empirical anal-
ysis of German state expenditure policies. Germany is a very interesting case to study in
this context as tax rates for the most important tax categories are set coordinately at the
federal level while, on the other hand, states can rather freely decide on the composition
of the spending side of their budgets. Germany is also characterised by a complex sys-
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tem of fiscal equalisation among state governments. The results from our panel analysis
strongly support the existence of an incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on state
expenditure policies. We observe that an increase in the marginal contribution rate to
the German system of fiscal equalisation induces state governments to reduce the overall
budgetary share of public spending on infrastructure and education. Thus, the theoret-
ically predicted ”price-effect” from an increase in the degree of redistribution within a
capacity-based equalisation scheme is identified on the basis of our sample of German
states. Moreover, note that we find this effect while controlling in a comprehensive way
for shifts in the state governments’ budget constraints.
The analysis in this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3.1 we conduct the theo-
retical analysis and derive testable empirical implications. Section 3.2 then presents the
empirical analysis of state expenditure policies in Germany. Conclusions are drawn in
section 3.3.
3.1 Theoretical Analysis
3.1.1 The Model
Our theoretical analysis is based on a standard framework of fiscal competition as pre-
sented, for example, in Keen and Marchand (1997). We consider a federation where a nu-
meraire output is produced in each state using immobile labour L, perfectly mobile capital
K and a publicly provided input P . The common production technology F (L,K,P ) is
assumed to be linear homogenous with respect to labour and capital. The public input P
is of the factor-augmenting type and raises the marginal productivity of the primary input
factors, capital and labour. For analytical convenience labour is normalized to unity and
we assume that firms in jurisdiction i produce according to the following (per labour unit)
production technology:
f(ki, Pi) = kαi P
β
i , α+ β ≤ 1 (3.1)
The impact of public inputs is modeled by introducing a shift-term, P βi , into the production
function which captures total factor productivity.3 Thereby, β labels the productivity
impact of the publicly provided input to production. We assume that the production
function exhibits non-increasing returns to scale, i.e. α+ β ≤ 1.
The states finance themselves by a source-based tax on capital τ¯ , which is set in
coordination with the upper-level government and therefore cannot be altered by the
individual jurisdiction. Free capital mobility and profit maximization by firms then yields
3For an overview on different treatments of public inputs in the literature see Feehan (1989) and Feehan
(1998).
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the following marginal productivity condition for local investment
∂f(ki, Pi)
∂ki
= α kα−1i P
β
i = r + τ¯ , (3.2)
Note that equation 3.2 implies demand for capital ki = φ(r + τ¯ , Pi). By implicitly differ-
entiating the profit maximization condition we can derive
∂ki
∂Pi
= −∂
2f(ki, Pi)
∂ki∂Pi
[
∂2f(ki, Pi)
∂k2i
]−1
=
β
1− αkiP
−1
i > 0. (3.3)
Therefore, an increase in the provision of the public input (Pi) increases the marginal
productivity of capital and consequently broadens the local tax base.
Following Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), we assume that total supply of capital
to the federation is fixed and given by the sum of individual capital endowments in all
jurisdictions. Therefore the capital market equilibrium reads∑
i
ki =
∑
i
si, (3.4)
where si denotes per capita endowment with capital in jurisdiction i. Note that r, the
after-tax return to capital, is equalized across jurisdictions due to the assumption of free
capital mobility. As in Keen and Marchand (1997), we also assume that the individual
state, being small compared to the overall size of the federation, treats r as fixed.
Let us assume that there exists a single household in each state deriving utility from
a private good ci and a public good Zi. Preferences are quasi-linear according to the
following utility function
ui = ci + v(Zi), (3.5)
where v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Consumers receive total factor income and therefore private
consumption in jurisdiction i is given by
ci = kαi P
β
i − ki (r + τ¯) + si r.
State governments use their capital tax revenue to provide both a purely consumptive
public good (Zi) and a productivity-enhancing public input (Pi). Moreover, local govern-
ments receive unconditional grants (gi) from the federal level. The budget constraint then
reads
bi = Zi + Pi = τ¯ ki + gi. (3.6)
As our primary concern is not so much with the levels of public spending on Zi and Pi
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but rather the public spending mix, we substitute Pi = λib and Zi = (1− λi)bi into (3.5),
where λi denotes the overall budgetary share of spending on the public input.4
This leads to the following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
λi
ui = kαi (λibi)
β − ki (r + τ¯) + si r + v ((1− λi) bi) (3.7)
Assuming symmetric jurisdictions, the first order condition for the optimal expenditure
structure λ∗i can be written as
∂ui
∂λi
= kαi βP
β−1
i
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
(3.8)
− v′
(
bi − (1− λi) ∂bi
∂λi
)
!= 0,
where ∂bi∂λi captures the budgetary effect of a marginal increase in the budgetary share of
the public input. This derivative has a positive sign if gi > 0, i.e. if federal grants play a
role in financing local public good provision.5 Note that, in spite of the assumption that
τ¯ is exogenous to the local jurisdiction which rules out capital tax competition within the
federation, we observe competition for the mobile tax base ki via the decision on the local
spending mix. This expenditure competition is attributed to the productivity-enhancing
characteristic of the public input which leads to a partial self-financing of Pi via its positive
tax base effect.
Compositional Inefficiencies in Local Public Spending Rearranging (3.8) shows
that the positive tax base effect of an increase in the expenditure structure λi results in a
wedge between kαi βP
β−1
i , the marginal product of Pi, and v
′, the marginal utility of Zi:(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
= −v′ ∂bi
∂λi
(3.9)
From equation (3.9) one can immediately see that in the local government optimum the
marginal product of the publicly provided input to production (kαi βP
β−1
i ) falls below the
marginal utility of public consumption (v′). Compared to a first best situation under policy
coordination where local governments provide public goods efficiently, i.e. kαi βP
β−1
i = v
′,6
we observe a distortion of the local spending decision due to the positive tax base effect
4Similar to our approach, Buettner (1999) presents theoretical model of strategic policy interaction
where local governments decide both on the tax rate on capital income and the expenditure structure, i.e.
the division of public spending between consumption and investment.
5See Appendix A.3 for further details.
6This can easily be shown in the benchmark case of a benevolent social planner who maximises the
aggregate welfare function of the federation with respect to λi. In this scenario, all fiscal externalities
arising from local public input provision are taken into account and we are left with the following first
order condition for the optimal expenditure structure, λ∗i :
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
bi
!
= 0.
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of public input provision. This finding is in line with Keen and Marchand (1997) who
analyse the impact of fiscal competition on the pattern of public spending and come to the
conclusion that public inputs are relatively overprovided in an uncoordinated equilibrium.
In fact, their finding can easily be reproduced within our setting as a revenue-neutral
switch from Pi to Zi, i.e. dZi = −dPi, yields the following utility effect:
dui =
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
dPi > 0 (3.10)
According to (3.10), the gap between the marginal productivity of Pi and the marginal
utility of Zi which in equilibrium arises from the productivity-enhancing impact of the
public input, results in a positive welfare effect of a budget-compensated switch from
public input provision to public consumption.
3.1.2 Introducing Fiscal Equalisation
In the equilibrium described above one observes compositional inefficiencies in local pub-
lic spending due to fiscal externalities which arise from the productivity effect of public
input provision and are not internalised by the individual juridiction. Therefore, in this
section we address the question of whether, and how, the implementation of a redistribu-
tive equalisation scheme affects a state‘s provision of the tax-base-enhancing public input
relative to its provision of the consumptive public good.7 We build on recent literature
(e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) suggesting that inefficiencies in
local public finances resulting from capital tax competition are reduced or, under certain
assumptions, even corrected for via the implementation of a capacity-based revenue shar-
ing scheme. Intuitively, this effect arises as local jurisdiction, when lowering their capital
tax rate, not only observe a capital inflow and a broadening of their tax base but also face
increased contribution payments to the fiscal equalisation system. Therefore, negative
fiscal externalities arising from capital tax competition are (at least) partially internalised
by local governments which enhances their taxing effort and in turn results in a higher
level of public good provision.
In line with the theoretical analysis presented in chapter 2, we introduce fiscal equal-
isation into our framework by setting a marginal contribution rate ϑi such that income
from grants gi constitutes a linear function of the tax base, i.e.
gi = yi − ϑki.
With this modification the state’s budget constraint changes to
bi = Zi + Pi = (τ¯ − ϑi) ki + yi,
7See Dahlby (2002) for a theoretical analysis in the context of the Canadian equalisation system.
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where yi corresponds to lump-sum grants from the federal government.
Fiscal Equalisation and the Composition of Public Spending
Now, in order to analyse the effects of fiscal equalisation on the local expenditure structure
λi we introduce the modified budget constraint and rearrange f.o.c. (3.9) in order to
generate an implicit function Γ (λi, τ¯ , ϑi, yi) = 0. Applying the implicit function theorem
then yields the effects of variations in the fiscal equalisation parameters ϑi and yi on the
local expenditure structure λi:
dλi
dϑi
= −Γϑi
Γλi
,
dλi
dyi
= −Γyi
Γλi
.
Assuming that the second order condition for the government optimisation problem holds,
i.e. Γλi < 0, it is obvious that sgn(
dλi
dϑi
) = sgn(Γϑi) and sgn(
dλi
dyi
) = sgn(Γyi). Therefore, in
the following comparative static analysis we will focus on the numerators when analyzing
the impact of variations in the two parameters.
Income Effect of Fiscal Equalisation The first step is to analyse how an increase in
unconditional federal transfers affects the state‘s expenditure structure λi. Derivation of
the implicit function Γ with respect to yi yields
Γyi =
∂bi
∂yi
[(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+
(α+ β)− 1
1− α kiβP
β−2
i λi
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
− v′′(1− λi)
(
bi − (1− λi) ∂bi
∂λi
)]
(3.11)
+
∂2bi
∂λi∂yi
[
λi
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+ v′
]
.
According to (3.11), the marginal impact of higher federal transfers on the local ex-
penditure structure consists of two terms, one arising from the direct budgetary effect of
an increase in grants received from the federal level ( ∂bi∂yi ) and an additional indirect effect
stemming from the respective reoptimisation of λi which alters its budgetary impact, i.e.
∂2bi
∂λi∂yi
.
Starting with the direct budgetary impact of an increase in yi, one observes from
equation (3.11) that ∂bi∂yi , which has a positive sign, is multiplied with the gap between the
marginal product of Pi and the marginal utility of Zi (term 1 in upper square brackets).
According to (3.9) this term is negative in the local government optimum which triggers an
incentive to reduce the budgetary share of the public inputs when the federal government
raises transfers yi. In addition, higher spending on Pi lowers its marginal product (term 2
in upper square brackets) thereby further increasing downward pressure on λi. As (1−λi)
of the increase in federal transfers is also spent on Zi, term 3 (in upper square brackets)
indicates that the marginal utility of public consumption will also fall, leading to an adverse
effect. Furthermore, the indirect effect of an increase in unconditional federal transfers
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which arises from the reoptimization of λi cannot be determined as it is not possible to
unambiguously sign ∂
2bi
∂λi∂yi
.8 Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in federal transfers,
yi, on the local budgetary share of the public input to production is ambiguous.
Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalisation In order to capture the incentive effect of
fiscal equalisation we implicitly differentiate Γ with respect to the marginal contribution
rate ϑi. This yields
Γϑi = −ηbi
[
λi
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+ v′
]
− kiΓyi , (3.12)
where η = 11−α
β
k−1i Pi−(τ¯−ϑi)λi
> 0 if yi ≥ 0. Note that an increase in the marginal con-
tribution rate induces both, an income effect (term 2) due to higher contributions to the
redistributive transfer system and a substitution effect (term 1) as public input provision
becomes relatively more costly.9 The substitution (or incentive) effect arises because the
positive tax base effect of the public input is redistributed to a greater extent within the
federation as the marginal contribution rate ϑi rises. In order to focus on this direct
incentive effect of fiscal equalisation we analytically separated the income effect, which ac-
cording to (3.11) cannot be signed unambiguously, from the substitution effect and assume
that jurisdictional income losses are fully compensated by higher transfers, yi, from the
federal government, i.e. dbi = −ki dϑi+dyi != 0. This neutralises the second term on the
RHS of equation (3.12) and we are left with term 1. Note that, as λi takes values between
zero and unity one can immediately see that the term in square brackets is positive. More-
over, as shown in Appendix A.3, η > 0 if federal transfers play a role in financing local
public goods. Therefore, a budget-compensated increase in the marginal contribution rate
applies downward pressure on the optimal budgetary share of public inputs λ∗i , i.e.
∂λi
∂ϑi
∣∣∣∣
comp.
< 0. (3.13)
The magnitude of this incentive effect of fiscal equalisation on local expenditure policies
becomes larger as ∂ki∂Pi , the positive tax base effect of the public input, increases. This is
quite intuitive as fiscal competition becomes fiercer as the negative spending externality
rises. On the other hand, decreasing marginal productivity of Pi consequently leads to a
reduction of the magnitude of the incentive effect as the budgetary share of ”productive”
spending and the gap between the marginal productivity of Pi and the marginal utility of
Zi increase.
Proposition 4 (Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalisation)
Starting from an interior solution, a budget-compensated increase in the marginal contri-
8See Appendix A.4
9See Appendix A.4 for further details on the computation of Equation (3.12).
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bution rate ϑi to the fiscal equalisation system will induce local jurisdictions to rebalance
their budget towards a lower budgetary share of the public input.
Note that, in line with Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), full equalisation, i.e. τ¯ = ϑi,
establishes efficiency of local public finances as f.o.c. 3.8 reduces to
∂ui
∂λi
=
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
yi
!= 0. (3.14)
With full equalisation the gap between the marginal product of the public input and
the marginal utility of public consumption vanishes which indicates an efficient provision
of public goods, i.e. kαi βP
β−1 = v′ = 1. Note that a necessary assumption for this result is
that the aggregate tax base of the federation is not distorted by the implicit coordination
of local spending policies.
Corollary 2 (Efficient Equalisation)
Unitary optimal spending policies can be decentralized by implementing full equalisation,
i.e. ϑi = τ¯ for all i.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
In the following, the theoretical model described above is taken to an empirical test based
on a panel of German states. For a number of reasons, the German federation is a very
interesting case to study in our context. The German states lack taxing autonomy in
regard to their most important sources of revenue, i.e. income and corporate taxes as well
as VAT. Respective tax rates are set coordinately at the federal level. In contrast, their
competencies on the expenditure side of the budget are rather comprehensive. Further-
more, state public finances are strongly influenced by a complex system of vertical and
horizontal intergovernmental transfers.
The empirical analysis will proceed as follows. In section 3.2.1, we define ”produc-
tive” state spending categories used to compute the numerical counterpart of the local
expenditure structure (λi). Then, the underlying data set and the estimation approach
are described in section 3.2.2. Finally, the results are presented and discussed in section
3.2.3.
3.2.1 State productive spending
Our computation of expenditure structures for the German states is based on Thoene
(2005) who provides an in-depth review of the empirical literature on the productivity-
effects of different public spending categories. The insights from this literature overview
are then applied to the German system of budgetary accounting to develop a quality
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indicator for the spending composition at the different levels of state. Following Thoene
(2005), we identify the spending items presented in Table (3.1) as being ”productivity-
enhancing”. Our focus lies on educational and infrastructure spending. Note that, in
order to compute the empirical counterpart of the expenditure structure, λ, from our
theoretical model we first calculate the state-specific ratio of each expenditure item to
primary spending and then aggregate to derive the overall (primary) budgetary share
of ”productive” spending. In the year 2003, this share averaged 33.6% indicating that
German states, on average, devoted approximately one third of their primary expenditure
to spending on education and infrastructure. Note that, as public finances at the state
and municipal level are strongly interlinked in Germany we use aggregated spending data
from the German Statistical Office to compute expenditure shares.
Table 3.1: State Productive Spending 2003
Spending item % of
Primary spending
Education and R&D:
- Schools and pre-school education 15.16
- Universities 5.95
- Sponsorship of pupils, students, etc. 1.25
- Research and development (outside universities) 0.95
Infrastructure:
- Streets 3.09
- Waterways and ports 0.09
- Rail and public transport 2.81
- Aviation 0.04
- Municipal services (sewer system, etc.) 4.28
Overall ”productive” spending: 33.62
Source: German statistical office and own calculations.
3.2.2 Data and estimation approach
Our empirical analysis is based on an annual database of German states which covers
the period between 1980 and 2003. Since the former eastern states have only been fully
integrated into the state fiscal equalisation system since 1995 our dataset includes these
states from 1995 onwards and our panel is therefore unbalanced. We us the following
estimation equation to identify the determinants of state expenditure policies in Germany:
λi,t = β1λi,t−1 + β2yi,t + β3ϑi,t + β4xi,t + χi + ψt + εi,t (3.15)
Note that, as we assume the decision on the expenditure structure to constitute a dynamic
adjustment process, we take into account the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand
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side of our estimation equation. The database underlying our empirical analysis contains
detailed information on the composition of state spending which we used to compute
state expenditure structures as described in Section 3.2.1. According to Table 5.1, the
mean value of the (primary) budgetary share of state ”productive” spending amounted to
approximately 34.2% in the period under consideration and varied between 22.6 and 41.3%.
In addition, the database contains information regarding the treatment of each state within
the fiscal equalisation system. More specifically, the database allows us to compute for
each state and each year all contributions and transfers related to fiscal equalisation at
the state level.10 In order to control for income effects from intergovernmental transfers
we include in our regression equation unconditional transfers, which are computed by
summing up the fiscal equalisation related transfers presented in Table (1.1) in section
1.1, i.e. fiscal equalisation, federal and special requirement transfers. Note that in our
sample the mean value of these transfers amounted to 391.5 e per capita with a maximum
of 3017 and a minimum of -165.7 e per capita. Negative values result from the fact that
states which are characterised by above average per capita tax revenues contribute to the
equalisation system. The marginal contribution rate captures the incentives individual
states face within the fiscal equalisation scheme. As described in further detail in section
1.1, it quantifies to which extent tax revenue increases in a specific state reduce its transfers
received from or, in the case of a fiscally strong state, raise its contributions to the system
of fiscal equalisation. Between 1980 and 2003 this marginal contribution rate averaged
68.6% with the standard variation of 27.8 pointing to significant cross-sectional and time
variation. This indicates that on average only 30% of an increase in revenues remained in
the state budget due to higher contributions to or lower transfers from the equalisation
system. We also implement a set of control variables xi which includes the relative fiscal
capacity. It is calculated by relating a state’s fiscal need, which basically depends on
the respective population size, to its fiscal capacity, i.e. the sum of its tax revenues.
The relative fiscal capacity is used as a control variable in our estimations to control
for state differences in the taxing capacity. In the period under consideration, it varied
between 67.8 and 125.8% , therefore revealing substantial variation. Note that a relative
fiscal capacity of say 80% indicates that this particular state’s taxing capacity, in per
capita terms, amounts to 80% of the state-wide average. As shown in Table 5.1 we also
employ a set of political dummy variables, capturing the partisan composition of state
governments. The reasoning behind this is that the spending structure might also be
affected by political preferences. We therefore created dummies for social-democratic
(left) and christian-democratic (conservative) led governments as well as grand coalitions.
Other control variables include the unemployment rate as well as the population size.
Fixed effects, χi, are included to control for state heterogeneity and we implement a full
set of time dummies, ψt.
10See section 1.1 for further details.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal variables:
Expenditure structure (in %), λ 34.23 3.686 22.66 41.30
Marginal contribution rate (in %), ϑ 68.60 27.81 1.666 98.44
Unconditional transfers (e per capita), y 391.5 591.6 -165.7 3017
Relative fiscal capacity (in %) 94.99 12.06 67.82 125.8
Debt Service (e per capita) 314.5 174.5 73.92 949.0
Political dummy variables:
Conservative government .2619 .4404 0 1
Conservative coalition government .1123 .3162 0 1
Left government .2585 .4386 0 1
Left coalition government .2551 .4367 0 1
Grand coalition .1088 .3120 0 1
Other control variables:
Unemployment rate (in %) 10.88 4.541 2.3 21.8
Population (in 1000) 5602 4863 655.8 18073
Number of observations: 294. Annual data for 10 western (6 eastern) German States in the
period 1980-2003 (1995-2003).
A close inspection of regression equation (3.15) reveals some potential sources of en-
dogeneity, one arising from the implementation of the lagged dependent variable. As we
use a dynamic specification, the standard Least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator
might be inconsistent and result in biased parameter estimates. This is well-known from
the literature on dynamic panel estimation and referred to as the ’Nickell bias’. Nickell
(1981) derives a formula for the inconsistency of the LSDV estimator in models with a
finite time dimension showing that the bias declines as T increases. Kiviet (1995) and
Kiviet (1999) extend this result by analysing the small sample properties of the bias and
present a method to correct the LSDV estimator (LSDVC). On the basis of Monte Carlo
simulations, Judson and Owen (1999) show that when the cross-section dimension of a
panel is only moderately large the LSDVC estimator outperforms standard GMM estima-
tion techniques. Therefore, to ensure that our results do not suffer from the bias described
above, we make use of a correction method for unbalanced panel data models which was
developed by Bruno (2005).
Another potential source of endogeneity results from the fact that a state’s ”treatment”
within the fiscal equalisation system depends on its relative fiscal capacity, which may be
influenced by state expenditure policies. For example, infrastructure spending to attract
private investment could exert a tax base broadening effect which would alter a state’s
fiscal capacity and, thereby, the amount of equalisation grants received. Therefore, our
regression could suffer from simultaneity bias. Note that Egger, Koethenbuerger, and
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Smart (2007), in the context of municipal fiscal equalisation in Germany, refer to this issue
as a problem of self-selection which they address by exploiting a ”natural experiment”,
i.e. a reform of the system of fiscal equalisation in the German state of Lower-Saxony,
and performing, inter alia, differences-in-differences estimation. In our analysis, we make
use of a simulation programme which enables us to calculate ”standardised” values of
the variables potentially causing the simultaneity bias. In particular, this concerns the
marginal contribution rate as well as state and federal fiscal equalisation transfers. The
idea is to separate potentially endogeneous variation in these variables, i.e. variation due
to differences in the taxing capacity, from supposedly exogenous variation resulting, inter
alia, from heterogenous population developments. Concretely, this is done by rerunning the
simulation procedure for each state while assuming an average per capita taxing capacity.
The resulting values for the equalisation variables will now only capture relative differences
in the population size as well as a number of exogenous revenue sources and therefore
should not cause the described problem of endogeneity in our estimations.
In addition, as discussed in Buettner (2006) in the context of local tax policy, a precise
identification of the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation might be hindered due to diffi-
culties in separating the ”treatment effect” via the equalisation system from the impact
of heterogeneous and possibly unobserved characteristics driving local fiscal conditions.
This is due to the fact that both the marginal contribution rate as well as fiscal equalisa-
tion transfers depend on a state’s relative fiscal capacity. Therefore, we follow Buettner
(2006) and exploit the fact that incentives within the complex, however clearly defined,
state fiscal equalisation system in Germany vary discontinuously with a state’s relative
fiscal capacity. Along the lines of regression discontinuity estimation (e.g., Angrist and
Lavy, 1999; Van der Klaauw, 2002), we employ a number of non-linear specifications of
the relative fiscal capacity in order to separate out the different treatment of the state
within the equalisation system.
3.2.3 Results
Table 3.3 provides results from our baseline regression using the standard Least square
dummy variable (LSDV) estimator. Specification (1) includes the basic set of explanatory
variables while in specifications (2) and (3) we test for the impact of non-linear differences
in the relative fiscal capacity along the lines of regression discontinuity estimation. Con-
ditioning on the relative fiscal capacity in all specifications is important to make sure that
the results capture the impact of the equalisation system rather than simply reflecting
differences in taxing capacity. Note that the high significance of the lagged expenditure
structure across all specifications supports our assumption that the decision on the state
spending mix constitutes a dynamic adjustment process. Moreover, our results suggest
a non-linear relationship between the relative fiscal capacity and the budgetary share of
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”productive” spending. In particular, taking into account a quadratic and cubic polyno-
mial as in specification (3) increases the fit of the empirical model.
Table 3.3: Determinants of State Expenditure Structures - baseline
Variable (1) (2) (3)
LSDV LSDV LSDV
Expenditure structure (λ), lag .6706 ??? .6611 ??? .6599 ???
(.0704) (.0722) (.0709)
Unconditional transfers (y) -.0004 -.0004 -.0005
(.0004) (.0005) (.0004)
Marginal contribution rate (ϑ) -.0077 ?? -.0082 ?? -.0084 ??
(.0033) (.0034) (.0034)
Relative fiscal capacity -.0324 ? .0902 -2.188
(.0191) (.1927) (1.343)
Relative fiscal capacity (quadratic) -.0006 .0230 ?
(.0009) (.0134)
Relative fiscal capacity (cubic) -.0001 ?
(.0000)
Debt service -.0033 ?? -.0031 ?? -.0032 ??
(.0014) (.0015) (.0015)
Left government .6047 ?? .5941 ?? .5056 ??
(.2456) (.2484) (.2323)
Observations 294 294 294
R-squared (adjusted) .9364 .9363 .9373
Standard Lest square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator . All specifications include state-
specific and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. If significant at 1%,5%
or 10% level coefficients are marked with one star, two stars or three stars. Insignificant
control variables are not reported and include population, unemployment rate and political
variables.
Turning to the fiscal equalisation variables in Table (3.3) one can observe a negative
sign on unconditional transfers throughout all specifications, suggesting a negative income
effect of state and federal transfers. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant
which is in line with the implications from our theoretical model as the impact of a
marginal increase in yi could not be determined unambiguously. Note that, controlling
for unconditional transfers in addition to the relative fiscal capacity is important to make
sure that income effects do not drive our results. This enables us to identify the pure
incentive effect of fiscal equalisation by including the marginal contribution rate as a
right-hand side variable. In line with Proposition 4 of our theoretical analysis, our results
strongly support the existence of an incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on state
expenditure policies. The point estimate in specification (3) implies that an increase in
the marginal contribution rate by one percentage point leads to a decrease in the share
of spending on infrastructure and education by 0.0084 percentage points. Note that, this
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effect is highly significant throughout all specifications reported in (3.3), suggesting that
state fiscal equalisation in Germany discourages public investment spending at the state
level. In addition, we find a statistically significant negative effect of the debt service
which indicates that an increase in a state’s debt burden tends to lower the budgetary
share of spending on infrastructure and education. Moreover, the positive and statistically
significant coefficient of the dummy variable capturing ”left” governments suggests that
there seems to be a tendency for social-democratically led governments to spend relatively
more on infrastructure and education than conservative governments.
As discussed in section 3.2.2, the results presented in Table 3.3 might be biased due to
potential inconsistency of the LSDV estimator in dynamic models. Therefore, we run ad-
ditional estimations based on a bias-correction method proposed by Bruno (2005). Results
are reported in Table 3.4. While the bias-correction does not change the results qualita-
tively, the coefficients and significance levels of our right-hand side variables are affected
to some extent. In particular, the magnitude of the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable increases by some 0.1 percentage point in all specifications. As regards the fiscal
equalisation variables, the coefficient of the unconditional transfers level is more or less
unaffected and remains insignificant. While the impact of the marginal contribution rate
is estimated somewhat less precisely, our central result is robust with respect to the use
of the corrected LSDV estimator. Moreover, the inclusion of a quadratic and cubic poly-
nomial of the relative fiscal capacity is confirmed, suggesting that the non-linearities from
the German state fiscal equalisation system are picked up best when implementing specifi-
cation (3). Furthermore, the coefficient on the debt service remains stable and significant.
However, the impact of the left government dummy becomes insignificant in specification
(3).
Overall, our empirical analysis provides strong evidence for the existence of an incen-
tive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on state expenditure policies in Germany. The
results presented above are in line with Proposition 4 from our theoretical analysis as we
observe that state governments who are facing higher marginal contribution rates within
the German state fiscal equalisation system tend to be characterised by lower budgetary
shares of ”productive” spending on infrastructure and education.
3.3 Summary
The theoretical analysis presented in this chapter is based on a simple model of fiscal
competition where local jurisdiction compete for a mobile tax base via the provision of a
productivity-enhancing public input. In line with Keen and Marchand (1997), we show
that, without coordination, the local public expenditure structure tends to be biased to-
wards a relative overprovision of productivity-enhancing public inputs compared to purely
consumptive public goods. The reason for this bias is that publicly provided inputs are
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Table 3.4: Determinants of State Expenditure Structures - bias corrected
Variable (1) (2) (3)
LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC
Expenditure structure (λ), lag .7506 ??? .7399 ??? .7392 ???
(.0604) (.0609) (.0596)
Unconditional transfers (y) -.0003 -.0004 -.0004
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Marginal contribution rate (ϑ) -.0072 ? -.0075 ? -.0076 ?
(.0043) (.0046) (.0045)
Relative fiscal capacity -.0294 .0500 -2.052 ?
(.0273) (.1784) (1.193)
Relative fiscal capacity (quadratic) -.0004 .0214 ?
(.0009) (.0124)
Relative fiscal capacity (cubic) -.0001 ?
(.0000)
Debt service -.0031 ? -.0031 ? -.0030 ?
(.0016) (.0017) (.0017)
Left government .5107 ? .5109 ? .4274
(.3012) (.3023) (.3015)
Bias corrected Least square dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator proposed by Bruno (2005).
All specifications include state-specific and time fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors
in parentheses. If significant at 1%,5% or 10% level coefficients are marked with one star, two
stars or three stars. Insignificant control variables are not reported and include population,
unemployment rate and political variables.
partially self-financing as they improve the productivity of local firms which induces a cap-
ital inflow, i.e. a broadening of the local tax base. The inefficiency in local public spending
arises because this negative fiscal externality for other jurisdictions in the federation is not
taken into account by the individual local government. Starting from this result, we show
that, similar to the case of tax competition (see, e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky
and Smart, 2006), the implementation of a redistributive transfer system can increase or,
in the case of full equalisation, even restore efficiency of local public finances. We find
that a budget-compensated increase in the marginal contribution rate to the system of
fiscal equalisation induces local governments to reduce the budgetary share of public in-
puts to production. Therefore, compositional inefficiencies on the spending side as pointed
out by Keen and Marchand (1997) are alleviated by the introduction of capacity-based
fiscal equalisation transfers. More intuitively, a higher degree of equalisation will make
it less attractive for the individual jurisdiction to provide public inputs as positive tax
base effects are redistributed to a higher extent among governments within the federation.
This induces an internalisation of fiscal externalities at the local level which generates
incentives for local governments to substitute public input provision by public consump-
tion. In line with the theoretical implications, our empirical analysis strongly supports
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the existence of an incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on state expenditure
policies in Germany. Controlling in a comprehensive way for income effects, we find that
a higher marginal contribution rate to the state fiscal equalisation system induces state
governments to reduce the budgetary share of spending on infrastructure and education.
This suggests that capacity-based equalisation transfers exert a substitution effect, i.e.
state governments which are facing higher transfer reduction rates within the equalisation
scheme tend to put a higher weight on public consumption.
Chapter 4
The Impact of Fiscal Equalisation
on Local Expenditure Policies
Building on the theoretical analysis presented in chapter 3, we now proceed with analysing
the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation transfers on local public finances.1 Unlike previ-
ously, we now explicitly assume that local jurisdiction have two policy instruments avail-
able to compete for the mobile capital tax base, i.e. the local capital tax rate and the
provision of a productivity-enhancing public input to production. Again, we follow Keen
and Marchand (1997) and use a static model of bi-dimensional fiscal competition. In-
troducing a redistributive grant scheme then allows us to analyse the incentive effects of
fiscal equalisation transfers on local tax and spending decisions. As already shown, e.g.,
in Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), we find that fiscal capacity equalisation induces local ju-
risdictions to increase distortionary taxation of the mobile tax base. In addition, we show
that increasing the degree of redistribution - while compensating for budgetary effects -
induces local governments to rebalance their budget towards a lower budgetary share of
the publicly provided input. Thus, in our analysis the implementation of a system of fiscal
equalisation alleviates both tax and expenditure competition. Moreover, in the case of full
equalisation of tax bases, the compositional inefficiencies in local spending pointed out by
Keen and Marchand (1997) vanish when assuming inelastic supply of capital. Compared
to our theoretical analysis in chapter 2, the result that fiscal equalisation transfers dis-
courage public input provision relative to purely consumptive public goods is shown in a
more general setting where local jurisdictions engage in simultaneous tax and public input
competition.
While two recent studies (Buettner, 2006; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2007)
have analysed the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation grants on local tax policy in
Germany, the empirical analysis presented in this paper, to the best of our knowledge,
1An earlier version of this chapter has already been circulated as a discussion paper. See Hauptmeier
(2007b).
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is the first that focuses on local public spending. The estimations are based on a panel
of German municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. As municipalities, within
their self-administration responsibilities decide on infrastructure spending on the local
street network as well as spending on local schools, Germany is an interesting case to
study in our context. Following Buettner (2006) we make use of non-linearities in the
grant scheme and implement a regression discontinuity estimator to identify the incentive
effect of fiscal equalisation transfers. We find that, in line with the theoretical predictions,
jurisdictions that are facing higher marginal contribution rates to the municipal system of
fiscal equalisation are characterised by lower budgetary shares of public investment in the
fields of street infrastructure and education.
In this chapter we proceed as follows. In section 4.1 we conduct the theoretical analysis
and derive testable empirical implications. Section 4.2 then describes the empirical analysis
of local expenditure policies in Germany. Conclusions are drawn in section 4.3.
4.1 Theoretical Analysis
As previously mentioned, the model in this chapter builds on the theoretical analysis in
chapter 3. Again, we use a standard framework of fiscal competition (e.g., Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986; Keen and Marchand, 1997) and consider a federation with a set of n
local jurisdictions, labelled i = 1, ..., n. In each jurisdiction a competitive firm produces
a homogenous private good using immobile labor L, perfectly mobile capital K and a
publicly provided input P . The common production technology F (L,K,P ) is assumed
to be linear homogenous with respect to labor and capital. The public input P is of
the factor-augmenting type and raises marginal productivity of the primary input factors,
capital and labor. For analytical convenience labor is normalised to unity and we assume
that firms in jurisdiction i produce according to the following (per labor unit) production
technology:
f(ki, Pi) = kαi P
β
i , α+ β ≤ 1
The impact of public inputs is modelled by introducing a shift-term, P βi , into the pro-
duction function which captures total factor productivity. By assumption, the production
function exhibits non-increasing returns to scale, i.e. α+ β ≤ 1.
Each jurisdiction levies a source based tax (τi) on locally installed capital. Profit
maximisation and free capital mobility imply an equal net rate of return to capital r
across jurisdictions which is given by the after tax marginal product of capital
r = fki − τi.
The profit maximisation condition implies per-capita demand for capital ki = φ(r+ τi, Pi)
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and implicit differentiation yields
∂ki
∂τi
=
1
fkiki
< 0,
∂ki
∂Pi
= −fkiPi
fkiki
> 0.
Therefore, a higher local tax rate reduces capital demand in jurisdiction i while an increase
in the provision of the productivity-enhancing public good raises it.
The representative consumer in jurisdiction i derives utility from private (ci) and public
(Zi) consumption according to a well behaved and quasi linear utility function
ui = ci + v(Zi).
Note that v constitutes an increasing and strictly concave function. As we assume that
the representative consumer in jurisdiction i owns the local firm, per-capita private con-
sumption equals the firm’s profits plus capital income:
ci = kαi (λibi)
β − ki(r + τi) + sir,
Note that si labels capital endowment per-capita in jurisdiction i.
Turning to the public sector, the budget of the local government i which is used to
finance public consumption and the public input provision reads
bi = τiki + gi = Zi + Pi,
where gi constitutes grants from the federal government. Again, we assume that the upper
level government administers a system of local fiscal equalisation by setting a marginal
contribution rate (ϑi) such that income from grants (gi) can be represented as a linear
function of the tax base
gi = yi − ϑiki. (4.1)
Unconditional transfers2 from the upper level government are labelled yi. In order to close
the model we assume that the capital market equilibrium is given by∑
j
kj =
∑
j
sj ,
so that total capital demand in the federation is satisfied by total capital endowment.
Similar to Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), we assume that the number of jurisdictions n
in the national economy is large and therefore the (net) interest rate effect of variations
in either policy instrument is not taken into account by local governments.
2These are the transfers a jurisdiction would receive if its tax base were actually zero.
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Local jurisdictions simultaneously choose their policy instruments τi and λi given the
optimal choices of the other jurisdictions while neglecting the external impacts of their
policies. Here, we extend the theoretical model presented in chapter 3 by explicitly as-
suming that local jurisdictions have fiscal autonomy, both with respect to the revenue
and the spending side of their budget. Therefore, given free capital mobility in the fed-
eration, local governments will engage in simultaneous tax and public input competition
for the capital tax base. This can be shown by setting up the following unconstrained
maximisation problem of jurisdiction i.
max
τi,λi
ui(τi, λi) = kαi (λibi)
β − ki (r + τi) + si r + v ((1− λi) bi) (4.2)
Note that again we substitute Zi and Pi by their respective budgetary shares times the
budget, i.e. Zi = (1 − λi)bi and Pi = λibi. Maximising with respect to the tax rate (τi)
and the budgetary share of the public input (λi) yields the first order conditions from the
perspective of jurisdiction i.
∂ui
∂τi
= −ki +
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′
)(
λi
∂bi
∂τi
)
+ v′
∂bi
∂τi
!= 0 (4.3)
∂ui
∂λi
=
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′
)(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
+ v′
∂bi
∂λi
!= 0 (4.4)
From (4.4) one can immediately observe that in the local government optimum the marginal
product of the publicly provided input to production (kαi β(λibi)
β−1) falls below the marginal
utility of public consumption (v′).3 This result has already been discussed in the theo-
retical section of chapter 3. Compared to a first best situation under policy coordination
where governments provide public goods efficiently, i.e. kα−γi β(λibi)
β−1 = v′ = 1, we
observe a distortion of the local spending decision due to the productivity-enhancing ef-
fect of public input provision. In line with Keen and Marchand (1997), we observe that
the public input to private production is relatively overprovided compared to the purely
consumptive public good (see section 3.1 for further details).
In order to generate further insights into the efficiency consequences of capital mobility
in our model of tax and public input competition, we can solve both first order conditions
(4.3) and (4.4) for
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′) and equate them. This leaves us with
v′ =
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
. (4.5)
3Note that rearranging equation 4.4 yields
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′) = − v′ ∂bi∂λi(
bi+λi
∂bi
∂λi
) < 0. This follows from
∂bi
∂λi
> 0 which can be shown by implicitly differentiating the local governments budget constraint with
respect to λi (see Appendix A.3).
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Equation 4.5 constitutes the usual optimality condition that the marginal rate of substi-
tution (MRS) between public and private consumption (v′) equals the marginal rate of
transformation (MRT) which captures the marginal cost of raising public funds (MCPF).4
As the marginal contribution rate ϑi enters the RHS of equation (4.5) the redistribu-
tive grant system allows the federal government to adjust the local cost of raising public
funds.5 One can immediately observe that by implementing full equalisation, i.e. τi = ϑi,
the MCPF reduce to one. This is in line with Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) who, in a
pure tax competition setting, show that if saving is inelastic full equalisation establishes
efficiency of local public finances. In addition, setting τi = ϑi in either of the first order
conditions (4.3) and (4.4) leads to the fact that the gap between the marginal product of
the public input (kαi β(λibi)
β−1) and the marginal utility of public consumption (v′) van-
ishes. Therefore, full equalisation corrects both externalities arising from tax as well as
expenditure competition in the presence of a publicly provided input to production. When
fiscal equalisation is only partial, i.e. τi > ϑi, underprovision of the public consumption
good occurs as MCPF exceeds one. This is apparent from equation 4.5 as the RHS exceeds
one due to the marginal tax base effect of an increase in the tax rate (∂ki∂τi < 0).
Comparative static analysis of variations in the marginal contribution rate ϑi generates
further insights into how the federal government can affect the local MCPF by inducing
jurisdictions to adjust their policy parameters λi and τi. We solve equations 4.3 and 4.4
for
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′) and mutually substitute the derived expressions. Thereby we take
into account the fact that in a local government optimum both conditions, 4.3 and 4.4,
need to be fulfilled. The resulting optimality conditions for the two policy parameters
read
Γλi (τi, λi, ϑi, yi) =
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
− v′ = 0, (4.6)
Γτi (τi, λi, ϑi, yi) = −Γλi (τi, λi, ϑi, yi) = 0. (4.7)
In order to derive the comparative static effects of a change in the marginal contribution
rate ϑi on the two policy parameters, the next step is to apply the implicit function
theorem on Γτi and Γλi which yields
dλi
dϑi
= −
∂Γλi
∂ϑi
∂Γλi
∂λi
. (4.8)
4See appendix A.5. for computational details on the derivation of equation 4.5.
5See section 1.2.
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dτi
dϑi
= −
∂Γτi
∂ϑi
∂Γτi
∂τi
, (4.9)
Assuming that the second order conditions of the unconstrained maximisation problem 4.2
hold ensures that ∂Γ
τi
∂τi
< 0 and ∂Γ
λi
∂λi
< 0. Therefore, the enumerators on the RHS of equa-
tions 4.9 and 4.8 will determine the signs of the comparative static effects. Differentiating
Γλi and Γτi with respect to ϑi yields
∂Γλi
∂ϑi
=
∂bi
∂ϑi
 β
1− α
(τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
bi
(
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
)v′ − (1− λi) v′′

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ki
∂Γλi
∂yi
(4.10)
− v
′
kαi βP
β−1
i
ki
∂ki
∂Pi
α
(
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
) ,
∂Γτi
∂ϑi
= −∂Γ
λi
∂ϑi
. (4.11)
According to equation 4.10, the overall impact of a marginal increase in ϑi on the opti-
mal expenditure structure chosen in jurisdiction i can be separated into a ”substitution”
and an ”income” effect. This result has already been discussed in the theoretical analysis
presented in chapter 3. The first term on the RHS of equation (4.10) captures the pure
”income effect” which cannot be signed unambiguously as the term in square brackets
comprises two counteracting effects. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in public funds directly
reduces public consumption as well as public input provision according to the respective
budgetary shares. This in turn leads to an increased marginal utility of Zi but also to a
higher marginal productivity of Pi. The adjustment of the endogenous budgetary struc-
ture then depends on the specification of the utility function, which is general in our case,
and the assumptions concerning production technology. The substitution or ”incentive
effect” (term 2 on RHS of equation 4.10), however, puts downward pressure on the local
expenditure structure, inducing local governments to reduce the provision of the public in-
put Pi relative to the purely consumptive good Zi. This results from the fact that positive
tax base effects due to an increase in the budgetary share of the public input λi are now
”shared” to a greater extent by all jurisdictions within the system of fiscal equalisation.
Note that this effect becomes stronger as the gap between the marginal utility of public
consumption and the marginal product of the public input
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′), which
arises in the local government optimum due to the productivity effect of Pi6, increases.
Furthermore, the impact of an increase in the degree of redistribution within the equali-
6See first order condition 4.4.
4.1. Theoretical Analysis 70
sation scheme depends on the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the public input.
This result is quite intuitive as the positive tax base effect of public input provision, i.e.
∂ki
∂Pi
, leads to a partial self-financing of Pi. An increase in the marginal contribution rate,
however, increases the perceived local cost of providing the input to production and this
effect becomes stronger as the tax base effect increases. Note that incentive effect of a
marginal increase ϑi on local tax policy operates in the opposite direction, indicating that
fiscal externalities arising from variations in the local tax rates tend to be internalised by
redistributive transfer schemes. More concretely, if a jurisdiction increases its tax rate
to generate additional public funds, the resulting adverse tax base effect will be partly
compensated via higher transfer payments from the equalisation system, i.e. the MCPF
perceived at the local level decrease as the degree of redistribution within the system
increases.
Unfortunately, as shown above, the ambiguity in the direction of the income effect of
equalisation transfers impede clear-cut theoretical predicitions. One can imagine however,
a scenario where the federal government imposes a budget-neutral reform of the local
fiscal equalisation system so that local revenue losses resulting from an increase in the
marginal contributions rate are fully compensated by corresponding increases in uncon-
ditional transfers yi, i.e. dbi = −ki dϑi + dyi != 0. Such a budget-compensated reform
of the local equalisation scheme would neutralise the income effect described above and
exert an isolated ”price effect”. Therefore, we can conclude that a marginal increase in
ϑi, if compensating for budgetary losses by a corresponding increase in transfers from
the upper-level government, yields the following budget-compensated comparative static
effects:
∂λi
∂ϑi
∣∣∣∣
comp.
< 0, ,
∂τi
∂ϑi
∣∣∣∣
comp.
> 0 (4.12)
Therefore, a budget-compensated increase in the marginal contribution rate induces local
jurisdictions to increase the tax rate on mobile capital. This finding is in line with the
theoretical literature which states that fiscal capacity based equalisation tends to decrease
the marginal cost of raising public funds, thereby generating incentives for participating
governments to increase their tax effort and raise distortionary taxation. Efficiency of local
public finances is enhanced despite the presence of tax competition for a mobile tax base
(Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006). While this tax rate effect is well
documented, we also show that by increasing the marginal contribution rate the upper-
level government is able to implicitly affect the composition of local public spending as a
higher degree of redistribution induces jurisdictions to lower the budgetary share of the
productivity-enhancing public input. Thus, compositional inefficiencies in local spending
as suggested by Keen and Marchand (1997) are (at least partially) corrected.
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4.2 Empirical Analysis
The following empirical analysis tests for the existence of incentive effects of fiscal equalisa-
tion transfers on local public finances in Germany. In order to do so, we exploit a rich data
set of municipalities in the major German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. In our context,
Germany is a very interesting case to study as the municipal system of fiscal equalisa-
tion, which is administered by the states, is characterised by substantial redistribution of
fiscal resources. Moreover, within their self-administration responsibilities, municipalities
decide on spending on local streets and schools, two expenditure categories which can be
classified as ”productive” spending.
In the following we will first present the underlying data and describe the estimation
approach in chapter (4.2.1). In Section (4.2.2) the results are presented.
4.2.1 Data and Estimation Approach
Our empirical analysis is based on an annual database for the 1111 municipalities in the
German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. It covers the period between 1990 and 2003 as
some of the expenditure data is not available for the most recent fiscal year 2004. For
our estimations we reduce this sample in two ways. Firstly, we restrict our attention to
municipalities with a population of more than 10000. The reason for this is that revenues
from the municipal business tax, which constitutes a tax on the profits of local firms, are
subject to significant fluctuations. The instability of the tax base is apparent especially in
small municipalities, which are often characterised by a relatively homogenous economic
structure. Secondly, there exist 9 independent cities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg,
which do not belong to a county and therefore face different incentives within the municipal
system of fiscal equalisation. We also exclude these observations. Table 5.1 gives an
overview of the underlying data for the reduced sample.
The local expenditure structure (λi) is calculated as the primary expenditure share of
spending on basic schools and municipal roads. In line with the empirical analysis of state
spending policies presented in chapter 3, we assume that these two spending categories
capture local ”investment spending”. The mean value of the expenditure structure is ap-
proximately 9.6 %, i.e. about 9.6 % of municipal spending (net of debt service) relates to
basic education and street infrastructure. Moreover, the data set comprises a set of vari-
ables capturing the treatment of local jurisdictions within the municipal system of fiscal
equalisation. First of all, as described in further detail in section 1.1, the marginal contri-
bution rate quantifies to what extent increases in the local tax base increase contribution
payments to the municipal equalisation scheme. In our sample period from 1990 to 2003,
this contribution rate averaged 12.8%, with a minimum value of approximately 4.5% and a
maximum of 14.5%. Moreover, municipalities received unconditional transfers amounting
to approximately 297 e per capita. In addition to further general grants, municipalities
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure structure (λi) in % 9.632 3.286 1.675 49.33
Fiscal equalisation variables:
Marginal contribution rate (ϑi) in % 12.77 1.487 4.445 14.50
Unconditional transfers (yi) e per capita 296.9 50.00 123.5 373.7
Other grants (general) e per capita 4.818 9.258 0 101.3
Specific grants e per capita 18.61 31.00 0 252.0
Other control variables:
Population in 1000 24.68 16.80 10.24 112.0
Population density per km2 576.1 434.7 68.23 2494
Sample size: 2758 observations - 197 municipalities over 14 years (1990-2003).
also received specific grants to fulfil their self-administered spending responsibilities. In
our context two types of specific grants are of particular interest: Firstly, within the so
called ”traffic and transport burden sharing” (”Verkehrslastenausgleich”), municipalities
receive general as well as lump-sum grants depending on the length of the road network
and the size of the municipal area respectively. Secondly, in the course of ”school burden
sharing” (”Schullastenausgleich”), municipalities receive transfers depending on the num-
ber of pupils. Overall, these specific grants amounted to approximately 19 e per capita
in our sample period.
The basic estimation equation is given in (4.13).
λi,t = λ (ϑi,t, yi,t ; xi,t, φi, ψt) (4.13)
We estimate the determinants of the local expenditure structure λi,t. The marginal con-
tribution rate to the municipal fiscal equalisation system (ϑi,t) denotes the key variable
on the RHS of estimation equation (4.13). Its coefficient is assumed to capture the incen-
tive effect of fiscal equalisation on local expenditure policies. To ensure that no ”income
effects” drive the results we control for unconditional transfers yi,t.7 In addition, specific
grants as well as other general grants from the state and the federal level are included
as control variables in xi,t. Finally, we control for population size as well as population
density.
We use panel estimation techniques and impose regional fixed effects φi to avoid an
omitted variable bias due to unobserved local heterogeneity. We also control for common
7See section 1.1 for details on the computation of unconditional grants.
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time shocks by implementing time fixed effects (ψt).
As previously pointed out by Buettner (2006) in the context of local tax policy in
Germany, a potential problem of endogeneity could hinder the identification of incentive
effects of equalisation transfers as it is difficult to disentangle the ”treatment effect” of the
equalisation scheme and the impact of heterogenous and possibly unobserved characteris-
tics driving local fiscal conditions. As both variables capturing the impact of equalisation,
i.e. the marginal contribution rate and unconditional transfers, depend on a municipality’s
relative fiscal capacity it is not clear which effect is measured when estimating equation
(4.13). In the light of these difficulties, Buettner (2006) proposes an identification strategy
which exploits the fact that incentives within the municipal equalisation system vary dis-
continuously with the relative fiscal capacity. Figure 4.1 illustrates these discontinuities.
Simulating marginal contribution rates at average revenue sharing and county contribution
rates for the year 2003 reveals discontinuous ”jumps” at the threshold levels of relative
fiscal capacity defined by law.8 The observed ”step function” is separated into three areas
according to whether a jurisdiction is characterised as having ”low”, ”medium” or ”high”
fiscal capacity. Municipalities with a fiscal capacity below 60% of fiscal need, on average,
face the highest marginal contribution rates leading to an average equalisation rate (ϑiτi )
amounting to 85%.9 The respective values for the ”medium” and ”high” capacity regime
are 77% and 61%.
The fact that small differences in relative fiscal capacity can lead to significant asym-
metries concerning the incentives faced by municipalities allows us to attempt to identify
the incentive effects of fiscal equalisation by using a regression discontinuity estimator.
The ”regression discontinuity approach” was first established by Campbell (1969). The
idea behind this approach is to identify the causal effect of a treatment that is assigned
as a deterministic function of an observed covariate, which is also related to the outcome
of interest. Recent applications of the regression discontinuity design include Angrist and
Lavy (1999), Van der Klaauw (2002) and Buettner (2006).
In our case the fiscal equalisation parameters ϑi and yi depict deterministic functions
of the municipal relative fiscal capacity which are defined by law. We therefore specify
the following estimation equation:
λi,t = β1ϑi,t + β2yi,t + β3ϕ(γi,t) + β4xi,t + φi + ψt + i,t (4.14)
Note that the impact of relative fiscal capacity (γi,t) on the local expenditure structure
is captured by a function ϕ(γi,t). By controlling for γi,t we ensure that fiscal capacity
differences do not drive the results and only discontinuities are exploited to identify the
8Note that unconditional transfers yi reveal a very similar pattern also characterised by discontinuous
”jumps” at the thresholds 0.6 and 1.
9Equalisation rates are calculated by taking the ratio of the marginal contribution rate ϑi and the
statutory business tax rate τi.
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Figure 4.1: Discontinuities in municipal fiscal equalisation
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effects of the fiscal equalisation parameters on local spending policies. As the specification
of ϕ(γi,t) is key to identification, we employ several alternatives in order to capture possible
non-linearities in the fiscal equalisation system. In addition to linear, quadratic and cubic
specifications in the relative fiscal capacity we therefore also employ a linear spline. This
is accomplished by interacting relative fiscal capacity with regime dummies, i.e. ”low”,
”medium” and ”high” capacity.
Another important aspect one should consider when analyzing the determinants of the
local expenditure structure is that previous decisions might affect contemporary spending
policies, i.e. the expenditure structure might follow a partial adjustment process. The
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the RHS would be a means of capturing
this intertemporal policy aspect. However, in the context of a ”regression discontinuity
approach” estimating a partial adjustment model is not straightforward as conditioning
on ϕ(γi,t) implies that only the fiscal equalisation parameters necessarily exhibit a behav-
ioral interpretation. Therefore, including lagged values of the covariates and estimating a
reduced form equation conceptually constitutes a prudential way of taking into account
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past policy decisions in our framework. Heckman and Robb (1986) suggest this procedure
as an alternative to an explicit dynamic specification.
4.2.2 Results
Table (4.2) gives an overview of the basic regression results. Specifications (1) - (3) include
general and specific grants as well as linear and quadratic specifications in the population
size and density as conditioning variables. In addition to controlling for regional and time
fixed effects we impose alternative specifications concerning the relative fiscal capacity.10
In all specifications we estimate a significant and negative effect of the marginal con-
tribution rate on the local expenditure structure. This is in line with the theoretical
predictions from the model described in section (5.1), i.e. a higher marginal contribution
rate should be associated with a lower budgetary share of ”productive” spending on basic
schools and the local street network.
Note that while the fit of the model is more or less unaffected by using alternative spec-
ifications of the relative fiscal capacity, the magnitude of the coefficients of the marginal
contribution rate varies between specifications (1) - (3). In particular, conditioning on the
linear spline and thereby explicitly taking into account the three fiscal capacity regimes
defined by law leads to a stronger effect of the marginal contribution rate. A one percent-
age point increase coincides with a 0.29 percentage point decrease of the local expenditure
structure compared to values of -0.21 and -0.19 in specification (1) and (2) respectively. In
addition, unconditional transfers which exert a significant and positive impact on the local
expenditure structure in the first two specifications turn insignificant when controlling for
the linear spline. It is also noteworthy that, when switching to the spline specification, the
significance and the magnitude of the effects of the remaining conditioning variables are
basically unaffected. Quite intuitively, specific grants in the field of basic schools and road
infrastructure exert a significant and positive effect on the respective budgetary share.
In addition, this share increases as the population size rises while the population density
exerts a negative and significant effect on the local expenditure structure.
As discussed in section 4.2.1 intertemporal policy aspects might play a role when
analyzing the determinants of the local budgetary structure. Therefore, Table (4.3) reports
results including lags of the covariates as further conditioning variables.
Taking into account dynamic effects marginally improves the R2 compared to the spec-
ifications without lags in time whereas specification (2) reveals a slightly better fit. Most
noticeable, the contemporary marginal contribution rate becomes insignificant when con-
ditioning on a cubic polynomial in the relative fiscal capacity while we observe a lagged
response of the expenditure structure. The positive ”income effect” through unconditional
10Note that the linear specification is not reported as results resemble those of specification (1) while
featuring a lower R2.
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Table 4.2: Determinants of Municipal Expenditure Structures - baseline
Variable / Specification (1) (2) (3)
Marginal contribution rate -0.2132 ??? -0.1885 ??? -0.2883 ???
(0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0931)
Unconditional grants, per capita 0.0614 ??? 0.0599 ??? 0.0323
(0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0235)
Other grants (general), per capita 0.0955 0.0990 0.0908
(0.1591) (0.1612) (0.1577)
Specific grants, per capita 0.3526 ??? 0.3523 ??? 0.3526 ???
(0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0332)
Population, in 1000 0.0047 ??? 0.0047 ??? 0.0048 ???
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Population, squared -0.0000 ?? -0.0000 ?? -0.0000 ??
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Population density -0.0290 ??? -0.02910 ??? -0.02940 ???
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Population density, squared 0.0009 ??? 0.0009 ??? 0.0009 ???
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Relative fiscal capacity squared cubic linear spline
Sample size 2758
Mean of dep. var. 0.0959
R-squared (adjusted) 0.5993 0.5998 0.5995
All specifications include regional and time fixed effects as well as controls for relative fiscal capacity as
denoted. If significant at 1% (5%) level coefficients are marked with three stars (two stars).
transfers is now only weakly significant. Including lags in time in the linear spline spec-
ification leaves the contemporary effect of the marginal contribution rate unaffected in
terms of magnitude though the coefficient is less precisely estimated. Again contemporary
unconditional transfers do not exert a significant impact on the local budgetary structure
but we find a weakly significant and positive lagged response.
Overall, the regression analysis confirms the presence of an incentive effect of fiscal
equalisation grants as suggested by theory. The coefficient of the marginal contribution
rate has a negative sign in all reported estimations and the effect is statistically significant
with the exception of specification (1) in table 4.3. Here we only observe a lagged response.
Notwithstanding, it must be highlighted that the magnitude of the incentive effect is
sensitive to the specification of relative fiscal capacity, the conditioning variable in the
context of the regression discontinuity approach. However, as capturing the nature of
discontinuity is key to identification when using discontinuity estimators, implementing
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Municipal Expenditure Structures - dynamic
Variable (1) (2)
Marginal contribution rate -0.1531 -0.2877 ??
(0.1063) (0.1472)
Unconditional grants, per capita 0.0502 ? 0.0016
(0.0294) (0.0374)
Other grants (general), per capita 0.0033 0.0068
(0.1280) (0.1293)
Specific grants, per capita 0.3376 ??? 0.3382 ???
(0.0342) (0.0341)
Population, in 1000 0.0300 ??? 0.0304 ???
(0.0090) (0.0084)
Population, squared -0.0000 ??? -0.0000 ???
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Density -0.1241 ??? -0.1258 ???
(0.0374) (0.0372)
Density, squared 0.0027 ??? 0.0028 ???
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Marginal contribution rate, lag -0.1990 ?? -0.1827
(.0910) (0.1234)
Unconditional grants, per capita, lag 0.0270 0.0609 ?
(0.0275) (0.0370)
Relative fiscal capacity cubic linear spline
Sample size 2561
Mean of dep. var. 0.0969
R-squared (adjusted) .60578 .60598
All specifications include regional and time fixed effects as well as controls for relative
fiscal capacity as denoted. Covariates are also employed as lagged values. If significant
at 1%, 5% or 10% level coefficients are marked with one star, two and three stars.
the linear spline specification and thereby explicitly taking into account the three fiscal
capacity regimes defined by law is a commendable approach. While differences are small,
the dynamic specification combined with a linear spline in fiscal capacity also reveals the
best fit.
Results for the ”income effect” of the grant system are mixed. While the theoretical
analysis in section (4.1) did not yield a clear-cut prediction as to how a marginal increase
in unconditional transfers should affect the local expenditure composition, we observe a
highly significant and positive effect of these transfers in specifications (1) - (3) of the
static estimations. The significance of this effect completely disappears when conditioning
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on the linear spline. Switching to the dynamic specification reduces the significance of the
”income effect” when controlling for the cubic polynomial while we observe a positive and
significant effect of lagged unconditional transfers.
4.3 Summary
While the literature on the internalising impact of redistributive grant systems has thus far
mainly focused on the aspect of tax competition, we present a model of two-dimensional
fiscal competition in taxes and public inputs to analyse the incentive effects of fiscal equal-
isation transfers. Our theoretical findings are in line with previous theoretical analyses
suggesting that the implementation of capacity based equalisation induces local govern-
ments to increase distortionary taxation of a mobile capital tax base. In addition, the
analysis in this chapter extends the existing literature by pointing out that inefficiencies
in local public spending, as stated by Keen and Marchand (1997), are reduced while the
degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalisation rises. The mechanism behind
this result is that a higher degree of equalisation will make it less attractive for the indi-
vidual jurisdiction to provide public inputs as positive tax base effects are redistributed
to a higher extent among governments within the federation. This induces an internalisa-
tion of fiscal externalities at the local level which generates incentives for governments to
substitute public input provision by public consumption.
The theoretically predicted incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on local ex-
penditure policies has then been tested on the basis of a rich data set of German munic-
ipalities. Using a regression discontinuity approach and controlling in a comprehensive
way for income effects from fiscal equalisation transfers, we find that a higher marginal
contribution rate to the redistributive grant system induces local governments to reduce
their budgetary share of infrastructure spending on the local road network and basic school
expenditures. This suggests that capacity-based equalisation transfers exert a substitution
effect, i.e. local governments which are facing higher transfer reduction rates within the
equalisation scheme tend to put a higher weight on public consumption.
Chapter 5
Tax and Public Input Competition
It has long been recognized that governments may use various instruments to attract mo-
bile factors. With regard to capital, two of these instruments, business taxes and public
infrastructure investment, have received special attention in this book. While it seems
natural to think of governments’ choices regarding tax rates and public input provision as
being closely interrelated, the empirical literature on fiscal competition has in most cases
treated them separately. The analysis presented in this chapter is an attempt to overcome
this deficiency. We derive general reaction functions of local governments from a model
of tax and public input competition. Using data from a large sample of German munic-
ipalities, we estimate an empirical counterpart of the system of fiscal reaction functions,
thereby providing evidence on fiscal competition by way of a model treating taxes and
spending on infrastructure as jointly determined endogenous variables.
Early theoretical literature on fiscal competition pointed to the role of public inputs as
means of attracting private investment, focusing on the problem of overprovision. Taylor
(1992) models a race between jurisdictions which compete for capital by building infras-
tructure more rapidly than their neighbors. Bucovetsky (2005) argues that public inputs,
by attracting mobile factors, may create scale economies, and that governments tend to
invest too much when choosing their level of spending on infrastructure. The literature
has also addressed the link between taxes and public inputs in games of fiscal competi-
tion. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) deal with local jurisdictions which compete for a
mobile capital tax base by setting the tax rate and by providing a public input to produc-
tion. Keen and Marchand (1997) extend the analysis, showing that in the presence of a
productivity-enhancing public good the composition of local public spending tends to be
systematically biased towards a relative overprovision of public inputs compared to public
goods which are consumed directly by residents. Hindriks, Peralta, and Weber (2007)
present a model suggesting that such compositional inefficiencies might be reversed in a
dynamic setting. In their model, local governments face incentives to underinvest in stage
one of the game in order to alleviate second-stage tax competition. In an international
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context, Haufler and Schjelderup (1999) analyse public input provision in the presence of
internationally integrated firms which engage in profit shifting. Assuming taxation of pure
corporate profits according to the source principle, the authors find that public inputs will
be unambiguously underprovided.
In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical work on governments competing
for mobile capital has in most cases treated fiscal competition as pure tax competition.
The standard argument states that governments competing for mobile capital neglect the
fiscal externality of their tax policy, resulting in an inefficiently low level of taxation and
an underprovision of public goods in equilibrium. Based on the work of Mintz and Tulkens
(1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and Wildasin (1988), a number of
empirical studies have shown that the tax setting behavior of local governments in many
countries seems to be well in line with the predictions of the theoretical tax competition
literature. Buettner (1999) and Buettner (2001) identify local business tax competition
among German municipalities. Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) estimate a property-tax
reaction function for U.S. cities and find a non-zero slope and Hayashi and Boadway (2001)
analyze provincial corporate income taxes in Canada.1 Empirical contributions addressing
the joint effect of taxes and public inputs on the allocation of capital are scarce. In one of
the few studies available, Be´nassy-Que´re´, Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007) show that both
capital tax rates and public capital stocks help to explain FDI flows. In a recent working
paper, Gomes and Pouget (2008) provide some related evidence on OECD countries.
As in Keen and Marchand (1997), our theoretical analysis is based on a model of fiscal
competition with two instruments. Local jurisdictions compete for a mobile tax base by
setting the capital tax rate and by providing a productivity-enhancing public input to
production. As both taxes and inputs affect the tax base, the determination of optimal
local taxing and spending decisions is substantially more complex than in a model with
just a single policy instrument. We use the theoretical framework to highlight the forces
that drive the strategic behavior of local governments when setting tax rates and public
inputs. In particular, we demonstrate that governments react to taxes as well as to the
level of public inputs provided by other jurisdictions when choosing each of their own
policy instruments.
We then proceed with an empirical investigation of tax and public input competition
among municipalities in Germany. As mentioned previously, German municipalities have
autonomy in setting the local business tax rate and, within their self-administration re-
sponsibilities, decide on spending on the local infrastructure. Therefore, Germany is an
interesting and appropriate case to study. Building on recent work of Kelejian and Prucha
(2004), we estimate a system of equations allowing for the joint determination of the mu-
nicipalities’ business tax rate as well as their level of spending on local infrastructure. From
1For further references on strategic tax setting of local jurisdictions see Brueckner (2003) as well as
Revelli (2005).
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a methodological point of view, our approach is related to Revelli (2002) and Allers and
Elhorst (2007). While Revelli (2002) estimates a tax equation and an equation for local
jurisdictions’ overall expenditures separately, Allers and Elhorst (2007) use an estima-
tion approach that accounts for the simultaneity in government choices regarding several
spending categories. In contrast to the aforementioned studies, we focus on competition
for mobile capital as the source for strategic behavior of governments, and delineate our
empirical approach from an explicit theoretical model of tax and public input competition.
To the best of our knowledge, our application is the first attempt to extend the canon-
ical empirical model of tax competition to account for public inputs as a second policy
instrument. The picture of local government behavior that emerges from our estimations
is much more complex than suggested by the earlier empirical literature on fiscal competi-
tion. Across various specifications, our findings point to simultaneous tax and public input
competition for mobile capital. In addition to the well-known positive interaction effect in
local business tax rates, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of neighboring
communities spending on infrastructure on a community’s own spending level. Further-
more, we find that a municipality’s level of spending on public inputs is also affected by
the tax rates of neighboring jurisdictions. Treating taxes and public inputs as alternative
means to attract capital thus reveals that local governments react to competition from
other jurisdictions in a rather flexible way. Municipalities experiencing a boost in local
infrastructure investment in neighboring communities will, on average, raise the level of
public input provision, too. If neighbors choose to lower the tax burden on locally installed
capital, municipalities not only adjust their own tax rates, but also increase their spending
on infrastructure.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 5.1 we introduce our theoretical framework.
Section 5.2 describes our estimation approach and presents the evidence on local tax and
public input competition in Germany. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.3.
5.1 Theoretical Considerations
Our theoretical analysis of strategic interaction of taxes and public inputs with capital
mobility extends the standard approach to model strategic tax competition by allowing
for public inputs as a second policy instrument that affects a jurisdiction’s tax base (e.g.,
Buettner, 1999; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Buettner, 2003). Our aim is to characterise
the functions describing a jurisdiction’s reaction to taxes and inputs set by a competing
jurisdiction.
We consider a federation of two symmetric jurisdictions, labeled i = 1, 2. In each
jurisdiction a competitive firm produces a homogenous private good using immobile labor,
perfectly mobile capital and a publicly provided input. As in Keen and Marchand (1997),
the public input P is of the factor-augmenting type and raises the marginal productivity
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of the primary input factors. For ease of exposition, we normalise labor supply to unity
and assume the common production technology to take the form
f(ki, Pi) = αkiPi − 12βk
2
i , (5.1)
where ki is the capital-labor ratio and Pi is the public input. Each jurisdiction levies a unit
source based tax τi on locally installed capital. Profit maximization and capital mobility
imply an equal net rate of return to capital r across jurisdictions which is given by the after
tax marginal product of capital. The supply of capital is assumed to be fixed, ki +kj = k.
Moreover, we assume home ownership of capital. Capital demand in jurisdiction i is then
given by
ki = k∗ +
α (Pi − Pj) + (τj − τi)
2β
, (5.2)
where k∗ = k/2 is the equal capital endowment in both jurisdictions. Equation 5.2 shows
that local governments can attract capital from the other jurisdiction by lowering the tax
rate or by spending more on public inputs.
Each jurisdiction is inhabited by a representative consumer deriving utility from private
(ci) and public (Zi) consumption,
u(ci, Zi) = ci + v(Zi). (5.3)
We assume v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Private consumption equals the income of the immobile
factor, ci = f(ki, Pi) − ki (τi + r) + k∗r. The jurisdictions maximise the utility of their
representative consumer subject to the budget constraint
Zi + Pi = τiki. (5.4)
We assume that both jurisdictions treat the tax rate and the public input as their strategic
variables, i.e. they treat the other jurisdiction’s tax rate and public input as given and
optimise against these variables. Public consumption is thus a residual variable that
ensures a balanced budget.2
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium with ki = k∗, we denote the first order conditions
with respect to τi and Pi as
ωτi ≡ −ki + v′
[
ki + τi
∂ki
∂τi
]
!= 0 (5.5)
2Wildasin (1991) provides a discussion of alternative assumptions regarding the choice of strategic
variables in a model with taxation and public consumption.
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ωPi ≡ αki + v′
[
τi
∂ki
∂Pi
− 1
]
!= 0. (5.6)
Equations 5.5 and 5.6 implicitly define jurisdiction i’s tax and public input reaction func-
tions. Generally, these functions are of the form τi = τ(τj , Pj) and Pi = P (τj , Pj). Note
that, even with the simple functional form of the production technology assumed here, it
is not possible to derive the reaction functions explicitly. However, it is possible to derive
the ‘slopes’ of the reaction functions by totally differentiating the first order conditions.
From
(
ωτiτi ωτiPi
ωPiτi ωPiPi
)(
dτi
dPi
)
= −
(
ωτiτj ωτiPj
ωPiτj ωPiPj
)(
dτj
dPj
)
(5.7)
we obtain
dτi
dτj
=
−ωPiPiωτiτj + ωτiPiωPiτj
D
(5.8)
dτi
dPj
=
−ωPiPiωτiPj + ωτiPiωPiPj
D
(5.9)
dPi
dτj
=
−ωPiτjωτiτi + ωτiτjωPiτi
D
(5.10)
dPi
dPj
=
−ωPiPjωτiτi + ωτiPjωPiτi
D
, (5.11)
where D = ωPiPiωτiτi −ω2τiPi > 0 from the second order condition. It is straightforward to
show that the sign of all slopes is ambiguous.3 Thus, our analysis extends the finding of
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) who, in a framework of pure tax competition, show that
the tax reaction function can only be signed unambiguously when applying strong param-
eter restrictions on the production technology and consumer preferences. Introducing a
public input to production as a second strategic variable further augments the scope for
fiscal policy interaction. Hence, clear-cut theoretical predictions regarding the response by
governments to other jurisdictions’ choices are no longer possible. We therefore leave it to
the subsequent empirical analysis to yield evidence on fiscal policy interactions resulting
from simultaneous tax and public input competition.
3Note that we have ωPiPi < 0 and ωτiτi < 0 from the SOC, ωτiτj =
1
2β
(v′ − 1) + v′′ τi
2β
(ki − τi2β ) ≷ 0,
ωτiPi = ωPiτi =
α
2β
(v′ − 1) + v′′(ατi
2β
− 1)(ki − τi2β ) > 0, ωτiPj = − α2β (v′ − 1) − v′′ ατi2β (ki − τi2β ) ≷ 0,
ωPiτj =
α
2β
+ v′′ τi
2β
(ατi
2β
− 1) > 0, and ωPiPj = −α
2
2β
− v′′ ατi
2β
(ατi
2β
− 1) < 0.
5.2. Empirical Analysis 84
5.2 Empirical Analysis
5.2.1 Estimation Approach
A valid empirical test of tax and public input competition between jurisdictions should
take into account the fact that the choice of the tax rate and the provision of infrastructure
are interrelated. In the following, we suggest an estimation approach that is flexible enough
to allow for tax rates and public inputs to be determined simultaneously. Moreover, the
design of our empirical model accounts for the interdependence of all jurisdictions’ choices
regarding taxes and inputs, i.e. each jurisdiction’s tax rate as well as the level of inputs
provided to attract mobile capital are allowed to depend on both taxes and inputs of all
other jurisdictions.
Our structural empirical model builds on the reaction functions of the tax and public
input competition model. To facilitate estimation, we make use of linearised versions of
the general form reaction functions and define the following system of equations,
τi = θτPi + λττ−i + ϕτP−i + βτXτ i + ui (5.12)
Pi = θP τi + λP τ−i + ϕPP−i + βPXPi + vi, (5.13)
where τ−i =
∑
j wijτj and P−i =
∑
j wijPj indicate the average tax rate and average
inputs of other jurisdictions, weighted by the predetermined weights wi1, . . . , wiN , and Xτ i
and XP i denote vectors of control variables in the tax and input equation, respectively.
The variables entering both Xτ i and XP i are subsets of a set of exogenous variables,
Xi = (x1i, . . . , xKi). Note that in specifying our system of equations and including Pi
among the right-hand side variables of the tax equation and τi as an explanatory variable
in the input equation, we deviate from the usual approach which uses counterparts of
reduced-form reaction functions when estimating models of fiscal competition with more
than one choice variable (see Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008; Egger, Pfaffermayr,
and Winner, 2007). We do this because we want the empirical model to allow for the
possibility that governments are not always free to adjust both instruments to optimal
levels. For instance, governments may face political costs when frequently changing the
business tax rate, and prefer to keep the tax rate constant if the difference between the
optimal rate and the rate actually implemented is sufficiently small. The optimal choice
of public inputs should then be modeled as being conditional on a given business tax rate.
Another reason for governments to deviate from jointly optimal levels of taxes and public
inputs is the political process. Due to inertia in the decision-making process, it may not
always be possible to set fiscal variables to preferred levels.
In addition to modeling the tax rates and inputs of different jurisdictions to be interre-
lated, we also allow for the presence of spatial auto-correlation in the disturbances u and
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v,
ui = ρuu−i + i and vi = ρvv−i + εi, (5.14)
where u−i =
∑
j wijuj and v−i =
∑
j wijvj . The innovation vectors  and ε are assumed
to be identically and independently distributed with zero mean. Hence, we require that
the innovations are free of spatial correlation. Note, however, that we allow for contem-
poraneous cross-equation correlation among innovations of the same cross-sectional unit.
While our specification of the empirical reaction functions is more flexible than the
commonly employed reduced-form version, it also makes the estimation of the parameters
of interest more involved. In fact, treating the choice variables as explanatory variables
increases the number of endogenous regressors from two to four. To account for all endo-
geneity problems and to achieve efficient estimation, we use the spatial system estimator
proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2004). In the following, we briefly outline the four step
estimation procedure.
In the first step, we run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure on the tax rate
and the input equation, treating τi, Pi, τ−i and P−i as endogenous regressors. We use
the same set of instruments in both estimations, containing x1i, . . . , xKi as well as the
corresponding first and second order spatial lags. In matrix notation, they can be written
as WX1, . . . ,WXK ,WWX1, . . . ,WWXK , where W denotes the N -dimensional square
matrix of weights.4
Using the residuals of the first stage, in the second step of the procedure the spatial
auto-regressive parameters ρu and ρv are estimated by the generalised moments method
originally suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999). The estimates of the spatial auto-
regressive parameters are then used in the third step to perform a Cochrane-Orcutt-type
transformation of the structural equations to remove the spatial error correlation and to
re-run 2SLS on the transformed system. Finally, in the fourth step we apply the systems
instrumental variable estimator suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (2004). It is efficient
relative to the first and third stage single-equations estimators because it utilises the full
system information and accounts for potential cross-equation correlation in the innovation
vectors.
For several reasons, the systems estimation approach outlined above seems to be the
ideal choice for estimating our tax and public input competition model. First of all, the
procedure takes into account the fact that both taxes and public inputs are determined
simultaneously. Secondly, in a very general way, it allows for contemporaneous interaction
between jurisdictions. In addition, it is easily implemented even in large samples, which
provides a clear advantage over maximum likelihood procedures.
The evidence reported in this study is derived from cross-sectional estimations. There
4As usual, we require that W has zeros on the main diagonal and that
∑
j wij = 1. Details on the
specification of W are reported in Section 5.2.3
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are several reasons why panel estimations do not constitute a feasible option. First of all,
the systems estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (2004) is designed for cross-sectional data.
A straightforward way to account for unobserved heterogeneity would be to apply the
estimation routine to panel data and to include a series of jurisdiction-specific constants as
ordinary regressors. With more than 1,000 cross-sectional units, however, computational
limitations hindered us to estimate panels with a reasonable time dimension. Based on
short panels of up to four years, we were unable to identify the coefficients of interests
with reasonable precision. The likely reason is that many variables, including the tax
rate, show only limited variation over time. As in many applications, it is thus difficult to
achieve identification in a fixed effects framework with a small number of cross-sections.
5.2.2 Data
The data used to estimate our empirical model of tax and public input competition come
from a sample of 1100 German municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, covering
the period 1998 - 2004. Note that we exclude independent cities from the sample (10
cross-sectional units), which face different incentives within the municipal system of fiscal
equalisation. As we will observe, the treatment within this redistributive grant system
exerts a strong impact on local tax and spending decisions. In the following, we briefly
comment on the data which are summarised in Table 5.1.
As already pointed out, German municipalities have taxing autonomy with respect to
the business tax (Gewerbesteuer), essentially a tax on local business earnings. In the time
period under consideration, the statutory tax rate in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg
averaged 0.167 and varied between 0.145 and 0.21. Besides revenues from the local busi-
ness tax, grants and federal tax revenue sharing play an important role in municipal
financing. In our context of tax and public input competition, fiscal equalisation grants
deserve special attention as redistributive grant systems affect the incentive of local gov-
ernments with respect to tax and expenditure policies. The theoretical literature on the
internalising effects of fiscal capacity based equalisation suggests that the implementation
of redistributive grant systems tends to weaken tax competition (e.g., see Koethenbuerger,
2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006). Recent empirical evidence for Germany (Buettner,
2006; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2007) supports the view that tax rates tend to
rise when the degree of equalisation increases. Moreover, the empirical analysis presented
in chapter 4 of this book suggests that fiscal equalisation transfers exert a significant incen-
tive effect on municipal spending policies. We therefore include the marginal contribution
rate to the municipal system of fiscal equalisation as well as unconditional transfers in our
regressions to account for substitution and income effects of equalisation grants. For the
period between 1998 and 2004 the average marginal contribution rate was 13.2% with a
maximum value of 14.5% and a minimum of 8.8%. Relating the marginal contribution
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Statutory tax rate, τ 0.167 0.006 0.145 0.210
Spending for local roads, P a 130 92.8 0.815 1739
Marginal contribution rate 0.132 0.011 0.088 0.145
Unconditional transfersa 300 50.3 96.5 447
Fiscal capacity 0.714 0.272 0.276 6.35
Specific grants for local roadsa 27.3 53.7 -76.5 1730
Other specific grantsa 57.4 33.0 -3.92 282
Debt servicea 10.6 35.2 -858 280
Population (1,000s) 7.81 10.7 0.101 112
Population densityb 0.300 0.302 0.017 2.50
Unemployment 0.062 0.013 0.025 0.127
% population< 16 years 0.181 0.022 0.101 0.300
% population> 65 years 0.155 0.027 0.071 0.347
% church members 0.891 0.053 0.706 1.04
a per capita; b (total population)/1000 per square kilometer; Nob=7700 (1100 municipalities from 1998 to 2004, in-
dependent cities excluded); Fiscal variables in e (prices of 2000). Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg
and own calculations.
rate to the tax rate reveals an average equalisation rate of around 80%. As a means to
control for pure income effects we include unconditional transfers capturing the amount
of transfers a municipality would receive if its tax base were actually zero. This includes
equalisation transfers and the municipal share of statewide income and value added taxes.
Furthermore, since differences in taxing capacity may affect local tax and expenditure
policies, we account for a municipality’s relative fiscal capacity. This variable is calculated
by relating a municipality’s fiscal capacity (comprising the local business tax base as well
as other revenue sources, in particular the share of statewide income and value added
taxes) to its fiscal need, which is crucially dependent on the population size. The relative
fiscal capacity shows values between 28% and 635% with an average value of 71.4%.5
In our analysis, public input provision is defined as spending on the municipal road
network. Between 1998 and 2004, municipalities have spent, on average, 130 e per capita
(at 2000 levels) on the construction and maintenance of local roads. A standard deviation
of 93 e per capita indicates substantial variation in this expenditure category. As munic-
ipalities receive grants in order to fulfill their self-administered spending responsibilities,
we explicitly control for specific transfers in the spending category ‘local roads’. This
includes grants within the so called ‘traffic and transport burden sharing’ (Verkehrslaste-
nausgleich), which depend on the length of the road network and the size of the municipal
area. In addition, we include other specific grants independent of the tax base in order to
control for the corresponding income effects. Other conditioning variables capturing local
5For further details on the municipal system of fiscal equalisation in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg
see 1.1.
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characteristics include debt service, population size and population density as well as the
population share of the young (less than 16 years) and the elderly (above 65 years). Fur-
thermore, we also include the unemployment rate as a proxy for the general demand for
spending on social services. Finally, drawing on Buettner (2001), we include the share of
the population that is affiliated with one of the three major Christian churches (Catholic,
Protestant State, and Protestant Free Church) as well as two variables that interact this
proportion with the rate of unemployment and the share of elderly people, respectively.6
The inclusion of these variables is warranted as the religious orientation of the population
may indicate preferences regarding the provision of local public goods and, in particular,
social services and welfare. The interactions account for the possibility that, depending
on the strength of religious orientation, an increase in the number of potential welfare
recipients may have different effects on the socially preferred level of social services.
5.2.3 Specification of spatial weights and exclusion restrictions
Before turning to the estimation results, we need to discuss some further details of our em-
pirical specification. In particular, we motivate the choice of spatial weights and comment
on the exclusion restrictions imposed on our system of equations.
As pointed out in the previous section, we define the weights used to construct neigh-
bors’ average tax rates and spending levels based on geographical distance and relative
population size. There is one aspect of the different weighting schemes that seems to be
of particular importantce. As shown in the descriptive statistics, the cross-sectional vari-
ation of the tax rate is limited. Taking averages over neighboring jurisdictions’ tax rates
will, of course, give a variable with even smaller variation. This problem can be expected
to become more severe as more municipalities are, on average, defined as neighbors for a
given community. In fact, with sufficiently many communities included in the calculation
of neighbors’ taxes, τ−i will quickly converge towards the regional (or even the statewide)
average of taxes. Defining many municipalities as neighbors for a given community will
thus result in τ−i becoming a poor measure for the tax effort of nearby municipalities. A
quick inspection of Table 5.2 confirms this presumption. It displays descriptive statistics
for neighbors’ average tax rates (τ−i) and neighbors’ expenditures on infrastructure (P−i)
for the year 2000 according to different weighting schemes.
The first four rows depict statistics for weighting schemes that include either the mu-
nicipalities within a distance of up to 15km, or the 10 geographically closest municipalities,
to be neighbors of a given municipality. Irrespective of whether the weights are chosen
to be uniform or to decrease with distance, the variable capturing the average tax rate of
6Data on religious affiliation is available only for 1987. The slight imprecision in the count of church
members relative to overall population (10 municipalities with a reported share of church members higher
than one) is known from other studies using the same data. Excluding municipalities with implausible
figures does nothing to our estimation results.
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Table 5.2: Neighbors’ average tax rates and infrastructure spending per capita for different
weighting schemes, year=2000
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Weighting scheme τ−i P−i τ−i P−i τ−i P−i τ−i P−i
WD15 0.167 140 0.0030 31.3 0.160 76.3 0.177 253
WD15INV 0.167 139 0.0032 33.6 0.159 68.8 0.182 329
WN10 0.167 139 0.0034 37.4 0.157 66.0 0.181 332
WN10INV 0.167 139 0.0036 40.6 0.156 66.9 0.182 465
WD15P 0.171 147 0.0068 28.9 0.160 83.7 0.198 281
WN10P 0.169 146 0.0066 35.4 0.156 72.0 0.204 326
Notes on weighting schemes: WD15: Municipalities with distance up to 15km defined as neighbors, weights of
neighbors uniform; WD15INV : Municipalities with distance up to 15km defined as neighbors, weights of neighbors
based on inverse distance; WN10: 10 geographically closest municipalities defined as neighbors, weights of neighbors
uniform; WN10INV : 10 geographically closest municipalities defined as neighbors, weights of neighbors based on
inverse distance; WD15P : Municipalities with distance up to 15km defined as neighbors, weights of neighbors
based on relative population size. WN10P : 10 geographically closest municipalities defined as neighbors, weights
of neighbors based on relative population size. All weight matrices are row-standardised.
neighbors shows very limited variation. With uniform weights assigned to municipalities
within a distance up to 15km, for instance, the variation in neighbors’ average tax rate
is actually modest, with a minimum of 0.16 and a maximum of 0.177. Table 5.2 also
suggests a straightforward way to circumvent the problem of insufficient variation in τ−i.
The schemes WD15P and WN10P define weights based on the geographical distance as
before, but in addition assign higher weights to larger municipalities. This is done by
setting
wij =
nij popj∑
k 6=i
nik popk
,
where nij is an indicator for neighbors of i and popj is j’s population. As can be observed
from Table 5.2, both schemes that account for asymmetries in population size are charac-
terised by a variation in the resulting series that is significantly higher compared to the
weighting schemes discussed previously. Also notable is the fact that assigning weights
according to relative population size is supported by the literature on asymmetric tax
competition (e.g., see Bucovetsky, 1991; Haufler and Wooton, 1999). Note that, due to
higher variation in local expenditures per capita, neighbors’ spending on infrastructure
does not apear to be affected by the problem of quick convergence towards regional or
statewide averages. Based on the preceding discussion, we expect the estimates regarding
the impact of τ−i to critically depend on the choice of the weighting scheme. In contrast,
the estimates regarding the coefficient of P−i should be more robust to the definition of
neighbors.
A further important issue regarding the specification is the choice of exclusion restric-
tions. Note that both the tax rate and public inputs appear as explanatory variables in our
system of equations. The exclusion restrictions must be set carefully, as they will provide
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us with the opportunity to use some of the exogenous characteristics as instruments for
the endogenous fiscal variables. An exclusion restriction for the tax equation is suggested
by the system of specific grants. As specific grants for the construction and maintenance
of local roads amount, on average, to only 1.2% of overall expenditures, the business tax
rate should be independent of the level of these grants. To the contrary, we expect grants
for local roads to significantly affect actual spending on the local road network. Conse-
quently, we include specific grants in the public input equation, but exclude it from the tax
equation. Note that other specific grants amount to 57.4 e per capita, twice as much as
specific grants for local roads. We therefore include other specific grants in both equations
to account for potential income effects.
Regarding the exclusion restrictions for the public input equation, note first that local
roads are not only used as public inputs by firms, but are also consumed by private
households. A change in infrastructure spending will therefore have direct as well as
indirect effects on the utility of residents. In contrast, a change in the business tax rate
will affect households only indirectly. This suggests exclusion of the variables describing
the religious orientation of the local population and related preferences regarding spending
on social services from the input equation. We thus assume that a stronger preference for
spending on social services and welfare may affect the preferred level of local taxation, but
that the level of municipal spending on physical infrastructure is independent of residents’
religious orientation.
The quality of the instruments obtained from imposing our exclusion restrictions is
also an empirical question. In particular, to identify public inputs in the tax equation, we
need the specific grants for local roads to show a strong partial correlation with spending
on local roads. Furthermore, the identification of the local business tax rate in the input
equation rests on the partial correlations between the tax rate and the proportion of
church members as well as the related interaction terms. We will discuss the quality of
the instruments when addressing the estimation outcomes.
5.2.4 Results
Table 5.3 and 5.4 present detailed estimation results for the system estimations on tax
and public input competition. Based on the preceding discussion, we focus on weighting
schemes WD15P and WN10P. Results based on different schemes are summarised in Table
6. As mentioned above, we report results from cross-sectional estimations. To check for
the robustness across years, the tables depict regressions for different years. Furthermore,
we also report results for estimations after a between-transformation, i.e. after taking
averages across periods.
After excluding the 10 independent cities from the sample, we are left with 1100 cross-
sectional observations. Note that the sample restriction is applied after taking spatial
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Table 5.3: Tax and Public Input Competition - System Estimation, W = WD15P
Cross section 1998 2000 2002 2004
Dependent variable τ P τ P τ P τ P
τ−i 0.196 ??? -731 ? 0.207 ??? -1055 ? 0.278 ??? 68.4 0.314 ??? 60.0
(0.049) (350) (0.049) (427) (0.055) (559) (0.058) (480)
P−i -0.000 0.178 ? -0.000 0.507 ??? 0.000 0.237 ? 0.000 0.148
(0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.108)
Own tax rate - 3190 ??? - 2396 ??? - -2176 ? - -171
(801) (924) (1057) (772)
Own public input 0.000 ??? - 0.000 ??? - 0.000 - -0.000 -
(4D-06) (4D-06) (0.000) (0.000)
Marg. contr. rate 0.098 ??? -810 ??? 0.091 ??? -523 0.065 ? 342 0.088 ??? -469 ?
(0.029) (302) (0.026) (318) (0.030) (426) (0.030) (276)
Uncond. transfers -0.000 ??? 0.241 ??? -0.000 ??? 0.175 ? -0.000 ??? 0.199 ? -0.000 ??? 0.215 ???
(7D-06) (0.070) (6D-06) (0.075) (7D-06) (0.097) (8D-06) (0.075)
Fiscal capacity -0.001 46.0 ??? -0.002 ? 87.7 ??? -0.002 ? 95.7 ??? -0.004 ??? 52.8 ???
(0.001) (13.5) (0.001) (14.4) (0.001) (15.7) (0.001) (10.5)
Specific grants - 0.995 ??? - 1.05 ??? - 1.30 ??? - 1.12 ???
for local roads (0.044) (0.051) (0.047) (0.037)
Other specific 0.000 ? -0.005 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.010 0.000 ? 0.004
grants (7D-06) (0.071) (0.000) (0.073) (0.000) (0.078) (7D-06) (0.060)
Debt service 0.000 ??? -0.112 0.000 ??? -0.153 ? 0.000 ??? -0.100 0.000 ??? -0.116 ?
(6D-06) (0.072) (6D-06) (0.074) (5D-06) (0.078) (5D-06) (0.049)
Unemployment -1.01 ??? 194 -1.27 ??? 265 -1.50 ??? -70.3 -1.23 ??? 166
(0.266) (147) (0.316) (200) (0.344) (280) (0.337) (186)
Population 0.000 ??? 0.119 0.000 ??? 0.309 0.000 ??? 1.02 ? 0.000 ??? 0.625 ?
(1,000s) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.308) (0.000) (0.418) (0.000) (0.274)
Pop. density 0.000 -22.1 ? 0.001 -18.1 ? 0.000 -6.59 0.000 -7.80
(0.000) (9.25) (0.001) (10.1) (0.000) (11.6) (0.000) (8.17)
% pop.< 16 years -0.005 -42.8 -0.004 25.6 -0.005 40.6 -0.015 212 ?
(0.012) (120) (0.012) (138) (0.012) (165) (0.014) (127)
% pop.> 65 years -0.272 ? -37.8 -0.187 ? -112 -0.075 50.4 -0.089 140
(0.111) (98.3) (0.111) (109) (0.111) (124) (0.118) (88.2)
% church members -0.132 ??? - -0.114 ??? - -0.115 ??? - -0.109 ??? -
(0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032)
% church members× 1.07 ??? - 1.32 ??? - 1.57 ??? - 1.28 ??? -
unemployment (0.295) (0.352) (0.383) (0.374)
% church members× 0.308 ? - 0.219 ? - 0.108 - 0.107 -
% pop.> 65 years (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.130)
R2 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.49
F -tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 110.3 215.7 105.4 199.6 73.6 133.9 94.1 115.0
P−i 77.7 91.2 95.6 104.1 68.0 65.4 49.8 54.7
Own tax rate - 5.0 - 5.8 - 6.9 - 5.4
Own public input 7.3 - 8.7 - 7.7 - 16.6 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Weighting scheme for constructing τ−i and
P−i is WD15P (see notes in Table 5.2 for details). Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of
the estimation procedure (2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F -tests of excluded IVs are from
first-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure.
? significant at 10% level; ? significant at 5% level; ??? significant at 1% level.
lags. Hence, while all municipalities are included in the computation of τ−i and P−i, the
IV estimations at the first, third and fourth step of the system estimation approach are
based on the restricted sample.
Let us now turn to the estimation outputs summarised in Table 5.3. For each year, we
report two columns, the left showing estimated coefficients and corresponding standard
errors for the tax equation, and the right one depicting the results for the public input
equation. The coefficients of our variables of interest are shown in the first rows. We note
that the coefficient of neighbors’ taxes is positive and highly significant in all reported
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cross-sections, ranging from 0.20 to 0.31. These results suggest that the municipalities
in our sample react to the tax policies of their neighbors by adjusting their own business
tax rate towards the level chosen in nearby jurisdictions. Note that this finding is well in
line with the evidence presented in Buettner (2001). However, our results also reveal that
there are several other effects at work, suggesting that the behavior of local governments is
much more complex than described in the earlier empirical tax competition literature. In
particular, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of neighbors’ spending on
infrastructure on a community’s own spending level in three out of four cross-sections. The
coefficients indicate that a one-Euro increase in neighbors’ average spending per capita
triggers an increase in a municipality’s own per-capita spending on infrastructure between
18 and 51 Cents. Hence, our findings suggest that the municipalities engage in simultane-
ous tax and public input competition for mobile capital. A second effect that has not been
analyzed in the literature to date is that of neighbors’ taxes on a municipality’s own level
of spending on public inputs. In two out of four cross-sections, we find a negative and
statistically significant effect, pointing to local governments increasing their per-capita
spending on infrastructure by approximately 7 to 11 e per capita in reaction to a one
percentage point decrease of their neighbors’ average tax rate. Finally, our results also
point to direct interaction between fiscal variables within a community: a one percentage
point increase in the statutory tax rate triggers an increase of spending per capita of 32
e in 1998 and of 24 e in 2000, while in the 2002 cross-section we find a negative effect of
about 22 e . Moreover, for 1998 and 2000 there is a positive partial effect of public inputs
on taxation, indicating that an increase in spending of 100 e per capita would result in a
tax rate increase of 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points.
Besides the evidence on tax and public input competition, there are additional findings
that are worth mentioning. Confirming our expectations, the marginal contribution rate
positively affects the tax rate, while unconditional transfers exert a negative impact on
local taxes. Both findings are in line with Buettner (2006) and support the view that a
higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalisation alleviates business
tax competition. In addition, there is evidence for a negative impact of the marginal
contribution rate on public input provision in two out of four cross-sections. This suggests
that fiscal equalisation counteracts both tax and public input competition. Furthermore,
unconditional transfers are found to positively affect public inputs. An increase of these
transfers by one Euro per capita brings about an increase in infrastructure spending per
capita of 0.18 to 0.24 e . Regarding relative fiscal capacity, our expectations are also
confirmed: municipalities with higher capacity set lower tax rates and spend more on
public inputs. With respect to the variables that are excluded in one of our equations, we
note that spending on local roads strongly reacts to the amount of specific grants received
for that purpose. In addition, we find at least two highly significant variables capturing the
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religious orientation of the population in all cross-sections.7 Finally, we note the positive
impact of debt service on local taxes, and the negative impact on public input provision,
and the negative (positive) effect of unemployment (population) on the tax rate.
Regarding the quality of the instruments, we first note that τ−i and P−i are identified
by a strong partial correlation with first and second-order spatial lags of exogenous com-
munity characteristics, resulting in F -tests of excluded instruments in the corresponding
first-stage regressions larger than 50 in general.8 Hence, we are confident that our identifi-
cation approach with respect to the spatial effects does not suffer from a weak instruments
problem.9 With respect to a community’s own tax rate and public input as endogenous
explanatory variables, we initially checked the performance of the instruments in the first
stage regression in terms of statistical significance. The specific grants-variable is always
highly significant in the first-stage regression of public inputs on the set of instruments,
with t-statistics around 10. In the first-stage regression of the tax rate, both the propor-
tion of church members and the interaction with the rate of unemployment are generally
significant at the 1% level. However, since the F -tests for a community’s own tax rate and
public input are relatively small, we also checked the critical values for the Stock-Yogo
weak identification test (Stock and Yogo, 2005). We were able to reject the null that the
bias of our IV estimation exceeds 20% of the bias in the corresponding OLS estimation in
all cases, lending further support to our identification strategy.
The weighting scheme used in the estimations reported in Table 5.3 assigns 23 neighbors
on average to each municipality. In addition, there is substantial variation in the number
of neighbors, ranging from one to 54. As a robustness check of our findings with respect
to the definition of ”neighborliness” among municipalities, Table 5.4 reports results of the
same estimations as before, with WN10P as the weighting scheme. As mentioned above,
scheme WN10P assigns as neighbors the 10 nearest communities (in terms of geographical
distance) to each municipality, weighted by population.
All main effects from Table 5.3 are robust to the change in the weighting scheme. The
effect of neighbors’ taxes on a municipality’s own tax rate is estimated to be significantly
positive but somewhat smaller than before, ranging from 0.16 to 0.21. The impact of
neighbors’ spending on infrastructure on local provision of public inputs is of similar size
as before, with estimated coefficients ranging from 0.22 to 0.39. The results also confirm
the finding that the municipalities take into account the level of taxes among neighbors
when choosing their level of spending on the local road network. Even with respect to
the strength of the interaction, we do not find any significant difference compared to the
results reported in Table 5.3. A brief inspection of the evidence regarding the control
7Note, however, that the quality of the instruments should be evaluated based on the first stage regres-
sions of the corresponding 2SLS estimations. We comment on this below.
8We refer to the 2SLS estimation that is performed as the third step of the estimation procedure.
9See Staiger and Stock (1997) for a general discussion and practical guidance for avoiding weak instru-
ments.
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Table 5.4: Tax and Public Input Competition - System Estimation, W = WN10P
Cross section 1998 2000 2002 2004
Dependent variable τ P τ P τ P τ P
τ−i 0.158 ??? -678 ? 0.177 ??? -796 ? 0.212 ??? -604 0.213 ??? -1412 ???
(0.041) (398) (0.040) (481) (0.040) (503) (0.044) (373)
P−i -0.000 0.086 0.000 0.389 ??? 0.000 ? 0.134 -0.000 0.217 ???
(0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.075) (7D-06) (0.086) (0.000) (0.080)
Own tax rate - 3039 ??? - 1276 - -560 - 3283 ???
(821) (923) (1066) (800)
Own public input 0.000 ??? - 0.000 ? - 0.000 - 0.000 -
(4D-06) (4D-06) (0.000) (0.000)
Marg. contr. rate 0.089 ??? -774 ? 0.080 ??? -470 0.089 ??? 120 0.098 ??? -763 ???
(0.028) (303) (0.025) (323) (0.029) (433) (0.029) (289)
Uncond. transfers -0.000 ??? 0.225 ??? -0.000 ??? 0.170 ? -0.000 ??? 0.265 ??? -0.000 ??? 0.304 ???
(7D-06) (0.071) (6D-06) (0.073) (7D-06) (0.09) (8D-06) (0.080)
Fiscal capacity -0.001 45.7 ??? -0.003 ? 85.2 ??? -0.003 ? 100 ??? -0.004 ??? 61.9 ???
(0.001) (13.4) (0.001) (14.2) (0.001) (15.5) (0.001) (10.6)
Specific grants - 0.999 ??? - 1.05 ??? - 1.30 ??? - 1.10 ???
for local roads (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.038)
Other specific 0.000 ? -0.004 0.000 ? 0.064 0.000 ? 0.003 0.000 ? -0.060
grants (7D-06) (0.071) (6D-06) (0.073) (6D-06) (0.078) (7D-06) (0.062)
Debt service 0.000 ??? -0.096 0.000 ??? -0.089 0.000 ??? -0.153 ? 0.000 ??? -0.194 ???
(6D-06) (0.072) (6D-06) (0.074) (5D-06) (0.077) (5D-06) (0.048)
Unemployment -0.961 ??? 189 -1.10 ??? 187 -1.18 ??? 93.7 -0.913 ??? 425 ???
(0.264) (140) (0.312) (183) (0.334) (248) (0.316) (157)
Population 0.000 ??? 0.169 0.000 ??? 0.315 0.000 ??? 0.585 0.000 ??? 0.027
(1,000s) (0.000) (0.267) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) (0.3759) (0.000) (0.272)
Pop. density 0.000 -26.8 ??? 0.000 -22.8 ? -0.000 -12.7 -0.000 -11.9
(0.000) (8.45) (0.000) (9.29) (0.000) (10.5) (0.000) (7.56)
% pop.< 16 years -0.003 -9.84 -0.000 51.8 -0.001 80.9 -0.007 241 ?
(0.012) (118) (0.011) (136) (0.012) (163) (0.014) (128)
% pop.> 65 years -0.248 ? -7.39 -0.198 ? -52.5 -0.094 77.1 -0.025 115
(0.110) (97.0) (0.110) (107) (0.109) (120) (0.112) (87.8)
% church members -0.124 ??? - -0.106 ??? - -0.100 ??? - -0.077 ? -
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
% church members× 1.02 ??? - 1.16 ??? - 1.25 ??? - 0.965 ??? -
unemployment (0.294) (0.349) (0.372) (0.351)
% church members× 0.280 ? - 0.229 ? - 0.126 - 0.037 -
% pop.> 65 years (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.124)
R2 0.21 0.38 0.22 0.39 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.48
F -tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 77.0 76.1 76.3 63.2 69.0 63.4 88.6 93.7
P−i 72.6 78.7 67.1 63.9 38.9 33.7 37.5 36.8
Own tax rate - 4.9 - 5.8 - 5.7 - 4.1
Own public input 6.9 - 9.5 - 7.1 - 14.7 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Weighting scheme for constructing τ−i and
P−i is WN10P (see notes in Table 5.2 for details). Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of
the estimation procedure (2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F -tests of excluded IVs are from
first-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure.
? significant at 10% level; ? significant at 5% level; ??? significant at 1% level.
variables reveals that the effects mentioned above are highly robust to the change in the
weighting scheme, too.
To some extent, the evidence on tax and public input competition depends on which
cross-sections are used for estimation, and it might therefore be useful to examine average
effects. Table 5.5 reports estimation results after applying a between-transformation to
our system of estimation equations. Using t = 1, . . . , T as the index of time periods, the
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Table 5.5: Tax and Public Input Competition - System Estimation after Between-
Transformation (years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004),
Weighting scheme WD15P WN10P
Dependent variable τ P τ P
τ−i 0.263 ??? -387 0.211 ??? -505 ?
(0.050) (352) (0.039) (263)
P−i -0.000 0.328 ??? -0.000 0.215 ???
(0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.060)
Own tax rate - 1658 ??? - 1591 ?
(568) (632)
Own public input 0.000 ??? - 0.000 ??? -
(5D-06) (5D-06)
Marginal contribution rate 0.098 ??? -372 0.093 ? -438
(0.037) (278) (0.036) (282)
Unconditional transfers -0.000 ??? 0.261 ??? -0.000 ??? 0.259 ???
(7D-06) (0.054) (7D-06) (0.057)
Fiscal capacity -0.002 87.7 ??? -0.003 ? 84.7 ???
(0.002) (11.7) (0.001) (11.8)
Specific grants for local roads - 1.17 ??? - 1.17 ???
(0.044) (0.044)
Other specific grants 0.000 ? 0.016 0.000 ? 0.019
(7D-06) (0.047) (6D-06) (0.048)
Debt service 0.000 ??? -0.166 ??? 0.000 ??? -0.153 ???
(6D-06) (0.050) (6D-06) (0.050)
Unemployment -1.41 ??? 179 -1.15 ??? 232 ?
(0.314) (147) (0.306) (134)
Population (1,000s) 0.000 ??? 0.133 0.000 ??? 0.198
(0.000) (0.203) (0.000) (0.228)
Pop. density 0.000 -8.43 0.000 -15.8 ?
(0.000) (6.38) (0.000) (6.19)
% pop.< 16 years -0.010 90.6 -0.004 109
(0.013) (94.7) (0.013) (94.6)
% pop.> 65 years -0.141 -4.47 -0.135 25.8
(0.108) (70.3) (0.107) (69.6)
% church members -0.127 ??? - -0.109 ??? -
(0.028) (0.027)
% church members×unemployment 1.47 ??? - 1.21 ??? -
(0.349) (0.340)
% church members×% pop.> 65 years 0.165 - 0.158 -
(0.120) (0.118)
R2 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.39
F -tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 108.2 149.1 81.2 91.1
P−i 124.0 123.8 83.5 79.9
Own tax rate - 6.3 - 6.0
Own public input 15.9 - 16.5 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is
from the third step of the estimation procedure (2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F -tests of
excluded IVs are from first-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure.
? significant at 10% level; ? significant at 5% level; ??? significant at 1% level.
transformed system reads
τ¯i = θτ P¯i + λτ τ¯−i + ϕτ P¯−i + βτ X¯τ i + u¯i (5.15)
P¯i = θP τ¯i + λP τ¯−i + ϕP P¯−i + βP X¯Pi + v¯i, (5.16)
where τ¯i = T−1
∑
t τit, X¯i = T
−1∑
tXit, τ¯−i =
∑
j wij τ¯j , etc. The between-estimations
confirm the presence of direct strategic interaction in the choice of taxes and public inputs.
The results regarding the impact of neighbors’ taxes on own spending on infrastructure is
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mixed: the null of no interaction cannot be rejected under the weighting scheme WD15P,
but it is rejected under WN10P at the 10% level of significance. However, the magnitude
of the estimated effect is rather small.
The results discussed thus far have been derived under various assumptions and practi-
cal considerations regarding the appropriateness of the weighting schemes and the selection
of years reported. To provide an overview on the impact of these choices on the key out-
comes, Table 6 displays estimates for our coefficients of interest for a number of different
specifications and cross-sections.
With regard to the different weighting schemes, we note that usingWD15, WD15INV ,
WN10 and WN10INV results in very large estimates of λτ compared to WD15P and
WN10P . This is well in line with our expectations, as the variation in τ−i tends to
be low (recall that, with the weight matrix approaching a matrix of uniform weights for
all other municipalities, τ−i becomes a constant measuring the average tax rate among
all communities). Note that for our system of equations to be stable, λτ is required to
be smaller than one in absolute value. There are two estimations based on the 2004
cross-section where this requirement is barely met, adding further doubt regarding the
appropriateness of weighting schemes that define ‘large’ sets of neighbors and that do not
account for the municipalities’ relative population size. It is also worth mentioning that
the estimate for the interaction effect in public input provision, ϕP , is much more robust
to changes regarding the weighting scheme. Noting that the variation in spending on
infrastructure is much higher than the variation in tax rates, and that defining composite
neighbor jurisdictions from a large set of communities should therefore be less of a technical
problem, it is reassuring that the conclusions regarding public input competition are not
affected by the choice of a weighting scheme that defines either smaller or larger sets of
neighbors.
5.3 Conclusions
The empirical literature on local governments competing for mobile capital has thus far
focused on the role of the tax rate, thereby neglecting the fact that governments may also
try to attract private investment by the provision of public inputs to production. This
paper is an attempt to overcome this deficiency. We derive general reaction functions
from a standard model of tax and public input competition and estimate an empirical
counterpart of the system of fiscal reaction functions. Based on a rich data set of 1100
German municipalities, we employ the spatial system estimator developed by Kelejian
and Prucha (2004). The estimator allows for the joint determination of a municipality’s
business tax rate and the level of spending on the local road network and for general
interaction effects across equations.
Our main findings suggest that the behavior of local jurisdictions is much more com-
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plex than described by the earlier empirical literature on fiscal competition. In particular,
the estimation results of our system of interrelated equations show that the municipalities
engage in simultaneous tax and public input competition. Firstly, in accordance with
earlier research, in particular Buettner (2001), we find a positive and significant direct
interaction effect in the local business tax rate. Municipalities facing competition from
low-tax jurisdictions thus set lower taxes than municipalities with high-tax neighbors. Sec-
ondly, the local governments also adjust their level of spending on infrastructure towards
the average level among neighboring jurisdictions. For our preferred specifications, the
direct interaction effect in public input provision is statistically different from zero in 10
out of 14 cross-sections, and it tends to be larger than the direct interaction effect in taxes.
Moreover, treating taxes and public inputs as alternative means to attract capital reveals
that the municipalities react to competition in a rather flexible way. If neighbors lower
their taxes, a municipality not only adjusts its own tax rate, but also increases its level
of public input provision. Finally, we have demonstrated that our results depend on the
choice of the spatial weighting scheme in a predictable way, and that all main results are
robust across various cross-sections.
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
This book sheds further light on the functioning of federal systems and, in particular,
the impact of fiscal equalisation on subnational public finances. Both the theoretical and
empirical analyses presented herein indicate that the efficiency consequences of intergov-
ernmental transfers in the presence of competition for mobile tax bases are more complex
than suggested by the existing literature. To date, theoretical analyses have dealt with
the impact of fiscal equalisation transfers on local tax policy putting forward the argu-
ment that capacity-based equalisation schemes work as corrective devices for inefficiencies
arising from decentralised tax setting (e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart,
2006). In particular, they find that, if intergovernmental transfers are inversely related
to a jurisdiction’s tax base, local governments are induced to increase their tax effort and
provide a higher level of public goods. In the case of full equalisation of tax bases this
leads to efficient decentralised tax policies. Recent empirical work provides evidence for
the existence of an incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on local tax policies (e.g.,
Buettner, 2006; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2007).
However, a theoretical analysis by Keen and Marchand (1997) suggests that inefficien-
cies in local public finances resulting from fiscal competition for mobile tax bases are not
limited to the revenue side of the budget. Using a standard model of interjurisdictional
fiscal competition, they show that, if governments, in addition to public consumption,
provide a public input to production which attracts local investment, the local spend-
ing mix tends to be biased towards a relative overprovision of the prodactivity-enhancing
public good. Therefore, inefficiencies resulting from local fiscal competition occur both
on the revenue and expenditure side. The analyses presented in chapters 3 and 4 of this
book start from this result. We extend the model used in Keen and Marchand (1997)
by implementing a system of intergovernmental transfers to analyse the impact of fiscal
equalisation transfers on local spending policies. Our theory suggests, that, similar to the
case of pure tax competition, capacity-based equalisation induces governments to allevi-
ate public input competition for the mobile tax base. More concretely, local governments
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increasingly rebalance their budget towards a higher share of public consumption as the
degree of redistribution within the equalisation scheme rises. The mechanism behind this
result is that a higher degree of equalisation will make it less attractive for the individ-
ual jurisdiction to provide public inputs as positive tax base effects are redistributed to
a higher extent among governments within the federation. This induces an internalisa-
tion of fiscal externalities at the local level which generates incentives for governments to
substitute public input provision by public consumption. If tax bases are fully equalised,
local spending policies turn out to be efficient. The empirical analyses in chapters 3 and
4 provide strong evidence for this incentive effect of fiscal equalisation transfers on local
spending policies, both for the state as well as the local government level in Germany.
Overall, the theoretical literature on the ”internalising” impact of capacity-based fiscal
equalisation schemes suggests that such transfer systems tend to increase the efficiency
of local public finances, therefore serving both equity and efficiency objectives. However,
when judging the actual welfare effects of fiscal equalisation one has to take into account
the fact that government objectives play a crucial role. Therefore, if one deviates from
the assumption that benevolent governments seek to maximise residents’ utility, political
economy aspects come into play. The public choice literature, for example, argues that
tax competition may well increase welfare, as the size of government might be excessive
in the absence of such competition. In such a scenario, capacity-based equalisation would
alleviate beneficial competitive behavior and actually reduce welfare. A recent theoretical
analysis by Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) puts forward the argument that equalisation
programs can lead to perverse fiscal incentives if political accountability is reduced. This
may hold true, especialy in countries characterised by a pronounced fiscal federalism such
as Germany. Therefore, taking into account political incentives and possible inefficiencies
in the public sector when analysing institutional issues in a fiscal competition context
deserves further attention. In addition, the specific design of federal systems is of critically
importance when judging the welfare effects of redistributive grant systems. Our analysis
presented in chapter 2 suggests that in a multi-level government setting, deviations in
the objectives of upper and lower level governments tend to undermine the efficiency-
improving impact of equalisation transfers. We provide first evidence on the interrelation
of state and local public finances for the case of the German federation, however further
research should be devoted to the investigation of federal systems and the impact of their
design on local public finances.
Finally, our empirical analysis in chapter 5 provides evidence on the existence of si-
multaneous tax and public input competition among local governments in Germany. Our
application extends the canonical empirical model of tax competition to account for public
inputs as a second policy instrument. While our results suggest that local governments act
in a competitive way when setting their tax and expenditure policies, it would be interest-
ing to further explore empirically the nature of this competition observed in the data. In
101
particular, future empirical work should attempt to differentiate between different models
and provide evidence on the question of whether local governments in Germany actually
engage in fiscal competition for mobile tax bases or, alternatively, in political ”yardstick
competition”.
Appendices
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Appendix A: Mathematical appendix
A.1: Equivalence of (2.4) and (2.9)
Since ∂τi∂ϑi 6= 0, the expression in brackets in (2.9) must be zero in an optimum. Computing
∂V 2
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂zi
(
ki + (τi − ϑi) (∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+
∑
j 6=i
αj
∂v
∂zj
(τj − ϑj) ∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi

and using αi ∂v∂zi = αj
∂v
∂zj
= λ2 for all i, j, condition (2.9) is so equivalent to
−ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ2
(
ki + (τi − ϑi) (∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
(1)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ2
∑
j 6=i
(τj − ϑj) ∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
+ λ2
ϑi∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 != 0
Close inspection of (1) reveals that the terms involving the contribution rates ϑi and ϑj
cancel out. Hence, since from (2.7), λ2 = αi ∂v∂zi = αj
∂v
∂zj
for all i, j, we are back with the
first best optimality condition (2.4).
A.2: Calculation of the optimal contribution rate
Inserting the optimality condition from the perspective of the individual jurisdiction (2.5)
in (2.4), using sj = kj for all j, dividing by αi ∂v∂zi = αj
∂v
∂zj
> 0, and observing that in the
symmetric situation, τj = τ for all j, we obtain
ϑi
(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
= −τ
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
.
Differentiating the capital market equilibrium condition with respect to τi, one finds
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
=
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
−
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
.
Thus,
ϑi = τ
(
1−
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
− ∑j 6=i ∂kj∂r ∂r∂τi
)
.
Notice that in the symmetric situation, ∂kj∂r is identical for all jurisdictions j, say
∂k
∂r . Then,
dividing the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in the bracket by ∂r∂τi 6= 0 and
multiplying both by rnk yields ϑi = ϑ
∗ as in (2.10).
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A.3: The budgetary effect of public input provision
In order to derive the budgetary effects of a marginal increase in the budgetary share of
the public input, λi, one has to apply the implicit function theorem to the government
budget constraint which can be rewritten as follows
bi − τ¯φ(r + τ¯ , λibi)− gi = 0 (2)
Implicit differentiation w.r.t λi yields
dbi
dλi
=
τ¯ ∂ki∂Pi bi
1− τ¯ ∂ki∂Piλi
=
τ¯ bi(
∂ki
∂Pi
)−1 − τ¯λi . (3)
Substituting ∂ki∂Pi =
β
1−αkiP
−1
i in (3) then leaves us with
dbi
dλi
=
τ¯ bi
1−α
β Pik
−1
i − τ¯λi
. (4)
Therefore, in order to ensure that dbidλi > 0, the denominator of (4) must have a positive
sign ,i.e. τ¯λi < 1−αβ Pik
−1
i . Further rearrangements yield the following condition
gi > τ¯ki
(
(α+ β)− 1
1− α
)
. (5)
As our assumptions regarding the production technology imply that (α+β) ≤ 1, gi > 0 is
a sufficient condition for dbidλi > 0 to hold, i.e. federal grants need to play a role in financing
local public good provision.
A.4: Analytical separation of income and incentive effects
In order to derive the budget-compensated effect of a marginal increase in the marginal
contribution rate we first calculate the overall derivative of the implicit function Γ w.r.t.
yi and ϑi:
Γyi =
∂bi
∂yi
[(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+
(α+ β)− 1
1− α kiβP
β−2
i λi
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
− v′′(1− λi)
(
bi − (1− λi) ∂bi
∂λi
)]
(6)
+
∂2bi
∂λi∂yi
[
λi
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+ v′
]
Γϑi =
∂bi
∂ϑi
[(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+
(α+ β)− 1
1− α kiβP
β−2
i λi
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
− v′′(1− λi)
(
bi − (1− λi) ∂bi
∂λi
)]
(7)
+
∂2bi
∂λi∂ϑi
[
λi
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+ v′
]
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Note that, as explained in further detail in section 3.1, an increase in the marginal contri-
bution rate induces both, an income and an incentive effect. Therefore, the next step is to
analytically separate these two effects. First, we need to compute the budgetary impacts
of variations in yi and ϑi
∂bi
∂yi
= η
(
∂ki
∂Pi
)−1
and ∂bi∂ϑi = −ki
∂bi
∂yi
,
where η = 11−α
β
k−1i Pi−(τ¯−ϑi)λi
> 0 if yi ≥ 01. Moreover, the cross derivatives read
∂2bi
∂λi∂yi
= η
[
∂bi
∂yi
(
(τ¯ − ϑi)− 1−(α+β)β ∂bi∂λi
λi
ki
)]
and
∂2bi
∂λi∂ϑi
= η
[
−bi + ∂bi∂ϑi
(
(τ¯ − ϑi)− 1−(α+β)β ∂bi∂λi
λi
ki
)]
Using these derivatives, we can now transform equation (7) as follows:
Γϑi = −ηbi
[
λi
(
kαi βP
β−1
i − v′
)
+ v′
]
− kiΓyi (8)
A.4: Implicit differentiation of the local government budget constraint
In order to derive the budgetary effects of marginal variations in the policy parameters
τi and λi, one has to apply the implicit function theorem to the local government budget
constraint which can be rewritten as follows.
bi − (τ − ϑi)φ(r + τ, λibi)− yi = 0 (9)
Implicit differentiation w.r.t τi and λi yields
dbi
dτi
=
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
1− (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂Piλi
, (10)
dbi
dλi
=
(τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂Pi bi
1− (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂Piλi
. (11)
It follows from optimality condition 4.5 that ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi > 0. Therefore, in order to
show that dbidτi > 0 and
dbi
dλi
> 0, it must hold that 1 − (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂Piλi > 0. This can be
shown by substituting ∂ki∂Pi =
β
1−αkiP
−1
i and rearranging which leaves us with
yi > (τi − ϑi) ki
(
(α+ β)− 1
1− α
)
. (12)
Therefore, as our assumptions regarding the production technology imply that (α+β) ≤ 1,
yi > 0 is a sufficient condition for dbidτi > 0 and
dbi
dλi
> 0 to hold, i.e. federal grants need to
play a role in financing local public good provision.
1This can be shown analogous to the calculations in Appendix A.3.
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A.5: Derivation of optimality condition 4.5
In order to derive the optimality condition 4.5 both first order conditions, (4.3) and (4.4),
are solved for
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′) and then equated. This yields
v′ =
ki
∂bi
∂τi
+ λi
ki
bi
∂bi
∂λi
∂bi
∂τi
. (13)
The next step is to substitute ∂bi∂τi =
ki+(τi−ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
1−(τi−ϑi) ∂ki∂Pi λi
and ∂bi∂λi =
(τi−ϑi) ∂ki∂Pi bi
1−(τi−ϑi) ∂ki∂Pi λi
which, after
rearrangement, leaves us with
v′ =
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
(
1 +
(τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂Piλi
1− (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂Piλi
)(
1− (τi − ϑi) ∂ki
∂Pi
λi
)
(14)
=
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
.
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Appendix B: Data Sources and Definitions
B.1: Chapter 2
The basic dataset consists of annual data for Germany in the period 1975 until 2003. Data
for the former East German states are only available from 1991 onwards.
The detailed expenditure data, population data and data on state specific un-
employment rates are obtained from the German federal statistical office (Statistisches
Bundesamt). Federal matching rates (university construction) are taken from the ”34.
Rahmenplan fu¨r den Hochschulbau nach dem Hochschulbaufo¨rderungsgesetz 2005-2008”.
Fiscal equalisation transfers, marginal contribution rates and relative fiscal ca-
pacity are obtained from a full implementation of the fiscal equalisation law and further
relevant statutory definitions for each year in the period 1975-2003 (a description of the
system is given in Appendix C). Federal fiscal equalisation rules (Finanzausgleichsgesetz
- FAG) are obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt. Data for calculating fiscal capacity
(Finanzkraftmesszahl) and fiscal need (Ausgleichsmesszahl) are taken from the annual en-
actments to implement the fiscal equalisation law (Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung
des Gesetzes u¨ber den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und La¨ndern in den Ausgleichs-
jahren 1975 - 2003). These enactments are also obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt.
Data on federal grants (Sonderbedarfs-Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen) are taken from
the FAG. Relative fiscal capacity is defined as the ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need.
The information on the partisan composition of state governments are obtained
from http://www.election.de/.
B.2: Chapter 3
The underlying dataset consists of annual data for Germany in the period 1980 until 2003.
Data for the former East German states are incorporated as of 1995. The detailed data on
the composition of state spending, the population data and the data on state specific
unemployment rates are obtained from the German federal statistical office (Statistis-
ches Bundesamt). Fiscal equalisation transfers, marginal contribution rates and
relative fiscal capacity are obtained from a full implementation of the fiscal equalisa-
tion law and further relevant statutory definitions for each year in the period 1980-2003.
Federal fiscal equalisation rules (Finanzausgleichsgesetz - FAG) are obtained from the
Bundesgesetzblatt. Data for calculating the states’ fiscal capacity (Finanzkraftmesszahl)
and fiscal need (Ausgleichsmesszahl) are taken from the annual enactments to implement
the fiscal equalisation law (Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung des Gesetzes u¨ber den
Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und La¨ndern in den Ausgleichsjahren 1980 - 2003). These
enactments are also obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt. The relative fiscal capacity
is defined as the ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need. Data on the special requirement
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transfers (”Sonderbedarfs-Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen”) are taken from the FAG. The
information on the partisan composition of state governments are obtained from
http://www.election.de/.
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